

Sent Via Email

January 19, 2022

Senate and Governmental Affairs Committee
Louisiana State Senate
P.O. Box 94183
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
s&g@legis.la.gov

House and Governmental Affairs Committee
Louisiana House of Representatives
Box 94062
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
h&ga@legis.la.gov

Re: Compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in State Legislative Redistricting

Dear Chairman Stefanski, Chair Hewitt, and Other Members of the House and Senate Governmental Affairs Committees:

The American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., NAACP Louisiana State Conference, Power Coalition for Equity and Justice, Black Voters Matter Fund, Urban League of Louisiana, Fair Districts Louisiana, Louisiana Progress, Southern Poverty Law Center Action Fund, Campaign Legal Center, Voice of the Experienced (VOTE), Voters Organized to Educate, League of Women Voters of Louisiana, Louisiana Budget Project, and E Pluribus Unum write to remind you of

your affirmative obligation to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“Section 2”) during this reapportionment and redistricting cycle when preparing new maps for the Louisiana State Legislature, made-up of the Louisiana House of Representatives and Louisiana Senate. In particular, we urge you to consider the State’s Section 2 obligations, including whether Section 2 requires this body to enact additional opportunity single-member districts comprised of a majority of Black voters (“majority-minority opportunity district”).

Section 2 requires the redistricting body to ensure that voters of color have an equal opportunity “to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice.”¹ Currently, only 25.69 % of the members of the State Legislature are Black.² Of these Black legislative members all but one are elected from single-member majority-minority districts. It is fair, necessary, and logical that Black Louisianans—who, according to the 2020 Census data, comprise nearly one-third of Louisiana’s residents³—have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice through additional majority-minority districts. Members of State Legislature make decisions and policies that impact every aspect of life in Louisiana, including access to education, economic opportunity, housing, health care, and criminal justice. Under the current House of Representatives and Senate maps, Louisiana’s Black voters are severely underrepresented. Adding a number of new majority-minority opportunity districts, which Section 2 likely requires, would provide Black voters with representation to address the state’s pervasive and ongoing record of inequality of opportunity in various aspects of life.

I. Introduction

During the new redistricting session, in February, the State Legislature will redraw district maps for Louisiana’s State Legislature based on data from the 2020 census, and your committees play an important role in that process.⁴ Currently just 37 out of the 144 (25.69%) members of the Louisiana Legislature are Black even though Black residents comprise 33.1% of the State’s population.⁵ This is a direct consequence of the configuration of Louisiana’s legislative districts. Under the current state legislative maps, Black voters in Louisiana have less opportunity to elect candidates of their choice than white voters. Louisiana’s new State Legislature

¹ *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986) (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)).

² See La. House of Representatives, *Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus*, https://house.louisiana.gov/H_Reps/H_Reps_Caucus_LLBC (last visited Jan. 18, 2022); see also *Adrian Fisher*, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Adrian_Fisher (last visited Jan. 18, 2022); *Louisiana House of Representatives District 102*, Ballotpedia,

³ The source of this data is the 2021 P.L. 94-171 Restricting Data released by the Census Bureau and accessible at data.census.gov.

⁴ Legislature maps are drawn by the State Legislature and subject to gubernatorial veto. La. Const. art. iii, § 6 (1974).

⁵ The source of this data is the 2021 P.L. 94-171 Restricting Data released by the Census Bureau and accessible at data.census.gov.

maps must adequately represent the State's growing Black population and adequately account for demographic changes within the State.

It is critical that the State Legislature uses this session to remedy long-standing dilution of Black voting strength in Louisiana's State Legislature. Failure to do so would likely further entrench and exacerbate vote dilution over the next 10 years given the State's steadily growing Black population. According to the new Census data the number of Black people in Louisiana increased by 3.78%.⁶ And the total number of Black Louisiana residents over the age of 18—the Black Voting Age Population (“BVAP”)—increased by 7.21%.⁷ Furthermore, although Louisiana's total population grew modestly since 2010, this growth has not been uniform throughout the State and was driven by growth in minority populations that offset a 6.3% *decrease* in the State's white population. For example, per the 2020 Census data, in the Shreveport area (including Bossier, Caddo, and De Soto Parishes) the overall population decreased by 1.3% but the region's Black population *grew* by 2.14%.⁸ In the Lake Charles area (including Calcasieu and Cameron Parishes), since 2010, the overall population decreased by 11.42% but the Black population *grew* by 19.12%.⁹ The Legislature must ensure that these communities are fairly and accurately represented by the new House and Senate districts, even as many districts must be reapportioned due to overall population loss.

II. The State Legislature Has an Obligation to Comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in Redistricting.

The Louisiana Legislature has an affirmative obligation to comply with the Voting Rights Act in the redistricting process. In particular, Section 2 requires the redistricting body to ensure that voters of color have an equal opportunity “to participate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice,” taking into consideration the state or locality's demographics, voting patterns, and other circumstances.¹⁰ A chief purpose of Section 2 is to prohibit minority vote dilution at all levels of government.¹¹

A district map may violate Section 2 when it dilutes the voting power of voters of color, including by “packing” Black voters into districts where they constitute an unnecessary large percentage of the voting population, which deprives them of the opportunity to elect candidates of choice in other districts.¹² Section 2 prohibits

⁶ See *supra* n. 5.

⁷ See *supra* n. 5.

⁸ See *supra* n. 5.

⁹ See *supra* n. 5.

¹⁰ *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 34 (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)).

¹¹ See *St. Bernard Citizens For Better Gov't v. St. Bernard Par. Sch. Bd.*, No. CIV.A. 02-2209, 2002 WL 2022589, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2002); *Fifth Ward Precinct 1A Coal. & Progressive Ass'n v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd.*, No. CIV.A. 86-2963, 1989 WL 3801, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 18, 1989).

¹² See *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 46, n.11.

minority vote dilution regardless of whether a plan was adopted with a discriminatory purpose.¹³ Indeed, Section 2 outlaws redistricting plans that result in a reduced ability of voters of color to elect candidates of their choice.

In *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court set forth three preconditions for assessing whether a districting plan or voting system has resulted in vote dilution. The three “*Gingles* preconditions” are whether (1) an alternative districting plan can be drawn that includes one or more single-member districts in which the minority community is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in the district; (2) the minority group is politically cohesive in its support for its preferred candidates; and (3) in the absence of majority-minority districts, candidates preferred by the minority group would usually be defeated due to the political cohesion of non-minority voters in support of different candidates.¹⁴ Together, the second and third *Gingles* preconditions are commonly referred to as racial bloc or racially polarized voting (“RPV”).¹⁵ The presence of RPV is key evidence of the need to remedy racial vote dilution, as discussed below.

If these three *Gingles* preconditions are met, a decisionmaker must then evaluate the “totality of circumstances” to determine whether minority voters “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”¹⁶ Courts consider several factors to determine whether the minority vote has been diluted impermissibly.¹⁷ It will be “only the very unusual case in which the plaintiffs can establish the existence of the three *Gingles* factors but still have failed to establish a violation of § 2 under the totality of circumstances.”¹⁸

¹³ *Id.* at 35.

¹⁴ *Id.* at 50-1.

¹⁵ Racially polarized voting occurs when different racial groups vote for different candidates. In a racially polarized election, for example, Black people vote together for their preferred (frequently Black) candidate, and most non-Black voters vote for the opposing (typically white) candidate.

¹⁶ 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); *League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry*, 548 U.S. 399, 425 (2006).

¹⁷ Courts examine the “totality of the circumstances” based on the so-called “Senate Factors,” named for the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments in which they were first laid out. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 43–45. The Senate Factors are: (1) the extent of any history of discrimination related to voting; (2) the extent to which voting is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision uses voting practices that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination; (4) whether minority candidates have access to candidate slating processes; (5) the extent to which minority voters bear the effects of discrimination in areas of life like education, housing, and economic opportunity; (6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; (7) the extent to which minority people have been elected to public office; (8) whether elected officials are responsive to the needs of minority residents; and (9) whether the policy underlying the voting plan is tenuous. *Id.* at 36–37. However, “there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other.” *Id.* at 45 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982)).

¹⁸ *Clark v. Calhoun Cnty., Miss.*, 21 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting *Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.*, 4 F.3d. 1103, 1135 (3d Cir. 1993)).

III. New State Legislature Maps Similar to the Current Maps Likely Violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

a. *Gingles* Precondition One: It Is Possible to Draw State Legislature Maps with Additional Majority-Minority Opportunity Districts

It is possible to draw additional majority-minority opportunity districts in both Senate and the House of Representatives. Attached as **Appendix 1 and 2** are illustrative maps for the Louisiana Senate and the House of Representatives. These maps are based on 2020 Census data, and demonstrate that additional majority-minority opportunity districts can be drawn in both the Senate and the House, achieving compliance with the Voting Rights Act. The provided maps illustrate just two possible ways to draw maps that follow traditional redistricting principals²⁰ and meaningfully expand the number of majority-minority opportunity districts. There are countless other potential district configurations of both the Senate and the House that would add a significant number of new majority-minority opportunity districts where the BVAP is the numerical majority,²¹ the Black voting community is geographically compact, and the share of Black majority-minority opportunity districts would fairly reflect the State's population and demographics.

The illustrative Senate map, at **Appendix 1**, demonstrates 14 majority-minority opportunity districts, adding four new majority-minority opportunity districts. In this illustrative plan, BVAP within each of the four new majority-minority opportunity districts is sufficiently large and geographically compact to satisfy *Gingles*' first precondition. This illustrative plan provides 14 majority-minority opportunity districts where the BVAP is over 50%.

The illustrative House of Representatives map, at **Appendix 2**, demonstrates 38 majority-minority opportunity districts, adding nine new majority-minority opportunity districts. Within each of the nine new majority-minority opportunity districts in the illustrative plan, BVAP is sufficiently large and geographically compact to satisfy *Gingles*' first precondition. The illustrative State House map provides 38 majority-minority opportunity districts where the BVAP is over 50%.

Moreover, as compared to the current map, both illustrative maps include more geographically compact communities of Black voters, as reflected by traditional

²⁰ Traditional Redistricting Principles include population equality, non-dilution of minority voting strength, respect for consideration of communities of interest, compactness and contiguity of districts, and other considerations.

²¹ The Supreme Court has held that a minority community is sufficiently large when it "make[s] up more than 50 percent of the voting-age population in the relevant geographical area." *Bartlett*, 556 U.S. at 18.

redistricting principles.²² For example, the illustrative Senate map has fewer overall parish and precinct splits than the current map, and the overall average of the widely recognized statistical measures of compactness of the illustrative Senate map are better than the current map.²³ The most of the majority-minority opportunity districts on the illustrative Senate map also have better compactness scores for two of the widely accepted measures than the current map. And overall, the compactness measures of four new majority-minority opportunity districts are better than, or essentially the same, as that of the current map.

Similarly, the illustrative House map has fewer overall parish and precinct splits than the current map; and the overall average of the widely recognized statistical measures of compactness of the illustrative House map are better than the current map. Additionally, more than half of the majority-minority opportunity districts of the illustrative House map have better compactness scores for two of the widely used measures than the current map. And overall, the compactness measures for the nine new majority-minority opportunity districts are better than, or essentially the same, as that of the current map.²⁴

As shown by the illustrative maps, it is possible to draw a House map with 38 majority-Black districts. Similarly, the Senate map could contain 14 majority-Black districts. Because the State Legislature could create House and Senate maps that both comport with traditional districting criteria and contain more majority-minority opportunity districts, the first *Gingles* precondition would likely be satisfied if Louisiana’s new State Legislature maps fail to provide a significant number of additional majority-minority opportunity districts.²⁵

²² *League of United Latin Am. Citizens*, 548 U.S. at 433 (“While no precise rule has emerged governing § 2 compactness, the inquiry should take into account traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).

²³ See, e.g., Compactness Reports for Illustrative Maps (on file with ACLU).

²⁴ While the illustrative maps reflect improvements in compactness, it should be noted that the Louisiana State Legislature Redistricting Criteria requires compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and only requires consideration of compactness concerns to the “extent practicable.” Therefore, the State Legislature should not prioritize compactness over compliance with Section 2 when creating new State Legislative maps. See House Concurrent Resolution No. 90, Joint Rule No. 21. Redistricting Criteria (2021).

²⁵ See *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50.

b. *Gingles* Preconditions Two and Three: Louisiana Elections Reflect Racially Polarized Voting Patterns.

There is ample evidence to suggest that the second and third *Gingles* preconditions are satisfied due to Louisiana’s well-documented history and ongoing record of racially polarized voting in elections across the state.²⁶

Over the past three decades, numerous federal courts have found that racially polarized voting pervades Louisiana statewide and local elections.²⁷ In the past two decades, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has sued local parishes under Section 2 three times; in each case, the DOJ identified racially polarized voting patterns within the parish.²⁸

The 2020 congressional elections similarly reflected racially polarized voting patterns. For instance, in the five districts comprised of a majority of white voters, there were four contests in which voters had a choice between Black and white congressional candidates. In each, the majority of white voters elected white

²⁶ *Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, La.*, 834 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Racial bloc voting is the linchpin of a § 2 vote dilution claim”); *McMillan v. Escambia County*, 748 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[RPV] will ordinarily be the keystone of a dilution case”); *see also Clark v. Calhoun County, Miss.*, 88 F.3d 1393, 1397 (5th Cir. 1996); *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15; *Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego*, 946 F.2d 1109, 1122 (5th Cir. 1991).

²⁷ A district court recently found that there was sufficient preliminary evidence of racially polarized voting statewide to support plaintiffs’ challenge to Louisiana’s Supreme Court district map. *La. State Conf. of NAACP v. Louisiana*, 490 F. Supp. 3d 982, 1019 (M.D. La. 2020). In *St. Bernard Citizens For Better Government*, the district court found racially polarized voting patterns in statewide gubernatorial elections, as well as local parish elections. 2002 WL 2022589, at *7. *See e.g., Terrebonne Par. Branch NAACP v. Jindal*, 274 F. Supp. 3d 395, 436–37 (M.D. La. 2017), *rev’d sub nom. Fusilier v. Landry*, 963 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2020) (The district court found that there were racially polarized voting patterns in the parish’s judicial elections, and although the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, it held that the district court did not err in its finding of racially polarized voting); *Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, La.*, 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1124 (E.D. La. 1986); *Major v. Treen*, 574 F. Supp. 325, 337 (E.D. La. 1983) (The court held that there was racial polarization in Orleans Parish).

²⁸ Most recently, in 2021, the DOJ sued the City of West Monroe under Section 2 over its at-large alderman elections. The DOJ contended that there was racially polarized voting sufficient to satisfy *Gingles* because “[i]n contests between Black candidates and White candidates for West Monroe Board of Alderman and other parish, state, and federal positions, White voters cast their ballots sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” The court agreed and entered a consent decree between the parties. Complaint at ¶ 17, *United States v. City of West Monroe*, No. 3:21-cv-0988 (W.D. La. Apr. 14, 2021); *see also* Complaint at ¶ 11, *United States v. City of Morgan*, No. 00-cv-1541 (W.D. La. June 27, 2000) (“Racially polarized voting patterns prevail in elections for the City Council of Morgan City. In contests between [B]lack and white candidates for City Council, [B]lack voters consistently vote for [B]lack candidates and white voters vote sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the [B]lack voters’ candidates of choice.”); Answer & Cross-Claim at ¶ 31, *Greig v. City of St. Martinville*, No. 6:00-cv-00603 (W.D. La. Jun. 2, 2000) (The DOJ asserted that “[e]lections in the City of St. Martinville are racially polarized.”).

candidates, defeating the Black candidates.²⁹ Furthermore, as noted, currently only one of the 37 Black members of the Louisiana Legislature is from a district that is not a single-member majority-minority district. There is ample evidence to support the conclusion that there are racially polarized voting patterns that may satisfy *Gingles* preconditions two and three.

c. Totality of Circumstances: Louisiana’s Voters of Color Have Less Opportunity to Elect Candidates of Their Choice.

In addition to the indicia of the three *Gingles* preconditions, under the “totality of circumstances,” Black voters have “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice” in Louisiana’s State Legislature elections.³⁰ Several of the Senate Factors³¹ strongly indicate that vote dilution is occurring, including: the extent of the history of voting discrimination in Louisiana (Factor 1); the extent of racially polarized voting in Louisiana (Factor 2); the extent to which Louisiana has used various voting practices that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against Black voters (Factor 3); the extent to which Black voters bear the effects of discrimination in a variety of areas of life (Factor 5); whether political campaigns in Louisiana have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals (Factor 6); and the extent to which Black candidates have been elected to public office in Louisiana (Factor 7). No set of number of these factors need to be established.³² Senate factors Two and Seven are the most significant³³ and the evidence of them in Louisiana is indisputable. The following are a sample of the indicia under the totality of circumstances impacting Black voters’ ability to participate equally in Louisiana’s State Legislature elections:

Senate Factor 1:

- The state of Louisiana has an extensive history and ongoing record of voting discrimination that has touched upon the right of Black and other minority voters, to register to vote, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the political process.³⁴ From Reconstruction to present day, Louisiana has passed countless laws to deny Black democratic participation, including

²⁹ See *United States Congressional Delegations from Louisiana*, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_congressional_delegations_from_Louisiana (last visited Sep. 1, 2021).

³⁰ *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 36-37.

³¹ See *id.*

³² *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 45.

³³ *Id.* at 48 n.15.

³⁴ *St. Bernard Citizens For Better Gov’t*, 2002 WL 2022589, at *9 (quoting *Citizens for a Better Gretna*, 636 F. Supp. at 1116) (“The history of black citizens’ attempts, in Louisiana since Reconstruction, to participate effectively in the political process and the white majority’s resistance to those efforts is one characterized by both *de jure* and *de facto* discrimination. Indeed, it would take a multi-volumed treatise to properly describe the persistent, and often violent, intimidation visited by white citizens upon black efforts to participate in Louisiana’s political process.”)

grandfather clauses, poll taxes, and educational and property qualifications.³⁵

- Louisiana has a long history and ongoing record of using various voting practices, such as at-large elections and redistricting to dilute the weight of Black Louisianans' vote once they cast them. From the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 until the Supreme Court's *Shelby County v. Holder* decision in 2013, the DOJ blocked nearly 150 voting related changes, including many vote dilution as well as vote denial schemes, in Louisiana pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.³⁶ Most recently, the DOJ successfully challenged the City of West Monroe's at-large alderman elections under Section 2.³⁷
- Louisiana's statewide district maps have been challenged under the Voting Rights Act in numerous reapportionment cycles since 1965.³⁸ District 2, Louisiana's only majority-minority Congressional district, was established in 1983, after the 1981 reapportionment cycle, when a federal district court held that the 1981 proposed congressional map diluted Black voting power in Orleans Parish by dispersing the parish's Black majority into two different congressional districts.³⁹

Senate Factor 2:

- As noted above, there is indicia of stark patterns of RPV throughout the State.

Senate Factor 5:

- Black Louisianans continue to experience the brunt of racial discrimination in every sector of public life. Black Louisianans experience higher unemployment rates than white Louisianans. Unemployment data from early 2021 shows that Black people were unemployed at a rate of 9%,

³⁵ Debo P. Adegbile, *Voting Rights in Louisiana: 1982–2006*, 17 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 413, 416–418 (2008).

³⁶ See *Voting Determination Letters for Louisiana*, U.S. Dep't of Just., <https://www.justice.gov/crt/voting-determination-letters-louisiana> (last visited Jan. 18, 2022).

³⁷ See *United States v. City of West Monroe*, No. 3:21-cv-0988 (W.D. La. Apr. 14, 2021).

³⁸ See *Louisiana House of Representatives v. Ashcroft*, No. 02-0062 (D.D.C. May 21, 2003) (challenge to congressional redistricting after the 2000 census); *Hays v. Louisiana*, 936 F. Supp. 360, 362–68 (W.D. La. 1996) (challenge to congressional redistricting after 1990 Census); *Major v. Treen*, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983) (challenge to congressional redistricting after 1980 Census); *Bussie v. Governor of La.*, 333 F. Supp. 452, 454, 463 (E.D. La. 1971) (challenge to state legislative redistricting after 1970 Census).

³⁹ See *Major*, 574 F. Supp. at 327. Although this case predated *Gingles*, the district court found that racially polarized voting, combined with “Louisiana’s history of racial discrimination, both *de jure* and *de facto*, continue to have an adverse effect on the ability of its [B]lack residents to participate fully in the electoral process.” *Id.* at 339-40.

compared to 4.6% for white people.⁴⁰ Black Louisianans also experience socioeconomic disparities as a result of systemic discrimination. In 2019, 29.4% of Black people lived below the poverty line, compared to 12.5% of white people.⁴¹ Health disparities also persist among Black Louisianans as compared to white Louisianans. Although only one-third of Louisiana's population, Black people accounted for more than 70% of the people who died of COVID-19.⁴²

Senate Factor 6:

- Louisiana political campaigns have been characterized by subtle and overt racial appeals impacting the political process. David Duke, the former grand wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, has run for public office in Louisiana several times; most recently, in 2016, he unsuccessfully ran for U.S. Senate to “defend the heritage of European American people.”⁴³ Even with his explicit ties to white supremacy, he received over 58 thousand votes.⁴⁴ Current U.S. Representative for Louisiana's first congressional district, Steve Scalise, spoke to a white supremacist group in 2002 while serving as a Louisiana state legislator.⁴⁵ In 2018, a white Tangipahoa School Board Member and candidate for reelection posted a picture of a noose on Facebook with the caption “IF WE WANT TO MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE EVIL PEOPLE FEAR PUNISHMENT AGAIN.”⁴⁶
- In 2001, the St. Bernard Parish School Board was sued under Section 2 for its redistricting plan that eliminated the only district where Black voters

⁴⁰ *State Unemployment by Race and Ethnicity*, Econ. Pol'y Inst., <https://www.epi.org/indicators/state-unemployment-race-ethnicity/> (last updated Nov. 2021).

⁴¹ *Poverty Rate by Race/Ethnicity*, KFF, <https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/poverty-rate-by-raceethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D> (last visited Jan. 18, 2022).

⁴² Tegan Wendland, *Black Communities Are Hit Hardest by COVID-19 in Louisiana and Elsewhere*, WWNO - New Orleans Pub. Radio, (Apr. 6, 2020), <https://www.wnno.org/latest-news/2020-04-06/black-communities-are-hit-hardest-by-covid-19-in-louisiana-and-elsewhere>.

⁴³ Camila Domonoske, *Former KKK Leader David Duke Says ‘Of Course’ Trump Voters Are His Voters*, NPR, (Aug. 5, 2016), <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/08/05/488802494/former-kkk-leader-david-duke-says-of-course-trump-voters-are-his-voters>.

⁴⁴ *United States Senate election in Louisiana, 2016*, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_Senate_election_in_Louisiana,_2016 (last accessed Sep. 1, 2021).

⁴⁵ Dan Roberts, *Senior Republican Steve Scalise spoke at white supremacist meeting in 2002*, The Guardian, (Dec. 30, 2014), <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/29/senior-republican-steve-scalise-spoke-at-white-supremacist-meeting-in-2002>.

⁴⁶ Caroline Grueskin, *Tangipahoa School Board Member Who Posted Noose Meme Opts for Last-minute Run for Reelection*, The Advocate (Jul. 31, 2018), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/communities/livingston_tangipahoa/article_e0999182-9506-11e8-bf14-fb6afcf2a6ee.html.

had an opportunity to elect a candidate of choice. Lynn Dean, a white state senator who was involved in the redistricting and the highest-ranking public official in the Parish, testified that he use[d] the [“n-word”] and “ha[d] done so recently . . .”⁴⁷

Senate Factor 7:

- Black people have been largely underrepresented in Louisiana public offices, particularly outside of the majority-Black districts. There is currently only one Black member of the Louisiana Legislature from a district that is not a single-member majority-minority districts. Moreover, Louisiana has never had a Black U.S. Senator, and has not had a Black governor since Reconstruction. Louisianans rarely elect Black candidates to Congress; the state has had only five Black Congresspeople since Reconstruction.⁴⁸ Louisiana’s first Black chief Justice of the state Supreme Court was appointed following a consent decree that was entered in a case challenging the use of at-large judicial districts. As part of the consent decree, the court created a majority-minority judicial district that has continued to elect the only Black member of the State Supreme Court.⁴⁹

An additional important factor in evaluating the totality of the circumstances is whether there is rough proportionality between the number of majority-minority voting districts and the minority members’ share of the relevant population.⁵⁰ “The relevant proportionality inquiry compares the percentage of total districts that are [minority] opportunity districts with the [minorities] share of the citizen voting-age population.”⁵¹

As noted, Black individuals are currently underrepresented in the Louisiana State Legislature. Currently just 37 out of the 144 (25.69%) members of the Louisiana Legislature are Black and there are no other members of color. According to the 2020 census data, Black people make-up 33.1% of the total population in Louisiana.⁵² Additionally, per the 2019 census data, the BVAP population in

⁴⁷ *St. Bernard Citizens For Better Gov’t*, 2002 WL 2022589, at *10.

⁴⁸ See *Black-American Members by State and Territory, 1870–Present*, History, Art & Archives: U.S. House of Representatives, <https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Black-American-Representatives-and-Senators-by-State-and-Territory/> (last visited Jan. 18, 2022).

⁴⁹ See *Chisom v. Jindal*, 890 F. Supp. 2d 696, 702–05 (E.D. La. 2012).

⁵⁰ See *League of United Latin Am. Citizens*, 548 U.S. at 401 (citing *Johnson v. De Grandy*, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994)).

⁵¹ *Id.*; see also *Patino v. City of Pasadena*, 677 Fed. App’x, 950, 953 (5th Cir. 2017) (*citation omitted*) (noting that one among many factors in the totality of circumstances to be considered is proportionality, which links the number of majority-minority voting districts to the minority members’ share of the relevant population).

⁵² The source of this data is the 2021 P.L. 94-171 Restricting Data released by the Census Bureau and accessible at data.census.gov.

Louisiana was 31.5%; and per the 2020 census data, the current BVAP population is 31.2%.⁵³ However, only 27 out of the 105 Louisiana House of Representatives seats are filled by a Black individual. This is only 25.7% of the total number of House districts. Similarly, the Louisiana State Senate has only 10 seats filled by a Black individual out of 39. This is only 25.6% of the total number of Senate districts. There has not been proportionality between the State Legislature and the Black population in Louisiana in the past, and unless additional majority-minority opportunity districts are added this lack of proportionality will continue.

Our illustrative House of Representatives map, by contrast, includes potentially 38 reasonably compact majority-Black districts out of 105 total statewide that, based on a preliminary analysis, have the opportunity to function for Black voters. Similarly, our illustrative State Senate map creates potentially 14 reasonably compact majority-Black districts out of 39 statewide that, based on a preliminary analysis, have the opportunity to function for Black voters. These maps would create the possibility of achieving representation that is proportional with the percentage of Black Louisianians statewide. As such, our illustrative maps in both the House and Senate clearly “result[] in less disparity than the [current] plan and more closely approximate[] rough, or substantial, proportionality”—especially when considering that Black Louisiana should not “continue to bear the burden of under-representation under the [proposed] scheme while the white majority enjoys over-representation.”⁵⁴ It is possible for the Legislature to draw new State Legislature maps that achieve proportionality.

IV. The Louisiana State Legislature Must Enact Maps with Additional Majority-Minority Opportunity Districts.

For the reasons explained above, the State Legislature must earnestly consider its obligations under the Voting Rights Act and adopt State Legislature maps with a significant number of new additional majority-minority opportunity districts to ensure Black voters’ right to an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Failure to do so may lead to costly and unnecessary litigation.⁵⁵ We therefore urge the state to consider map plans that ensure non-dilution of Black voting strength in Louisiana. We are happy to discuss the contents of this letter further and to provide additional assistance with developing a more inclusive districting plan.

Please feel free to contact Chris Kaiser, Advocacy Director with the ACLU of Louisiana, with any questions at 512-740-1317 or email at ckaiser@laaclu.org to discuss these issues in more detail.

⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ *Stabler v. Cnty. of Thurston, Neb.*, 129 F.3d 1015, 1022 (8th Cir. 1997).

⁵⁵ NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., *The Cost (in Time, Money, and Burden) of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Litigation as of September 2021*, <https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/Section-2-costs-9.19.21-Final.pdf> (last visited Jan. 18, 2022).

Sincerely,

/s/

Alanah Odoms, Executive Director
Chris Kaiser, Advocacy Director
Megan Snider, Staff Attorney
ACLU of Louisiana
P.O. Box 56157
New Orleans, LA 70156-6157

T. Alora Thomas
Samantha Osaki
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004

Sarah Brannon
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
915 15th St., NW Washington, DC 20005

Michael Pernick
Leah C. Aden, Deputy Director of Litigation
Stuart Naifeh, Manager of the Redistricting Project
Jared Evans
Victoria Wenger
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc.
40 Rector Street, 5th Fl.
New York, NY 10006

President Michael McClanahan
NAACP Louisiana State Conference
3313 Government Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70806

Ashley K. Shelton
Janea Jamison
Power Coalition for Equity and Justice
4930 Washington Avenue
New Orleans, LA 70125

Mark Gaber, Director of Redistricting
Chris Lamar
Valencia Richardson

Campaign Legal Center
1101 14th St NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20002

Terry C. Landry, Jr., Policy Director – Louisiana
Chandra Shae Foster, Policy Associate
Southern Poverty Law Center Action Fund
201 St. Charles Ave., Suite 2000
New Orleans, LA 70171
Liza Weisberg, Staff Attorney
P.O. Box 1287
Decatur, GA 30031

Judy Reese Morse
President and CEO
Urban League of Louisiana
4640 S. Carrollton Ave.
New Orleans, LA 70119
504-620-2332

Peter Robins-Brown
Policy & Advocacy Director
Louisiana Progress
504-256-8196
peter@louisianaprogress.org

Omari Ho-Sang, State Organizing Manager -
Louisiana
Keturah Butler-Reed, Southern Region Organizer -
Louisiana
Black Voters Matter Fund
omari@blackvotersmatterfund.org
keturah@blackvotersmatterfund.org

Norris Henderson
Executive Director
Voice of the Experienced
504-453-4819
norris@vote-nola.org

Bruce Reilly
Voters Organized to Educate
504-758-9420
bruce@vote-nola.org

Stephen Kearney
Fair Districts Louisiana
225-235-7955
stephenkearny@gmail.com

Hilda Walker Thomas
President
League of Women Voters of Louisiana
president@lwvofla.org

Jan Moller
Executive Director
Louisiana Budget Project
225-819-7715
jan@labudget.org

Kia Bickham
E Pluribus Unum
kia@unumfund.org

American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana

The ACLU of Louisiana has worked to advance and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Louisiana since 1956. The organization is part of a nationwide network of ACLU affiliates that fight tirelessly in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C.

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation

For 100 years, the ACLU has been our nation's guardian of liberty, working in courts, legislatures, and communities to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Whether it's ending mass incarceration, achieving full equality for the LGBT community, advancing racial justice, establishing new privacy protections for our digital age, or preserving the right to vote or the right to have an abortion, the ACLU takes up the toughest civil liberties and civil rights cases and issues to defend all people from government abuse and overreach. With more than one million members, activists, and supporters, the ACLU is a nationwide organization that fights tirelessly in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C., for the principle that every individual's rights must be protected equally under the law, regardless of race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, disability, national origin, and record of arrest or conviction.

NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. ("LDF")

Since its founding in 1940, LDF has used litigation, policy advocacy, public education, and community organizing strategies to achieve racial justice and equity in the areas of education, economic justice, political participation, and criminal justice. Throughout its history, LDF has worked to enforce and promote laws and policies that prohibit voter discrimination, intimidation, and suppression and increase access to the electoral process.

Louisiana NAACP State Conference

Louisiana State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (the "Louisiana NAACP State Conference") is a state subsidiary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. For decades, the Louisiana NAACP State Conference has worked towards its mission to ensure the political, educational, social, and economic equality of all persons and to eliminate race-based discrimination.

Power Coalition for Equity and Justice

The Power Coalition is a group of community-based organizations that work together to educate and empower voters across Louisiana. Through our voter engagement and community organizing work, we seek to unify our collective voices into a stronger, more cohesive force that can successfully advocate for an agenda of shared values and issues.

Campaign Legal Center

The nonpartisan Campaign Legal Center advances democracy through the law at the federal, state, and local levels, fighting for every American's rights to responsive government and a fair opportunity to participate in and affect the democratic process. Since the organization's founding in 2002, CLC has participated in major redistricting, voting rights, and campaign finance cases before the U.S. Supreme Court as well as numerous other federal and state court cases. CLC's work promotes every citizen's right to participate in the democratic process.

Southern Poverty Law Center Action Fund

SPLC Action is a catalyst for racial justice in the South and beyond, working in partnership with communities to dismantle white supremacy, strength intersectional movements, and advance the human rights of all people.

Urban League of Louisiana

The Urban League of Louisiana's mission is to assist African Americans and other communities seeking equity to secure economic self-reliance, parity, and civil rights. As an affiliate of the National Urban League, and for over 83 years, the Urban League of Louisiana has worked to ensure quality education, equal employment, entrepreneurial opportunities, economic inclusion, and shared dignity under the law.

Louisiana Progress

Louisiana Progress is a nonprofit organization that is dedicated to informing, engaging, and mobilizing grassroots organizations, advocates, and activists to enact progressive public policy in Louisiana.

Black Voters Matter Fund

The Black Voters Matter Fund believes in the value of the voter 365. In this vein, not only do we support our partners' voting rights during and in between elections, we also support capacity and power building all year long.

Voice of the Experienced (VOTE)

VOTE is a grassroots organization founded and run by formerly incarcerated people (FIP), our families and our allies. We are dedicated to restoring the full human and civil rights of those most impacted by the criminal (in)justice system. Together we have the experiences, expertise, and power to improve public safety in New Orleans and beyond without relying on mass incarceration.

Voters Organized to Educate

Voters Organized is a 501(c)4 non-profit focused on building collective power to create change in the criminal legal system. We are dedicated to building an educated and engaged democracy. We do this by keeping people informed regarding elections, and ongoing issues in city, state, and national policy reform. Through working with organizations and individuals that believe in the principles of social justice and equality, Voters Organized impacts elections and legislation in Louisiana and beyond. We educate and mobilize organizations and individuals that believe in the principles of grassroots movement building, social justice, and equality.

Fair Districts Louisiana

Fair Districts Louisiana is a grassroots, non-partisan alliance of citizens advocating for redistricting and voting reform.

League of Women Voters of Louisiana

The League of Women Voters of Louisiana is a nonpartisan political organization encouraging informed and active participation in government. It influences public policy through education and advocacy.

Louisiana Budget Project


The Louisiana Budget Project monitors and reports on public policy and how it affects Louisiana's low- to moderate-income families.

E Pluribus Unum

Founded by former New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu in 2018, E Pluribus Unum (EPU) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization whose mission is to build a more just, equitable, and inclusive South, uprooting the barriers that have long divided the region by race and class. Incubated at Emerson Collective, EPU is focused on changing the divisive narratives that perpetuate systemic and interpersonal racism, cultivating and empowering courageous leaders who are advancing racial equity, and championing transformative policy change. Learn more at www.unumfund.org.


APPENDIX 1*

ACLU Illustrative Full Senate Map




-
- * In this and following Senate map figures, district lines appear brown, and blue shading indicates the concentration of the Black Voting Age Population (BVAP), with darker shades indicating a higher BVAP percentage. District numbers are in black boxes.


Baton Rouge Area Districts of ACLU Illustrative Senate Map




New Orleans Area Districts of ACLU Illustrative Senate Map



Shreveport Area Districts of ACLU Illustrative Senate Map



Current Enacted Full Senate Map




©2021 CALIPER

Baton Rouge Area Districts of Current Enacted Senate Map



New Orleans Area Districts of Current Enacted Senate Map




Shreveport Area Districts of Current Senate Map



APPENDIX 2*


ACLU Illustrative Full House Map




©2021 CALIPER

* In this and following House map figures, district lines appear brown, and green shading indicates the concentration of the Black Voting Age Population (BVAP), with darker shades indicating a higher BVAP percentage. District numbers are in black boxes.


Baton Rouge Area Districts of ACLU Illustrative House Map




New Orleans Area Districts of ACLU Illustrative House Map




North Louisiana Districts of ACLU Illustrative House Map




Lafayette Area Districts of Current Enacted House Map



Lake Charles Area Districts of ACLU Illustrative House Map




Current Enacted Full House Map




©2021 CALIPER


Baton Rouge Area Districts of Current Enacted House Map




New Orleans Area Districts of Current Enacted House Map




North Louisiana Districts of Current Enacted House Map



Lafayette Area Districts of Current Enacted House Map



Lake Charles Area Districts of Current Enacted House Map



APPENDIX 3

Current Senate Plan with 2010 Data:

District	TTLPop10	Deviation	TTLWht10%	TTLBlk10%	WhtVAP10%	BlkVAP10%
1	119653	2.94%	76.78%	18.07%	79.09%	16.03%
2	111274	-4.27%	41.68%	56.48%	44.77%	53.54%
3	110993	-4.51%	31.11%	59.34%	33.88%	56.55%
4	110743	-4.73%	31.00%	65.38%	34.80%	61.33%
5	110517	-4.92%	40.76%	53.97%	44.36%	50.12%
6	120032	3.26%	69.53%	26.23%	73.28%	22.71%
7	110828	-4.66%	35.50%	56.06%	38.80%	52.54%
8	119917	3.16%	57.06%	32.06%	60.32%	29.14%
9	118074	1.58%	80.92%	10.35%	82.47%	9.24%
10	118865	2.26%	78.82%	11.26%	80.55%	9.99%
11	121670	4.67%	87.48%	8.79%	88.74%	7.81%
12	121321	4.37%	69.23%	28.55%	71.64%	26.27%
13	118958	2.34%	92.27%	5.02%	93.12%	4.42%
14	115785	-0.39%	29.29%	65.32%	33.57%	60.59%
15	119974	3.21%	22.11%	73.33%	25.79%	69.63%
16	118106	1.61%	75.47%	18.40%	77.83%	16.41%
17	111041	-4.47%	62.10%	36.23%	64.11%	34.36%
18	115438	-0.69%	83.49%	12.82%	84.78%	11.86%
19	111296	-4.25%	59.95%	35.13%	62.57%	32.65%
20	116242	0.00%	74.25%	13.94%	76.98%	12.44%
21	121985	4.94%	66.98%	27.24%	69.63%	25.05%
22	121775	4.76%	68.25%	27.69%	71.14%	25.04%
23	120896	4.01%	82.76%	12.35%	83.92%	11.43%
24	121168	4.24%	41.16%	56.60%	44.81%	53.02%
25	120244	3.44%	81.93%	15.16%	83.78%	13.53%
26	121256	4.32%	78.03%	18.45%	80.60%	16.09%
27	118161	1.65%	62.32%	34.58%	64.91%	32.08%
28	119732	3.00%	69.37%	27.89%	70.90%	26.52%
29	118159	1.65%	38.51%	58.65%	41.67%	55.41%
30	113853	-2.05%	80.65%	13.80%	82.21%	12.59%
31	110877	-4.61%	72.49%	21.59%	74.42%	20.14%
32	112248	-3.43%	75.51%	22.91%	75.70%	22.87%
33	113411	-2.43%	69.49%	28.14%	71.76%	26.18%
34	114714	-1.31%	31.05%	67.50%	34.99%	63.51%
35	112602	-3.13%	84.06%	12.89%	84.30%	12.79%
36	111024	-4.49%	73.09%	24.17%	74.24%	23.28%
37	110770	-4.71%	68.70%	24.66%	72.07%	21.71%
38	111806	-3.81%	60.75%	35.80%	63.52%	33.21%
39	117964	1.48%	28.95%	69.38%	31.83%	66.50%

Current Senate Plan with 2020 Data:

District	TTLPop20	Deviation	TTLWht20%	TTLBlk20%	WhtVAP20%	BlkVAP20%
1	128656	7.73%	61.64%	24.68%	64.88%	22.30%
2	108026	-9.55%	39.11%	54.85%	41.83%	52.43%
3	126317	5.77%	25.06%	60.30%	27.83%	57.94%
4	132156	10.66%	31.06%	60.36%	33.80%	57.94%
5	120152	0.60%	41.34%	45.21%	43.98%	43.00%
6	132643	11.06%	58.89%	29.33%	62.66%	26.55%
7	111694	-6.48%	25.91%	56.82%	28.75%	55.09%
8	121086	1.39%	43.08%	35.27%	46.14%	33.06%
9	122806	2.83%	64.95%	12.22%	68.06%	11.24%
10	120330	0.75%	57.99%	13.42%	61.26%	12.34%
11	151481	26.84%	77.79%	9.47%	79.79%	8.58%
12	121376	1.63%	65.40%	27.61%	67.75%	25.81%
13	129458	8.40%	81.53%	8.14%	83.64%	7.07%
14	119671	0.20%	28.06%	61.12%	31.07%	58.50%
15	117106	-1.95%	15.14%	75.91%	17.44%	74.04%
16	124272	4.05%	64.19%	22.18%	67.03%	20.21%
17	108212	-9.39%	59.06%	35.64%	61.24%	33.77%
18	138058	15.60%	71.85%	16.69%	74.36%	15.36%
19	109521	-8.30%	50.62%	35.69%	53.56%	34.02%
20	110837	-7.20%	66.81%	15.94%	70.18%	14.62%
21	119371	-0.05%	60.90%	27.03%	64.30%	25.08%
22	120003	0.48%	62.76%	29.12%	65.56%	26.86%
23	138634	16.08%	73.47%	14.28%	75.70%	12.83%
24	120632	1.01%	37.45%	56.77%	40.46%	54.42%
25	130272	9.08%	74.17%	17.75%	76.47%	16.08%
26	120668	1.04%	72.72%	18.98%	75.51%	17.03%
27	126558	5.97%	55.76%	35.50%	58.30%	33.56%
28	112240	-6.02%	65.18%	27.04%	66.52%	25.14%
29	109718	-8.13%	35.19%	59.01%	37.73%	56.56%
30	113424	-5.03%	76.10%	13.04%	77.59%	12.24%
31	106580	-10.76%	66.75%	21.87%	68.92%	20.16%
32	109020	-8.72%	73.71%	19.28%	74.52%	18.22%
33	109730	-8.12%	65.15%	28.59%	67.60%	26.58%
34	107041	-10.37%	28.02%	67.68%	31.32%	64.11%
35	119065	-0.31%	76.44%	14.54%	77.65%	13.73%
36	116688	-2.30%	68.08%	23.69%	69.49%	23.14%
37	110334	-7.62%	56.22%	29.85%	60.26%	26.70%
38	111086	-6.99%	50.53%	41.99%	53.48%	39.48%
39	102835	-13.90%	27.13%	68.33%	29.60%	66.22%

ACLU Senate Plan with 2020 Data:

District	TTLPop20	Deviation	TTLWhite20%	TTLBlk20%	WhtVAP20%	BlkVAP20%
1	125116	4.76%	57.69%	26.89%	61.22%	24.05%
2	114554	-4.08%	38.01%	54.62%	40.63%	52.42%
3	114636	-4.01%	33.36%	54.29%	36.80%	51.36%
4	114240	-4.35%	32.46%	57.76%	34.62%	55.97%
5	118062	-1.15%	36.25%	52.47%	38.93%	50.16%
6	124165	3.96%	73.18%	18.71%	74.94%	17.69%
7	123608	3.50%	26.79%	52.38%	29.81%	50.44%
8	119325	-0.09%	29.09%	52.29%	32.25%	50.08%
9	125275	4.89%	64.26%	13.62%	67.11%	12.77%
10	125255	4.88%	58.94%	12.29%	62.24%	11.19%
11	125276	4.89%	79.40%	7.43%	81.31%	6.70%
12	124918	4.60%	65.31%	27.77%	67.92%	25.69%
13	125144	4.78%	68.91%	20.89%	71.75%	19.05%
14	114081	-4.48%	33.83%	55.61%	37.74%	51.88%
15	118949	-0.40%	27.01%	59.03%	30.75%	56.11%
16	124850	4.54%	63.92%	21.50%	66.72%	19.85%
17	123401	3.33%	39.29%	55.90%	41.40%	53.90%
18	125122	4.77%	75.20%	13.45%	77.73%	12.15%
19	113927	-4.61%	60.62%	29.10%	63.45%	27.31%
20	122720	2.75%	65.12%	16.47%	68.47%	15.05%
21	123640	3.53%	69.29%	17.58%	72.56%	15.87%
22	124828	4.52%	54.02%	37.81%	56.96%	35.43%
23	118207	-1.02%	73.59%	14.53%	75.86%	13.00%
24	114806	-3.87%	37.29%	56.63%	40.56%	54.07%
25	125258	4.88%	75.60%	18.02%	77.82%	16.37%
26	120982	1.30%	74.05%	15.95%	76.63%	14.23%
27	113559	-4.92%	49.46%	41.37%	52.54%	38.95%
28	118640	-0.66%	67.30%	25.78%	69.01%	23.90%
29	114821	-3.86%	36.47%	57.18%	38.97%	54.52%
30	124095	3.91%	78.86%	11.59%	80.24%	10.81%
31	113671	-4.82%	70.42%	16.55%	72.65%	15.23%
32	114730	-3.94%	67.88%	24.37%	69.02%	22.79%
33	120626	1.00%	64.42%	29.33%	66.79%	27.39%
34	115470	-3.32%	32.99%	62.55%	36.48%	58.85%
35	114311	-4.29%	78.13%	13.09%	79.01%	12.54%
36	115768	-3.07%	67.05%	23.86%	68.61%	23.21%
37	113847	-4.67%	34.65%	55.51%	38.63%	52.01%
38	113757	-4.75%	65.27%	25.69%	67.26%	24.36%
39	114117	-4.45%	37.82%	56.16%	41.22%	53.12%

Current House Plan with 2010 Data:

District	TTLPop10	Deviation	TTLWht10%	TTLBlk10%	WhtVAP10%	BlkVAP10%
1	41626	-3.59%	75.33%	22.32%	76.50%	21.30%
2	43911	1.70%	27.10%	68.35%	30.67%	64.97%
3	41814	-3.15%	9.74%	89.01%	11.95%	86.69%
4	42595	-1.34%	26.30%	71.71%	29.93%	68.08%
5	41713	-3.39%	68.51%	25.98%	71.81%	23.08%
6	43138	-0.09%	81.46%	13.59%	83.22%	12.12%
7	44770	3.69%	73.82%	22.19%	75.54%	20.76%
8	44977	4.17%	72.66%	21.28%	75.12%	19.21%
9	44949	4.11%	77.18%	17.73%	78.74%	16.51%
10	43417	0.56%	65.26%	33.00%	67.35%	31.09%
11	44981	4.18%	37.31%	60.09%	39.35%	57.95%
12	45164	4.61%	74.63%	21.66%	76.33%	20.42%
13	44155	2.27%	68.23%	30.03%	69.03%	29.35%
14	44515	3.10%	78.04%	19.31%	80.54%	17.07%
15	43657	1.12%	92.90%	4.65%	93.43%	4.28%
16	42608	-1.31%	34.89%	62.98%	39.36%	58.40%
17	43019	-0.36%	26.61%	71.73%	31.38%	66.92%
18	41741	-3.32%	57.57%	41.09%	58.07%	40.77%
19	44254	2.50%	67.97%	30.27%	69.97%	28.41%
20	45227	4.75%	73.27%	25.51%	75.12%	23.75%
21	41183	-4.61%	41.31%	57.61%	44.28%	54.66%
22	44570	3.23%	81.74%	15.80%	81.72%	15.98%
23	42704	-1.09%	39.12%	58.18%	43.09%	54.10%
24	45236	4.77%	80.77%	11.14%	82.35%	10.16%
25	44424	2.89%	74.83%	19.31%	76.93%	17.62%
26	42553	-1.44%	27.81%	69.38%	31.97%	65.08%
27	44636	3.38%	85.80%	11.30%	86.66%	10.59%
28	42073	-2.55%	67.00%	30.60%	68.73%	29.09%
29	41209	-4.55%	19.68%	79.27%	22.09%	76.82%
30	45181	4.65%	66.52%	24.82%	69.25%	22.58%
31	41889	-2.98%	85.26%	10.39%	86.85%	9.07%
32	44715	3.57%	79.40%	16.66%	79.88%	16.66%
33	45072	4.39%	88.95%	8.26%	90.57%	6.94%
34	45041	4.32%	25.35%	72.10%	29.12%	68.22%
35	45028	4.29%	85.80%	11.56%	86.65%	10.96%
36	44320	2.65%	81.79%	12.70%	83.87%	10.94%
37	43849	1.56%	79.74%	18.17%	81.68%	16.34%
38	42595	-1.34%	69.97%	28.63%	71.90%	26.82%
39	44786	3.73%	69.11%	27.87%	72.61%	24.64%
40	41047	-4.93%	38.45%	59.64%	41.84%	56.23%
41	43203	0.06%	77.95%	19.53%	79.38%	17.99%
42	41236	-4.49%	75.81%	22.60%	77.98%	20.54%
43	42313	-2.00%	84.60%	11.07%	85.96%	9.91%

District	TTLPop10	Deviation	TTLWht10%	TTLBlk10%	WhtVAP10%	BlkVAP10%
44	41586	-3.68%	33.13%	64.42%	37.99%	59.39%
45	43388	0.49%	78.02%	15.77%	80.55%	13.59%
46	41297	-4.35%	75.54%	21.86%	78.12%	19.49%
47	45107	4.47%	81.10%	15.11%	83.54%	13.04%
48	42819	-0.82%	78.29%	17.01%	80.23%	15.51%
49	41117	-4.77%	74.42%	21.10%	76.87%	18.81%
50	45177	4.64%	58.55%	36.70%	61.05%	34.54%
51	45004	4.24%	64.72%	22.44%	67.78%	20.61%
52	45311	4.95%	77.51%	14.08%	80.02%	12.43%
53	45259	4.83%	70.35%	19.71%	73.70%	17.26%
54	45314	4.95%	86.51%	3.65%	88.31%	2.96%
55	45251	4.81%	72.33%	24.73%	75.15%	22.17%
56	45315	4.96%	75.10%	21.21%	77.04%	19.54%
57	44112	2.17%	36.98%	60.03%	40.06%	57.07%
58	41253	-4.45%	33.34%	65.05%	35.97%	62.55%
59	41749	-3.30%	80.10%	15.24%	81.26%	14.44%
60	42140	-2.40%	59.66%	38.66%	62.40%	35.95%
61	42061	-2.58%	19.27%	77.57%	23.09%	73.57%
62	41170	-4.64%	58.05%	40.41%	59.07%	39.56%
63	42487	-1.59%	20.12%	78.75%	22.13%	76.82%
64	41101	-4.80%	83.78%	14.44%	84.77%	13.62%
65	41840	-3.09%	71.46%	23.17%	75.74%	19.13%
66	44049	2.02%	74.90%	18.94%	77.29%	16.90%
67	41585	-3.68%	39.62%	52.30%	44.62%	46.78%
68	41230	-4.50%	74.28%	20.43%	76.52%	18.40%
69	42600	-1.33%	69.50%	23.27%	72.60%	20.76%
70	41941	-2.86%	66.16%	26.99%	69.45%	23.67%
71	41514	-3.85%	89.18%	7.42%	90.35%	6.52%
72	42105	-2.48%	39.04%	59.04%	42.90%	55.18%
73	41407	-4.10%	76.68%	20.67%	79.63%	17.92%
74	41152	-4.69%	87.96%	9.67%	89.31%	8.49%
75	41070	-4.88%	64.34%	33.93%	66.66%	31.72%
76	41255	-4.45%	74.63%	19.74%	77.02%	17.58%
77	41591	-3.67%	86.93%	10.06%	88.23%	8.96%
78	44733	3.61%	84.35%	9.03%	85.68%	7.96%
79	44927	4.06%	76.73%	11.12%	78.63%	9.81%
80	45222	4.74%	75.48%	14.95%	77.69%	13.08%
81	41132	-4.73%	80.71%	17.44%	82.14%	16.10%
82	45054	4.35%	84.20%	10.55%	85.24%	9.85%
83	44983	4.19%	38.21%	54.57%	41.72%	51.16%
84	41352	-4.22%	72.95%	17.79%	75.35%	16.02%
85	44327	2.67%	50.45%	37.01%	54.48%	33.20%
86	41888	-2.98%	74.11%	22.17%	77.09%	19.42%
87	41461	-3.97%	27.42%	60.60%	30.61%	57.17%

District	TTLPop10	Deviation	TTLWht10%	TTLBlk10%	WhtVAP10%	BlkVAP10%
88	41631	-3.58%	85.08%	11.07%	86.69%	9.88%
89	41737	-3.33%	92.64%	3.53%	93.40%	3.15%
90	41650	-3.53%	77.33%	17.61%	79.81%	15.48%
91	45109	4.48%	34.27%	61.11%	38.09%	57.03%
92	44991	4.21%	54.17%	33.74%	57.08%	30.92%
93	45297	4.91%	30.81%	64.43%	35.26%	59.59%
94	44953	4.12%	80.56%	9.57%	82.07%	8.56%
95	41084	-4.84%	91.82%	5.32%	92.59%	4.85%
96	41607	-3.63%	38.26%	58.05%	42.32%	54.05%
97	43541	0.85%	22.27%	72.62%	25.02%	69.65%
98	44771	3.70%	68.28%	26.65%	70.37%	24.53%
99	41505	-3.87%	15.84%	81.48%	19.67%	77.35%
100	41668	-3.49%	3.07%	87.94%	3.78%	86.69%
101	42828	-0.80%	22.31%	69.08%	27.00%	64.28%
102	44310	2.63%	27.51%	66.94%	31.29%	62.92%
103	42992	-0.42%	65.98%	22.73%	68.57%	20.09%
104	41243	-4.47%	80.53%	14.67%	82.29%	13.19%
105	44925	4.05%	54.97%	34.97%	56.74%	33.34%

Current 2010 House Plan with 2020 Data:

District	TTLPop20	Deviation	TTLWht20%	TTLBlk20%	WhtVAP20%	BlkVAP20%
1	40448	-8.82%	69.90%	22.48%	71.44%	21.84%
2	37287	-15.94%	22.23%	69.03%	25.27%	66.32%
3	35887	-19.10%	6.99%	90.08%	8.36%	88.99%
4	38713	-12.73%	21.24%	73.84%	24.40%	70.94%
5	45407	2.36%	55.35%	35.01%	59.17%	31.65%
6	42384	-4.45%	69.42%	19.47%	72.02%	17.47%
7	43738	-1.40%	64.28%	27.55%	66.61%	25.74%
8	53050	19.59%	61.33%	25.22%	64.41%	23.14%
9	48092	8.41%	65.88%	20.23%	68.40%	18.90%
10	38844	-12.43%	62.00%	33.22%	63.69%	31.82%
11	41578	-6.27%	36.67%	58.28%	39.05%	55.97%
12	44998	1.44%	71.97%	19.90%	73.94%	18.88%
13	41092	-7.37%	65.31%	27.35%	66.37%	26.02%
14	48883	10.20%	68.54%	24.37%	70.97%	22.33%
15	47535	7.16%	84.35%	6.90%	85.87%	5.95%
16	40502	-8.70%	27.85%	67.73%	31.46%	64.05%
17	41404	-6.66%	22.71%	70.42%	26.77%	65.84%
18	43306	-2.38%	58.80%	34.92%	61.12%	32.81%
19	40137	-9.52%	64.07%	31.61%	66.22%	29.63%
20	42282	-4.68%	69.63%	25.50%	71.30%	23.68%
21	36213	-18.37%	39.33%	57.52%	41.76%	55.27%
22	43149	-2.73%	73.88%	15.15%	73.18%	14.76%
23	40078	-9.65%	36.52%	56.84%	39.65%	53.47%
24	42060	-5.18%	76.33%	11.41%	78.41%	10.25%
25	45267	2.04%	67.53%	21.06%	70.25%	19.14%
26	38266	-13.74%	25.19%	69.86%	28.39%	66.77%
27	46490	4.80%	77.68%	13.61%	79.53%	12.21%
28	39693	-10.52%	63.58%	29.42%	65.30%	27.18%
29	38720	-12.71%	16.81%	79.83%	18.47%	78.42%
30	41987	-5.35%	59.77%	23.91%	62.04%	22.44%
31	50148	13.05%	75.56%	12.12%	77.63%	10.92%
32	42148	-4.99%	75.88%	13.81%	75.95%	13.15%
33	47543	7.18%	81.69%	8.68%	83.76%	7.51%
34	49494	11.57%	22.15%	71.34%	25.12%	68.77%
35	50744	14.39%	79.94%	12.06%	81.22%	11.48%
36	53864	21.42%	68.26%	18.10%	71.20%	15.99%
37	47273	6.57%	75.71%	18.94%	77.85%	17.31%
38	40658	-8.35%	67.06%	28.34%	68.92%	26.51%
39	48299	8.88%	60.06%	31.25%	63.82%	28.55%
40	41112	-7.32%	35.71%	60.17%	38.27%	58.07%
41	41258	-6.99%	73.88%	20.21%	75.65%	18.55%
42	37368	-15.76%	72.68%	22.86%	75.29%	20.85%

District	TTLPop20	Deviation	TTLWht20%	TTLBlk20%	WhtVAP20%	BlkVAP20%
43	50543	13.94%	75.25%	13.35%	77.29%	11.96%
44	38140	-14.02%	28.00%	65.50%	31.81%	62.36%
45	40768	-8.10%	67.24%	18.64%	70.66%	16.30%
46	41724	-5.94%	72.29%	22.27%	74.86%	20.09%
47	42206	-4.86%	76.83%	16.23%	79.32%	14.38%
48	51194	15.41%	69.82%	19.09%	72.03%	17.59%
49	40005	-9.82%	68.12%	22.63%	71.07%	20.46%
50	40839	-7.94%	53.94%	35.37%	56.86%	33.62%
51	43840	-1.17%	57.70%	23.04%	61.53%	21.35%
52	46618	5.09%	68.22%	16.22%	72.10%	14.25%
53	41949	-5.44%	63.44%	20.77%	67.44%	18.58%
54	42464	-4.27%	80.66%	4.38%	83.74%	3.34%
55	48529	9.40%	65.53%	27.53%	68.06%	25.65%
56	44460	0.23%	66.87%	22.07%	69.37%	20.59%
57	42626	-3.91%	28.29%	62.72%	31.00%	60.61%
58	37296	-15.92%	31.04%	64.01%	33.54%	61.83%
59	52034	17.30%	68.26%	18.34%	70.18%	17.53%
60	40695	-8.26%	57.64%	36.60%	59.66%	34.54%
61	38495	-13.22%	17.06%	76.73%	19.93%	73.99%
62	43573	-1.77%	56.27%	38.77%	58.01%	37.33%
63	41046	-7.47%	16.75%	79.68%	18.05%	78.41%
64	43434	-2.09%	76.14%	16.51%	77.53%	15.68%
65	44932	1.29%	56.42%	27.98%	60.37%	25.12%
66	51268	15.57%	62.38%	23.71%	65.63%	21.51%
67	41035	-7.50%	34.84%	54.05%	38.10%	50.35%
68	44666	0.69%	66.00%	22.30%	68.09%	20.79%
69	44912	1.24%	55.14%	28.68%	59.00%	26.22%
70	47905	7.99%	56.85%	26.00%	59.97%	24.35%
71	45336	2.20%	75.59%	11.39%	78.60%	10.02%
72	40006	-9.82%	36.40%	58.74%	39.91%	55.58%
73	50703	14.30%	68.54%	22.13%	71.70%	19.77%
74	42838	-3.43%	81.18%	9.85%	82.72%	8.94%
75	39046	-11.98%	62.86%	31.99%	65.17%	30.13%
76	45461	2.48%	58.02%	29.21%	61.44%	26.43%
77	59689	34.56%	78.91%	9.20%	80.47%	8.63%
78	44548	0.42%	66.71%	10.90%	69.76%	10.13%
79	45579	2.75%	55.37%	13.11%	58.86%	11.64%
80	47648	7.41%	56.58%	16.65%	60.57%	15.15%
81	44647	0.65%	75.33%	17.44%	77.48%	16.09%
82	46392	4.58%	70.52%	12.04%	72.58%	11.55%
83	43853	-1.14%	28.23%	57.65%	31.65%	54.65%
84	41952	-5.43%	57.48%	21.38%	60.58%	19.75%
85	46567	4.98%	32.95%	38.31%	36.83%	36.72%
86	46150	4.04%	63.78%	26.11%	67.20%	23.44%

District	TTLPop20	Deviation	TTLWht20%	TTLBlk20%	WhtVAP20%	BlkVAP20%
87	42694	-3.76%	18.81%	62.33%	21.34%	60.26%
88	47971	8.14%	71.64%	16.44%	74.61%	14.82%
89	44398	0.09%	82.15%	4.42%	84.07%	3.95%
90	43502	-1.93%	64.82%	21.81%	68.07%	19.48%
91	49815	12.30%	35.18%	53.15%	38.09%	50.76%
92	44398	0.09%	35.12%	30.65%	38.19%	29.85%
93	48621	9.61%	33.51%	54.40%	37.22%	50.90%
94	52522	18.40%	69.17%	10.19%	71.41%	9.58%
95	46091	3.90%	80.51%	9.48%	82.75%	8.32%
96	38859	-12.40%	35.08%	58.61%	38.03%	56.01%
97	53810	21.30%	25.38%	64.77%	27.26%	63.39%
98	46610	5.07%	65.04%	20.80%	65.79%	20.48%
99	50831	14.59%	16.32%	77.59%	20.04%	73.91%
100	46572	4.99%	1.79%	89.13%	2.13%	88.66%
101	41468	-6.52%	12.33%	72.54%	15.00%	70.64%
102	43158	-2.71%	20.54%	68.42%	23.63%	65.61%
103	52643	18.67%	46.33%	32.72%	50.46%	29.17%
104	43951	-0.92%	69.58%	16.25%	72.08%	14.88%
105	44833	1.07%	45.01%	35.71%	46.56%	34.72%

ACLU House plan with 2020 Data:

District	TTLPop20	Deviation	TTLWht20%	TTLBlk20%	WhtVAP20%	BlkVAP20%
1	44511	0.34%	38.30%	22.48%	40.64%	54.69%
2	42848	-3.41%	25.14%	69.03%	28.29%	65.32%
3	42396	-4.43%	24.40%	90.08%	28.07%	67.12%
4	44082	-0.63%	39.05%	73.84%	42.37%	51.53%
5	42239	-4.78%	73.19%	35.01%	74.17%	16.75%
6	42590	-3.99%	72.20%	19.47%	74.55%	14.92%
7	44608	0.56%	71.54%	27.55%	73.32%	15.39%
8	42714	-3.71%	49.15%	25.22%	53.92%	32.08%
9	43793	-1.28%	61.82%	20.23%	64.75%	21.43%
10	43686	-1.52%	60.07%	33.22%	61.75%	33.34%
11	42361	-4.51%	38.14%	58.28%	40.67%	54.10%
12	46485	4.79%	75.54%	19.90%	77.15%	16.35%
13	42551	-4.08%	69.03%	27.35%	70.55%	22.34%
14	46474	4.77%	78.08%	24.37%	80.15%	13.05%
15	45909	3.49%	77.87%	6.90%	79.02%	13.93%
16	42314	-4.61%	30.12%	67.73%	34.37%	59.76%
17	43007	-3.05%	33.20%	70.42%	36.94%	54.48%
18	43108	-2.82%	64.53%	34.92%	66.44%	28.35%
19	43609	-1.69%	61.09%	31.61%	63.26%	33.50%
20	42483	-4.23%	65.56%	25.50%	66.62%	26.67%
21	42536	-4.11%	37.16%	57.52%	40.17%	56.99%
22	43710	-1.47%	77.44%	15.15%	76.43%	10.78%
23	42298	-4.65%	37.08%	56.84%	40.17%	53.08%
24	44024	-0.76%	71.57%	11.41%	73.62%	16.41%
25	42586	-4.00%	69.33%	21.06%	72.20%	19.00%
26	45775	3.19%	32.00%	69.86%	35.25%	59.22%
27	43673	-1.55%	69.00%	13.61%	71.21%	14.05%
28	43737	-1.40%	64.08%	29.42%	65.78%	27.06%
29	42423	-4.37%	35.77%	79.83%	36.80%	58.24%
30	44717	0.80%	81.43%	23.91%	82.79%	9.26%
31	43472	-2.00%	72.31%	12.12%	74.75%	11.75%
32	44187	-0.39%	73.86%	13.81%	73.77%	15.39%
33	44513	0.34%	74.30%	8.68%	76.84%	10.96%
34	42451	-4.30%	40.52%	71.34%	42.74%	50.88%
35	43964	-0.89%	81.89%	12.06%	83.67%	8.58%
36	42475	-4.25%	35.73%	18.10%	40.06%	50.28%
37	46027	3.76%	77.45%	18.94%	79.41%	15.58%
38	46422	4.65%	68.67%	28.34%	70.21%	24.47%
39	42805	-3.51%	55.86%	31.25%	60.33%	28.25%
40	45170	1.83%	38.78%	60.17%	41.63%	54.88%
41	44862	1.13%	75.05%	20.21%	77.20%	17.94%
42	43826	-1.20%	72.08%	22.86%	74.75%	20.44%

District	TTLPop20	Deviation	TTLWht20%	TTLBlk20%	WhtVAP20%	BlkVAP20%
43	44253	-0.24%	77.00%	13.35%	78.86%	10.02%
44	42602	-3.96%	37.08%	65.50%	41.22%	51.31%
45	44264	-0.22%	74.26%	18.64%	76.69%	13.68%
46	43661	-1.58%	69.04%	22.27%	71.97%	22.27%
47	45524	2.62%	77.34%	16.23%	79.81%	13.56%
48	46449	4.71%	55.08%	19.09%	57.94%	34.66%
49	45983	3.66%	72.32%	22.63%	74.82%	15.42%
50	46217	4.19%	63.62%	35.37%	67.42%	20.87%
51	45893	3.46%	67.40%	23.04%	69.57%	23.04%
52	45840	3.34%	72.95%	16.22%	76.47%	9.70%
53	45838	3.33%	54.53%	20.77%	59.00%	24.41%
54	46458	4.73%	77.13%	4.38%	80.52%	6.26%
55	46138	4.01%	63.43%	27.53%	65.77%	25.56%
56	46311	4.40%	47.71%	22.07%	50.82%	17.83%
57	42477	-4.24%	31.42%	62.72%	34.73%	56.72%
58	42365	-4.50%	44.74%	64.01%	46.48%	50.30%
59	44221	-0.31%	67.11%	18.34%	69.21%	18.12%
60	42309	-4.62%	36.65%	36.60%	40.37%	50.45%
61	42448	-4.31%	24.53%	76.73%	28.10%	59.76%
62	46378	4.55%	74.23%	38.77%	74.59%	19.96%
63	42378	-4.47%	35.96%	79.68%	38.00%	56.73%
64	43770	-1.33%	78.86%	16.51%	81.45%	8.36%
65	42236	-4.79%	34.75%	27.98%	36.61%	58.34%
66	45492	2.55%	65.35%	23.71%	67.91%	18.33%
67	43956	-0.91%	32.55%	54.05%	36.94%	53.47%
68	42831	-3.45%	34.80%	22.30%	38.37%	50.15%
69	44483	0.28%	29.98%	28.68%	33.47%	56.94%
70	42410	-4.40%	69.68%	26.00%	71.47%	14.04%
71	46188	4.12%	67.79%	11.39%	70.82%	16.92%
72	43876	-1.09%	40.03%	58.74%	43.75%	50.27%
73	44244	-0.26%	70.95%	22.13%	73.82%	17.65%
74	46403	4.61%	79.56%	9.85%	81.75%	6.41%
75	45463	2.49%	65.08%	31.99%	67.29%	27.84%
76	46572	4.99%	71.94%	29.21%	74.50%	12.96%
77	46183	4.11%	77.46%	9.20%	79.62%	9.57%
78	46459	4.73%	58.78%	10.90%	62.71%	11.67%
79	46318	4.41%	59.84%	13.11%	63.34%	9.09%
80	46461	4.74%	62.45%	16.65%	65.81%	12.81%
81	43027	-3.01%	80.60%	17.44%	83.05%	7.72%
82	46432	4.67%	72.49%	12.04%	74.20%	12.02%
83	45396	2.34%	29.35%	57.65%	33.10%	50.60%
84	44289	-0.16%	54.50%	21.38%	57.79%	21.91%
85	45637	2.88%	32.53%	38.31%	36.44%	37.62%
86	46408	4.62%	60.15%	26.11%	63.90%	28.40%

District	TTLPop20	Deviation	TTLWht20%	TTLBlk20%	WhtVAP20%	BlkVAP20%
87	46269	4.30%	28.65%	62.33%	29.76%	51.62%
88	43884	-1.07%	76.05%	16.44%	78.73%	11.71%
89	46159	4.06%	83.93%	4.42%	85.38%	3.68%
90	42520	-4.15%	46.02%	21.81%	49.92%	38.11%
91	44209	-0.34%	35.75%	53.15%	38.91%	50.29%
92	45511	2.59%	27.42%	30.65%	30.50%	50.16%
93	44889	1.19%	32.74%	54.40%	35.92%	50.26%
94	46136	4.00%	48.21%	10.19%	49.89%	36.02%
95	45041	1.54%	80.27%	9.48%	82.36%	9.25%
96	44603	0.55%	33.05%	58.61%	36.12%	57.46%
97	44517	0.35%	38.40%	64.77%	40.21%	50.26%
98	46487	4.79%	68.23%	20.80%	68.67%	17.29%
99	42224	-4.82%	1.46%	77.59%	1.71%	81.75%
100	46349	4.48%	25.03%	89.13%	26.43%	65.09%
101	42517	-4.15%	26.23%	72.54%	30.45%	51.18%
102	42951	-3.18%	34.53%	68.42%	39.05%	52.49%
103	44701	0.77%	33.26%	32.72%	36.90%	50.25%
104	46282	4.33%	75.83%	16.25%	77.83%	9.90%
105	42546	-4.09%	29.97%	35.71%	32.45%	55.09%

Field Descriptions:

TTLPop10 - 2010 Total Population (TTL Pop)

TTLPop20 - 2020 Total Population (TTL Pop)

TTLWht10% - 2010 Not-Hispanic White Alone Total Pop%

TTLBlk10% - 2010 Any Part Black Total Pop%

TTLWht20% - 2020 Not-Hispanic White Alone Total Pop%

TTLBlk20% - 2020 Any Part Black Total Pop%

WhtVAP20% - 2020 Not-Hispanic White Alone VAP%

BlkVAP20% - 2020 Any Part Black VAP%