

CEASEFIRE VIRGINIA

CEASEFIRE VIRGINIA PRELIMINARY REPORT

Prepared for: The Office of the Attorney General of Virginia

September 2025

Acknowledgements

The Ceasefire Virginia Preliminary Report was prepared for the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia (OAG). The Center for Public Policy (CPP) within VCU's L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University is the trusted partner for public leaders in driving change for the common good. Our vision is to serve as the premier public policy consulting and research center for state, regional, and local leaders to evaluate and enhance decision-making capabilities, organization systems, and service delivery to positively impact their communities. Over the last two years, staff from the CPP have worked closely with OAG staff to develop and conduct a mixed methods evaluation of the Ceasefire Virginia campaign. Specifically, the CPP worked in tandem with the Director of Crime Reduction Initiatives, Mark Fero, and the Statewide Ceasefire Coordinator, Morgan Abbate, who assisted in guiding the evaluation, obtaining data, and building connections throughout the Commonwealth. Building connections was essential to the completion of the Ceasefire evaluation. The CPP extends thanks to OAG staff, Police Chiefs and representatives in the Cities of Chesapeake, Danville, Emporia, Hampton, Hopewell, Lynchburg, Martinsville, Newport News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Portsmouth, Richmond, and Roanoke, as well as analyst from the Virginia State Police, for sharing their time, expertise, and data. Additionally, our gratitude is extended to private sector partners at Madison and Main and FLOCK safety for assisting in sending and sharing data and expertise. A special thanks also to our student workers who contributed at various times throughout the project lifespan, particularly Victor Amuzu, Maria Bonwell, Jordan Brooks, Ari Galbraith, Kayla Howard, Sophia Macchiarolo, and Monali Mal.

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Executive Summary

In October of 2022, Attorney General Jason Miyares announced Ceasefire Virginia – a violent crime reduction strategy which partners with localities to support initiatives in high-crime neighborhoods in order to get the most violent and repeat offenders off the streets, while supporting local law enforcement and prevention and intervention strategies. Thirteen localities were selected as Ceasefire Virginia localities: Chesapeake, Danville, Emporia, Hampton, Hopewell, Lynchburg, Martinsville, Newport News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Portsmouth, Richmond, and Roanoke. The OAG entered into a project contract with the Center for Public Policy (CPP) at Virginia Commonwealth University for evaluation services related to the implementation of Ceasefire across the Commonwealth. In partnership with the OAG, the CPP developed a mixed methods evaluation strategy to provide a holistic assessment of all Ceasefire activities. The CPP is releasing a preliminary report highlighting the evaluation components completed to this point. A full evaluation report is expected to be released by the end of the year (2025). Major findings include:

- From 2022-2025, the OAG sponsored initiatives and programming to support violent crime reduction in 13 Virginia localities. The programming centered around 4 pillars: Partnerships & Community Engagement, Prevention & Intervention, Suppression, and Accountability.
- Overall violent crime in Virginia has been declining in recent years. Total violent crime dropped from 21,588 to 19,977 with a 7.5% decrease overall from 2023-2024. Declines in violent crime contributed significantly to the overall decline in the Commonwealth. For all Ceasefire cities, total violent crime decreased from 2023 to 2024 by 8.5%, dropping from 7,683 to 7,027 total violent crimes.
- 64% of the decrease in homicides in Virginia from 2023-2024 can be attributed to decreases in homicides in the Ceasefire localities and 40% of the decrease in overall violent crime from 2023-2024 can be attributed to decreases in overall violent crime in Ceasefire localities. 68% of the decrease in homicides in Virginia from 2021-2024 can be attributed to decreases in homicides in the Ceasefire localities.
- A survey of Ceasefire locality residents found that about 60% describe crime as at least a moderate problem, with 31% seeing it as moderate, 20% very serious, and 6.5% extremely serious. A majority felt that crime has increased, particularly crime in general (60%) and violent crime (55%).
- The majority of Ceasefire locality residents hold generally favorable levels of trust and approval relative to the local police department, with 76% agreeing that officers make their community safer and officers treat people in the community with respect (71%) and fairly (65%). The majority of respondents (72%) believe the local police department do a good job.
- Residents who are more satisfied with their local police department consistently report feeling safer – in general, during the day, or night – and are less likely to view crime as a serious problem. Higher satisfaction with their local police department is also associated with lower probability of perceiving violent and property crime as increasing.

- Residents who believe that guns have increased are also more inclined to perceive crime as a more serious problem and to perceive violent crime as having increased.
- Focus groups with law enforcement officers in Ceasefire Virginia localities experience violent crime as increasing, particularly among juveniles, and being amplified by social media. Violent crime is being glorified via social media and encouraging the theft of guns and the drug trade. Focus group participants reported wide support from their overall communities but felt a lack of accountability for juveniles exacerbated violent crime. Many participants reported their Departments to be woefully understaffed, causing officers to be overworked, which hindered proactive policing. Technology was cited as a “gamechanger” for officers and a “huge help” for short staffing issues. Specifically, officers highlighted the use of FLOCK ALPRs and surveillance cameras. Overall, officers believed Ceasefire Virginia efforts to be working, but expressed the need for better cooperation with their local prosecutors and the need for more equipment funding.
- A Virginia Cost of Crime calculator found that the cost of all crimes reported to police in 2024 was approximately \$8.9 billion with violent crimes accounting for approximately 69% of this cost (\$6.1 billion). Per Virginian household, the cost of all police reported crime in 2024 was \$2,626, with 2024 violent crime costing \$1,800 per household.
- A 1% reduction in police reported crimes across all categories studied would yield a savings of approximately \$89.3 million.
- A modified return on investment (ROI) analysis revealed the Ceasefire Virginia media campaign investments are in line with similar efforts in Virginia and other states and had an estimated return on investment (ROI) of 260%. For every \$1 invested in this campaign, the state saved approximately \$3.60. Per household, this campaign had an ROI of approximately \$2.22
- A modified return on investment (ROI) analysis of FLOCK Automatic License Plate Readers revealed an estimated return on investment (ROI) of approximately 127.6%. For every \$1 invested in this campaign, the state saved approximately \$2.28
- ALPRs are widely popular among law enforcement officers, “It has been a complete gamechanger” and “We could not operate at our current capacity without FLOCK and other tech” and Virginia residents with the majority of Virginians (57%) viewing local law enforcement’s use of ALPRs positively.
- A complete analysis is expected to be delivered in November of 2025.

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Introduction

Ceasefire Virginia is a violence reduction initiative launched in late 2022 by Virginia Attorney General Jason Miyares, in partnership with local elected officials and law enforcement. The program targets serious and repeat offenders involved in violent criminal activity, with the goal of reducing violence in high-crime areas across the Commonwealth, while rebuilding trust and safety within Virginia communities. Ceasefire Virginia focuses on four driving pillars: Partnerships & Community Engagement, Prevention & Intervention, Suppression, and Accountability.

Ceasefire Virginia is currently being implemented in 13 cities, selected based on their contribution to overall violent crime increases over the prior decade. The Ceasefire localities include the cities of:

- Chesapeake
- Hampton
- Newport News
- Norfolk
- Portsmouth
- Emporia
- Hopewell
- Petersburg
- Richmond
- Danville
- Lynchburg
- Martinsville
- Roanoke

Ceasefire Virginia Evaluation

To support the Accountability pillar, in June of 2023, the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia (OAG) entered into a project contract with the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs' Center for Public Policy (CPP) at Virginia Commonwealth University for evaluation services related to the implementation of Ceasefire across the Commonwealth. Originally conceptualized as an implementation evaluation of Real Time Crime Centers (RTCC), locality delays with procurement, approvals, and implementation, the evaluation shifted to an overall assessment of Ceasefire Virginia.

In partnership with the OAG, the CPP developed a mixed methods evaluation strategy (Figure 1) which provides a holistic assessment of all Ceasefire Virginia activities. The evaluation features violent crime trend analysis, community-based surveys and focus groups with law enforcement officers in each Ceasefire locality, the creation of a Virginia Cost of Crime Calculator –used to complete a modified Return on Investment (ROI) analysis– and a descriptive analysis of all OAG-sponsored Ceasefire Virginia components to date. In its role as a neutral facilitator and research partner, the CPP synthesized data from multiple sources, with the goal to provide clear and actionable insights that support both ongoing initiatives and future policy decisions.




Figure 1: Ceasefire Virginia Evaluation Framework

Due to issues with data availability, the CPP is releasing a preliminary report highlighting the evaluation components completed to this point. A full evaluation report is expected to be released by the end of the year (2025). This preliminary report evaluates the implementation and impact of Ceasefire Virginia aligned strategies in localities throughout the Commonwealth. The evaluation, which began with establishing a baseline for assessment (the subject of this preliminary evaluation report) will conclude with a final report, summarizing overall effectiveness and detailing repeated measures (to be conducted in 2026-2027).

Included in this preliminary evaluation report is a detailed background on Ceasefire Virginia, an overview of the OAG initiatives in each Ceasefire locality—categorized by Ceasefire Pillar, results of the Ceasefire Community Perceptions Survey, law enforcement focus group results, and introduction to the Virginia Cost of Crime Calculator and quasi-ROI analysis. The report will conclude with initial recommendations and a review of the next steps in the Ceasefire Virginia Evaluation.

Ceasefire Virginia Background

In October of 2022, Attorney General Jason Miyares announced Ceasefire Virginia – a violent crime reduction strategy which partners with localities to support initiatives in high-crime neighborhoods in order to get the most violent and repeat offenders off the streets. Due to rises in crime in certain areas, the OAG selected to partner with the following localities for Ceasefire Virginia:

Ceasefire Virginia is currently being implemented in 13 cities, including:

- Chesapeake
- Hampton
- Newport News
- Norfolk
- Portsmouth
- Emporia
- Hopewell
- Petersburg
- Richmond
- Danville
- Lynchburg
- Martinsville
- Roanoke

The Virginia Violent Crime Task Force

Ceasefire Virginia grew from a joint Violent Crime Task Force (VCTF), convened in early 2022 by Governor Glen Youngkin and Attorney General Jason Miyares. The Task Force brought together state leaders from the Office of the Attorney General, Virginia Departments of Criminal Justice Services, Juvenile Justice, and Corrections, Virginia State Police, the United States Attorney's Offices serving Virginia, and representatives from local Virginia law enforcement, and research professionals.¹ The VCTF highlighted the rise in violent crime since 2012, noting a 20% increase in the overall violent crime rate, driven largely by increases in aggravated assaults (41%) and homicides (72%).² Additionally, the task force determined several localities (13) accounted for the majority of homicides and gun-related aggravated assaults across the Commonwealth.

The VCTF implemented a two-phase approach to explore solutions to violent crime in Virginia. Phase 1 focused on convening roundtables with localities to strengthen collaboration, share insights, and guide next steps. Coordinated by VCTF participants, the

¹ Governor of Virginia. (2022, May 16). *Governor Glenn Youngkin announces Violent Crime Task Force*. <https://www.governor.virginia.gov/newsroom/news-releases/2022/may/name-933182-en.html>

² Internal VCTF working papers.

roundtables were held in Chesapeake, Newport News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Portsmouth, Prince William County, Richmond, Roanoke, and Virginia Beach. Recommendations from the roundtable included the need for:

- Recreational activities and mentorship for juveniles,
- Increased police presence,
- Encouraging parental involvement,
- Providing more educational opportunities for youth, and
- Workforce development and resources.

Using these findings, and coupled with violent crime trends, the VCTF transitioned to Phase 2 – strategic planning and implementation. The task force identified several leverage points:

1. Increasing capacity and support for law enforcement professionals.
2. Keeping criminals off the street.
3. Supporting children and rehabilitating juvenile offenders.
4. Revitalizing economic development in abandoned communities.
5. Forging community compacts for tailored action plans.

While the Governor's Secretariats worked to implement the leverage points of Phase 2 – increasing funding for local law enforcement through Department of Criminal Justice Services grants or increasing pay and bonuses for staff from the Departments of Juvenile Justice and Corrections or securing job investments throughout the Commonwealth – the Attorney General worked in tandem to declare a Ceasefire throughout Virginia.

Ceasefire Virginia

To build upon the VCTF identified leverage points, Attorney General Jason Miyares launched Ceasefire Virginia in October 2022. The mission of Ceasefire Virginia – reducing violent crime while fostering secure communities – built upon the momentum of the VCTF by deploying collaborative strategies with local law enforcement and community partners.³ The overarching message of Ceasefire was to

³ <https://www.oag.state.va.us/programs-outreach/ceasefire-virginia>

save the lives of citizens of the Commonwealth, especially by reducing gun violence. More specifically, Ceasefire Virginia emphasized the commitment to upholding the law and safeguarding Virginia communities by concentrating strategic efforts across four pillars: Partnerships and Community Engagement, Prevention and Intervention, Suppression, and Accountability.

- **Partnerships and Community Engagement** refer to fostering meaningful engagement and trust-building between and among law enforcement, prosecutors, communities, and other stakeholders. Initiatives within this pillar focus on building and sustaining relationships with Ceasefire localities to include coordinating training events, Group/Community Violence Interventions, and other coordinated anti-violence investments within a locality.
- **Prevention and Intervention** pertain to problem-solving approaches that address violent crime using an array of available tools, programming, and resources within a locality. Initiatives within this pillar center on working with existing programs that utilize strategies to address risk and protective factors, which often involve building relationships with representatives of agencies and organizations most suited to provide education, social services, job training and placement, reentry programs, or similar resources to those in need.
- **Suppression** centers around enhancing law enforcement's ability to be proactive and take immediate action to stop crime. This pillar focuses on galvanizing strategic enforcement efforts by local law enforcement and the Virginia State Police (VSP). Violent crime is often driven by a small number of prolific offenders and is typically concentrated in hotspots. Critical elements of strategic enforcement include understanding the most significant drivers of violence and resources, leveraging technology and analytics, and developing and implementing enforcement strategies.
- **Accountability** ensures all other pillars are functioning credibly and focus on long-term impact by investing in partnerships that analyze the effectiveness of strategies for success. Initiatives within this pillar include strategic prosecutions to guarantee violent offenders are held accountable for their crimes within localities, as well as the overall evaluation of Ceasefire Virginia.

The OAG has been hard at work since the launch of Ceasefire Virginia to reduce violent crime and build positive community relationships through the coordination and implementation of initiatives across all pillars. The following section details actions taken by the OAG in each Ceasefire Virginia pillar.

Ceasefire Virginia Pillars in Action

Building upon the efforts of the Virginia Violent Crime Task Force, staff from the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) began developing, coordinating, and implementing initiatives prioritized via Ceasefire Virginia Pillars. The OAG began by coordinating eight roundtables in Ceasefire localities with the bringing together local government, law enforcement, and community partners. The roundtables allowed OAG to gather information about specific needs in each locality, while also learning important locality dynamics and identifying key partners and stakeholders. With information gathered from the roundtables, the OAG began to strategize with localities to develop programming and initiatives based on the needs of each locality – all centering around the Ceasefire pillars. Data for this descriptive summary was provided through interviews with OAG staff and OAG record reviews.

Partnerships and Community Engagement

Within this pillar of Ceasefire Virginia, the OAG worked to foster meaningful engagement and trust-building between and among law enforcement, prosecutors, communities, and other stakeholders. To support this pillar, and the overall Ceasefire Virginia framework, the OAG hired a statewide Ceasefire Coordinator and three regional Ceasefire Coordinators. The Ceasefire coordinators worked to cultivate relationships with law enforcement and community partners in the Ceasefire localities. This included facilitating meetings, events, and training across local, state, and federal partners in law enforcement, the public sector, and non-profit, community serving organizations. In Petersburg, for example, the OAG assisted in the implementation of the Partnership for Petersburg⁴ and coordinated two reentry job fairs. In addition to coordinating, facilitating, and staffing meetings and events in Ceasefire localities with community-based organizations and law enforcement partners. Other initiatives include:

- **Anti-violence grant funding** sponsored by the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) was awarded to several Ceasefire Virginia localities through Operation Ceasefire and Firearm Violence Intervention and Prevention⁵ (FVIP) grants. The OAG helped coordinate, and secure funding for several Ceasefire localities to include Ceasefire grants for Commonwealth Attorney Offices (CA) in Emporia, Hampton, Petersburg, Portsmouth, and Richmond; for Police Departments (PD) and Sheriff Offices (SO) in Emporia, Martinsville, Newport News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Richmond, and Roanoke; and for nonprofits in

⁴ <https://www.pfp.governor.virginia.gov/>

⁵ <https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/grants/programs/firearm-violence-intervention-and-prevention-fvip-grant-program-cy2026-2027>

Hopewell and Richmond. FVIP grants were also awarded to nonprofits in Newport News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Portsmouth, Richmond; PDs (or the City at large) in Danville, Emporia, Lynchburg, Petersburg, Richmond, and Roanoke. Additionally, four Ceasefire localities - Norfolk, Portsmouth, Richmond, and Roanoke - were also selected to receive funding through Safer Communities, designed to support holistic, community-based strategies that address the root causes and conditions of community violence.⁶

- **Hospital-based Violence Intervention Programs (HVIPs)** are designed to break cycles of violent injury and retaliation by using the hospital setting as a key point of intervention. HVIPs serve patients who come into the emergency department with violence-related injuries through crisis intervention and counseling, mediation to reduce retaliation risk, case management – connecting people to mental health, employment, education, housing, and mentoring, and follow-up support after discharge.⁷ The OAG helped coordinate, and secure funding for HVIPs operating in Newport News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Richmond and Roanoke.
- **Group/Community Violence Intervention** is a strategy aimed at reducing group- and gang-related violence by combining law enforcement efforts with community support and social services. It uses direct communication with individuals at highest risk to discourage violence and connect them with resources. While also addressing the prevention and intervention pillar, during the Summer of 2023, staff from the OAG began coordinating partnerships with localities and the National Network of Safer Communities⁸ (NNSC) to implement the focused deterrence framework, also known as Group Violence Intervention (GVI) or Community Violence Intervention (CVI) to the tri-cities, Hampton Roads, and Roanoke areas. The programming began first in Hopewell, utilizing a partnership with the nonprofit Real Life to facilitate the GVI programing. In the Spring of 2024, Roanoke completed the GVI university, a problem analysis with NNSC, and hired an outreach coordinator and project manager to begin implementing GVI. NNSC also worked with Hampton PD to conduct a problem analysis. Unfortunately, the contract with NNSC was terminated in 2024, but GVI efforts still continue in many of the Ceasefire localities. For example, the Center for Public Policy performed a problem analysis with Petersburg Police Department to inform their GVI implementation.

⁶ <https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/safer-communities-youth-services/operation-ceasefire-grant-ocg>

⁷ <https://www.vhha.com/pressroom/vhha-highlights-successful-hospital-efforts-to-address-community-violence/>

⁸ <https://nnscommunities.org/strategies/group-violence-intervention/>

Prevention and Intervention

Referring to problem-solving approaches that address violent crime, the OAG's staff and Ceasefire coordinators worked to leverage an array of available tools, programming, and resources to prevent violent crime and intervene with violent offenders. For Ceasefire Virginia, OAG prevention initiatives centered mainly around coordinating training for localities, Virginia Rules Implementation, and an extensive, multitiered media campaign.

- **Sponsored training:** A key component to prevention and intervention is awareness and training. To better inform localities on existing trends, skills, and resources, the OAG sponsored and coordinated multiple trainings in Ceasefire localities. Ceasefire Virginia Coordinators worked with localities to bring gang training, led by the Virginia Gang Investigator Association (VGIA) to Chesapeake, Hampton, Hopewell, Newport News, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Richmond, and Roanoke. In addition to gang awareness and investigation training, OAG Ceasefire Coordinators also organized High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) training in Emporia, Hampton, and Newport News. Ceasefire Virginia Coordinators also organized Firearm Enforcement and Prosecutions training in Emporia, Hampton, Norfolk, and Richmond.
- **Media Campaign:** To support the prevention and intervention pillar, in the Summer of 2023, the OAG contracted with Madison and Main⁹ (M+M), a branding, PR, and Marketing firm to develop the Ceasefire Virginia media campaign. This campaign began with securing the Ceasefire Virginia website¹⁰ and the development of Ceasefire branding materials (logos, banners, flyers, pamphlets, etc). In the Fall of 2023, M+M began conducting interviews and background research for the development of ads and targeted marketing materials for the awareness and anti-retaliatory Ceasefire messaging. In Winter of 2023, the 'Game Over' theme was chosen as a media strategy and was launched in January of 2024. The media campaign included the following elements:¹¹

⁹ <https://madisonmain.com/>

¹⁰ <https://madisonmain.com/>

¹¹ A complete evaluation of the media campaign will be included in the final report.

- Linear, Cable, and Streaming Television advertising airing in the designated market areas (DMA) of Richmond and Petersburg; Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Newport News; and Roanoke and Lynchburg from January 2024 through July 2025. The DMAs allowed coverage within all Ceasefire localities. During that timeframe, approximately 3850 ads aired.




- Radio advertisements also played across the DMAs, covering outreach to all Ceasefire localities. From January 2024 through July 2025, approximately 5600 radio ads aired.
- Out of home advertising featured billboards, yard signs, bus wraps, and direct mail distributions. Throughout 2024 and 2025, 115 billboards were placed in Ceasefire localities, including Chesapeake, Danville, Emporia, Hampton Lynchburg, Martinsville, Newport News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Portsmouth, Richmond, and Roanoke. It is estimated the billboards garnered over 53,718,00 impressions.¹²
- Anti-retaliatory advertisements were sent to specific zip codes after violent events in Ceasefire localities. The OAG compiled a list of violent crimes in real time and forwarded to M+M, which triggered anti-retaliatory messaging to target electronic media, geo-fenced by the zip code of the violent crime. The ads aired for 7 days following the event. In 2024, 399 anti-retaliatory events triggered ads across 97 unique zip codes. In 2025, 182 anti-retaliatory events triggered ads across 96 unique zip codes. In total, the anti-retaliatory ads amassed over 607,000 impressions.

¹² GeoPath, which is the industry measurement service (like Nielsen or Comscore for OOH) uses traffic data to calculate the # of exposures then uses DMA demographic data to further calculate assumed exposure to various demo groups. It is usually updated 1x a year in the Fall.

- Digital advertising was also created centered around the “Game Over” branding strategy. M+M developed 27 unique ads which aired across Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Youtube. In 2025, the ads received over 13,427,600 impressions and 17,681 clicks.
- **Virginia Rules:** Created by the Office of the Attorney General, Virginia Rules is an educational program designed to help instructors, parents, and students understand the laws that apply to Virginia teens. The purpose of Virginia Rules is to educate young Virginians about Virginia laws and help them develop skills needed to make sound decisions, to avoid breaking laws, and to become active citizens of their schools and communities. While Virginia Rules is a statewide initiative, the program is an active part of the prevention pillar in Ceasefire localities. The image below highlights Virginia Rules activities throughout the Commonwealth. Since the launch of the new VA Rules system in November of 2022, about 460 reports have been submitted; 121 reports were submitted in 2023, 199 reports were submitted in 2024, and 111 reports were submitted in 2025 so far.

CEASEFIRE VIRGINIA RULES SUMMER CAMPS



In 2004, Virginia Rules founded a law-themed summer program that combines outdoor fun with lesson on Virginia laws, giving youth the chance to build decision-making skills and positive relationships with law enforcement. The program has expanded to more than 20 localities statewide with support from schools, civic groups, and community organizations. The graphic below shows the Ceasefire cities that have hosted Virginia Rules summer camps over the past three years, along with the number of camps held in each city. Learn more at <https://virginiarules.org/>.


Suppression

Enhancing law enforcement's ability to be proactive and take immediate action to stop crime was central to the Suppression pillar. The OAG worked with local law enforcement and VSP to fund needed technological updates and coordinate strategic enforcement efforts. OAG sponsored suppression efforts in Ceasefire localities includes:

- **Law Enforcement Technology Funding:** The OAG coordinated the distribution of American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) funding to Ceasefire Virginia localities. All but one Ceasefire Virginia (Hopewell) locality received ARPA funding via a one-time payment of up to \$750,000. ARPA funding was used to purchase much needed law enforcement equipment and technology such as computer hardware and software, mobile device forensic equipment such as greykey and cellbrite, surveillance and license plate reader cameras, drones, mobile command vehicles and equipment, tactical gear and breaching tools, and even a robot bulldog.
- **Virginia State Police (VSP) Surges:** Contributing to the Suppression Pillar, the OAG also assisted in funding VSP special enforcement projects in Ceasefire localities. In its first year, VSP officers worked over 16,600 hours in specialized efforts, seizing over 400 pounds of drugs (worth close to \$3,350,000) and over 100 guns, making over 200 felony arrests. In 2023 and 2024, VSP conducted 63 targeted surges across all Ceasefire localities.
- **Recovered Firearms:** A key component of the Ceasefire Virginia Suppression Pillar was to remove guns from the streets. In 2022, law enforcement partners reported removing 5659 guns from Ceasefire localities. In 2023, law enforcement partners reported removing 6323 guns from Ceasefire localities. By 2024, law enforcement partners reported removing 6958 guns from Ceasefire localities. Staff from the OAG reported the guns were taken off the street through arrests, seizures, surrenders, or recovered as found property.
- **Ballistics IQ:** While many law enforcement agencies struggled with recruitment and retention, technology has been a powerful solution under the Suppression Pillar to provide law enforcement agencies with tools to perform their jobs more efficiently. One such tool, that several Ceasefire and other Virginia localities have adopted, is Ballistics IQ (BIQ) - a portable ballistics triage tool that can quickly identify and catalog firearm evidence at a crime scene.¹³ The OAG funded and assisted in facilitating

¹³ Ballistics IQ. Evidence IQ. (2025). <https://evidenceiq.com/products/ballistics-iq>

partnerships with Ceasefire localities and BallisticsIQ, to secure the technology for localities. The technology creates a detailed Crime Scene Analysis (CSA) report which is then uploaded to the BIQ portal. Within an average of 4 hours, BIQ can provide a report that details the minimum number of firearms involved, the identity of a possible manufacturer, a recommendation of the best case to upload to National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) for comparison, and a list of other crimes the firearm may be connected to. In comparison, manual forensics identification can cost agencies a significant amount of time and money. Using BIQ, increases overall investigation efficiency and reduces financial strain on agencies, while also increasing collaboration between agencies. By uploading directly to the NIBIN, the only interstate automated ballistic imaging network in the United States, agencies are able to access a larger pool of resources and intelligence for firearm-related investigations. Currently, several localities in Virginia use Ballistic IQ (BIQ) to their advantage in their law enforcement agencies. The image below highlights the use of BIQ by Ceasefire localities¹⁴.



- **Danville Police Department** scanned 6,521 cartridge cases, generating 1,380 Crime Scene Analysis (CSA) reports, which revealed 166 potential links in the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) to their respective cases.

¹⁴ Data provided by EvidenceIQ, the parent company of BIQ.

- **Emporia Police Department** scanned 35 cartridge cases resulting in 1 CSA report.
 - **Hampton Police Department** created 2 CSA reports resulting from 49 cartridge case scans
 - **Lynchburg Police Department** scanned 1,584 cartridge cases, resulting in 256 CSA reports and finding 6 potential links in the NIBIN.
 - **Martinsville Police Department** scanned 66 cartridge cases, and created 29 CSA reports.
 - **Newport News Police Department** found 10 potential links in the NIBIN from 37 different CSA reports, produced from 366 cartridge case scans.
 - **Norfolk Police Department** uncovered 1 link in the NIBIN from their 29 CSA reports created from 189 cartridge case scans.
 - **Petersburg Police Department** scanned 287 cartridge cases to create 20 CSA reports.
 - **Portsmouth Police Department** scanned 6,416 cartridge cases to create 702 unique CSA reports, leading to 9 potential links to their investigations in the NIBIN.
 - **Roanoke Police Department** produced 1,382 CSA reports, from 5,428 cartridge case scans to assist in their investigations.
- **FLOCK:** Another law enforcement technology that has assisted law enforcement is FLOCK Safety technology. The OAG funded and assisted in building partnerships between Ceasefire localities and FLOCK Safety¹⁵ to aid in the Ceasefire Suppression Pillar. The main product implemented in Ceasefire Virginia localities were Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR). Along with other cameras, ALPRs can be used to aid in police investigatory and property and people recovery efforts. ALPRs detect license plates and vehicles (including general descriptions of vehicles), and do not detect faces, people, gender, or race. With expanded implementation, ALPRs have received various criticisms to include being an invasion of privacy to promulgating a system of

¹⁵<https://www.flocksafety.com/>

mass surveillance.¹⁶ To quell some of these concerns, and at the recommendation of the Virginia Crime Commission,¹⁷ the Virginia General Assembly recently passed legislation¹⁸ limiting the use of ALPRs to during a criminal investigation, when there is reasonable suspicion of a crime; as part of an active investigation involving a missing or endangered person (including human trafficking cases); and for receiving alerts regarding such persons, stolen vehicles, or stolen license plates. The legislation also limits the sharing of access to cameras to in-state, requires purging of data after 21 days, and requires usage data to be shared with VSP, as well as other data safeguards.

- A recent survey of randomly selected Virginians by the Center for Public Policy showed the majority of Virginians view ALPR use by their local law enforcement positively (57%) with 33% feeling negatively towards the idea. When asked to what extent the use of LPR technology by local law enforcement affects their sense of safety, the highest proportion of Virginians felt that use of LPR technology increases their sense of safety (45%) though 35% felt it has no impact. Virginians were also asked to rate their level of support or opposition for the restrictions on the use of LPRs by law enforcement—67% of Virginians support restrictions on its use and 23% oppose restrictions.
- While the new Virginia ALPR legislation requires law enforcement agencies adopting the technology to create and post a use policy, many Ceasefire Virginia localities have already implemented policies to ensure appropriate use and transparency, including Chesapeake, Danville, Emporia, Hampton, Hopewell, Lynchburg, Martinsville, Newport News, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Richmond, and Roanoke. Additionally, all but one Ceasefire Virginia locality (Petersburg) maintains a publicly available FLOCK transparency page, detailing use policy, prohibited uses, the total number of ALPR and other cameras operational in the locality, and the number of searches conducted in the last 30 days.¹⁹

¹⁶ <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF13068>.

¹⁷ <https://vsc.virginia.gov/Annual%20Reports/2024%20VSCC%20Annual%20Report%20-Law%20Enforcement%20Use%20of%20ALPR.pdf>

¹⁸ <https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacodeupdates/title2.2/section2.2-5517/>



¹⁹ Full assessment of FLOCK implementation to be included in the final report.

Accountability

Promoting accountability for violent offenders and measuring success ensures all other Ceasefire Virginia pillars are functioning credibly. Accountability allows for confirmation of programmatic success, flexibility to alter and update programming, and sustainability for long term Ceasefire Virginia goals.

- **Ceasefire Prosecutions:** To target the Ceasefire Virginia goal of removing violent offenders from the street, the OAG funded seven state and federal prosecutors - 3 serving the Hampton Roads area, 2 serving the Roanoke area, and 2 serving the metro Richmond area. Through 2024, prosecutors have worked over 170 Federal cases and 65 state cases, securing over 200 indictments, resulting in more than 60 violent criminals currently incarcerated with 2 life sentences and over 500 years of prison time.
- **Research Partnership:** In June of 2023, to support the Accountability pillar, the OAG entered into a project contract with the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs' Center for Public Policy (CPP) at Virginia Commonwealth University for evaluation services related to the implementation of Ceasefire across the Commonwealth. In partnership with the OAG, the CPP developed a mixed methods evaluation strategy which will provide a holistic assessment of all Ceasefire activities. In addition to items detailed within this Preliminary Evaluation Report (Ceasefire Virginia Descriptive Summary, Community Safety Survey, Law Enforcement Focus Groups, Cost of Crime Generator, Quasi-ROI analyses), the CPP also worked on other needs for the OAG during the duration of the contract.
 - **Virginia Crime Dashboard:** A critical need during the beginning of Ceasefire Virginia was the ability to access up-to-date violent crime data from Ceasefire localities, as one was not currently in existence. Staff from the CPP assisted with the planning and development of an online crime dashboard that utilized incident level data from police departments in Ceasefire localities in Virginia. Data was specifically collected for violent crimes including aggravated assault, murder and non-negligent manslaughter, robbery, and rape. The CPP also requested daily data exports from each police department including the incident number, date, location, crime classification, and the type of force used with the intention of replacing web scraped data with exports directly from departments. Utilizing these daily data updates, the CPP created a data dashboard to display visualizations including week-to-date, month-to-date, and year-to-date violent crime totals with

comparisons to the previous period. Ultimately, however, the Governor's office engaged with a private contractor to develop the final product, which provides monthly data from Virginia State Police (VSP) on all of the Ceasefire localities.



- Strategic Planning Meeting:** In the Fall of 2023, staff from the CPP assisted OAG Ceasefire staff in meeting planning and breakout session facilitation for the Newport News Strategic Planning Meeting. Close to 100 (98) area stakeholders attended the Strategic Planning Meeting. The two-day event featured briefing sessions on the Ceasefire initiative from representatives from the National Network for Safe Communities, awareness sessions about Hospital-based Violence Interventions and Virginia Rules, and an introductory session to the Virginia Ceasefire initiative. In addition, CPP created, disseminated, and produced and

evaluated results from a 'Temperature Check' survey of meeting participants. The planning meeting included subgroups for prevention, intervention, suppression, and reentry and focused on identifying existing resources and needs for future Ceasefire implementation.

- **Spot Crime Analysis:** On more than 25 occasions across the contract period, analysts from the CPP provided on-demand crime analysis services for the OAG. This included quarterly data collection and analysis from each Ceasefire Virginia locality, crime summary and trend tracking as needed, and completion of a shoot review for Petersburg police department. Crime summary and trend analysis was for elected official briefings, reports to policymakers, grant applications, and media requests. Staff from the CPP also served as key informants and shared data with OAG contractors including FLOCK, EvidenceIQ, and Madison and Main.

Since the inception of Ceasefire Virginia in the Fall of 2022, the OAG has coordinated, facilitated, and implemented trainings, initiatives, and programming across all Ceasefire Virginia Pillars. The following section details the impact of Ceasefire Virginia through crime trends and hotspot mapping.

Crime Trends

Researchers from the Center for Public Policy (CPP) tracked crime trends from 2020 to 2025. Aggregate data across violent crime categories was provided bi-weekly, and upon request from the Virginia State Police (VSP). Only crime incident counts are tracked by VSP. To facilitate a deeper analysis, analysts from the CPP collected quarterly, incident-level data from individual Ceasefire localities. Crime data used in this analysis included incident level data for January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2024 from VSP and all Ceasefire localities and included the following violent crimes: aggravated assault, murder or non-negligent manslaughter, robbery, and rape (FBI definition). Crime data obtained from localities included street level addresses which were geocoded for analysis. Incidents also included information on if a firearm was used or not.

Violent Crime

Four categories of crimes from collected from VSP and Ceasefire Locality police departments and were categorized as violent crimes including aggravated assault, murder or non-negligent manslaughter, robbery, and rape (FBI definition). Any violent crimes that involved a firearm were also included in a separate category for firearm-involved violent crimes. The table below displays violent crime counts across each Ceasefire Locality, by category from 2021 to 2024 and also displays the percentage of change in each crime category: 2024 vs. 2023, 2024 vs 2022, and 2024 vs. 2021. In addition, the figure shows the crime rate across each category in 2024.

Major findings from the analysis include:

- 64% of the decrease in homicides in Virginia from 2023-2024 can be attributed to decreases in homicides in the Ceasefire localities.
- 40% of the decrease in overall violent crime from 2023-2024 can be attributed to decreases in overall violent crime in Ceasefire localities
- 40% of the decrease in homicides in Virginia from 2022-2024 can be attributed to decreases in homicides in the Ceasefire localities.
- 49% of the decrease in overall violent crime from 2022-2024 can be attributed to decreases in overall violent crime in Ceasefire localities
- 68% of the decrease in homicides in Virginia from 2021-2024 can be attributed to decreases in homicides in the Ceasefire localities.

Ceasefire Locality	2024 Population	Offense Type	2021	2022	2023	2024	23-24 Growth %	22 - 24 Growth %	21 -24 Growth %	2024 Crime Rate (per 100K)
Chesapeake City	254,997	All Offense Types	15,841	17,022	16,730	15,575	-6.90	-8.50	-1.68	6.1079
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	28	25	10	12	20.00	-52.00	-57.14	0.0047
		All Rape	115	80	94	63	-32.98	-21.25	-45.22	0.0247
		Aggravated Assault	975	874	872	701	-19.61	-19.79	-28.10	0.2749
		Robbery	84	106	117	116	-0.85	9.43	38.10	0.0455
		Total Violent Crime	1,202	1,085	1,093	892	-18.39	-17.79	-25.79	0.3498
Danville City	42,239	All Offense Types	3,878	3,696	3,969	3,834	-3.40	3.73	-1.13	9.0769
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	6	8	6	9	50.00	12.50	50.00	0.0213
		All Rape	19	20	19	15	-21.05	-25.00	-21.05	0.0355
		Aggravated Assault	107	86	117	112	-4.27	30.23	4.67	0.2652
		Robbery	30	25	18	22	22.22	-12.00	-26.67	0.0521
		Total Violent Crime	162	139	160	158	-1.25	13.67	-2.47	0.3741
Emporia City	5,633	All Offense Types	527	544	526	514	-2.28	-5.51	-2.47	9.1248
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	1	3	2	1	-50.00	-66.67	0.00	0.0178
		All Rape	4	2	5	1	-80.00	-50.00	-75.00	0.0178
		Aggravated Assault	16	10	27	49	81.48	390.00	206.25	0.8699
		Robbery	1	10	5	8	60.00	-20.00	700.00	0.1420
		Total Violent Crime	22	25	39	59	51.28	136.00	168.18	1.0474

Figure 3: Violent Crime in Ceasefire Localities

Ceasefire Locality	2024 Population	Offense Type	2021	2022	2023	2024	23-24 Growth %	22 - 24 Growth %	21 -24 Growth %	2024 Crime Rate (per 100K)
Hampton City	137,596	All Offense Types	9,581	9,990	10,653	9,834	-7.69	-1.56	2.64	7.1470
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	31	21	27	15	-44.44	-28.57	-51.61	0.0109
		All Rape	50	47	47	41	-12.77	-12.77	-18.00	0.0298
		Aggravated Assault	230	244	230	219	-4.78	-10.25	-4.78	0.1592
		Robbery	99	88	115	80	-30.43	-9.09	-19.19	0.0581
		Total Violent Crime	410	400	419	355	-15.27	-11.25	-13.41	0.2580
Hopewell City	22,944	All Offense Types	1,665	1,894	1,593	1,556	-2.32	-17.85	-6.55	6.7817
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	3	9	6	6	0.00	-33.33	100.00	0.0262
		All Rape	8	10	7	6	-14.29	-40.00	-25.00	0.0262
		Aggravated Assault	52	78	61	74	21.31	-5.13	42.31	0.3225
		Robbery	12	30	11	5	-54.55	-83.33	-58.33	0.0218
		Total Violent Crime	75	127	85	91	7.06	-28.35	21.33	0.3966
Lynchburg City	80,301	All Offense Types	5,843	6,074	5,338	5,213	-2.34	-14.18	-10.78	6.4918
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	9	8	4	9	125.00	12.50	0.00	0.0112
		All Rape	34	25	32	46	43.75	84.00	35.29	0.0573
		Aggravated Assault	243	202	202	207	2.48	2.48	-14.81	0.2578
		Robbery	49	52	37	30	-18.92	-42.31	-38.78	0.0374
		Total Violent Crime	335	287	275	292	6.18	1.74	-12.84	0.3636

Ceasefire Locality	2024 Population	Offense Type	2021	2022	2023	2024	23-24 Growth %	22 - 24 Growth %	21 -24 Growth %	2024 Crime Rate (per 100K)
Martinsville City	13,584	All Offense Types	1,192	1,057	910	762	-16.26	-27.91	-36.07	5.6095
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	3	0	3	2	-33.33	200.00	-33.33	0.0147
		All Rape	9	7	8	6	-25.00	-14.29	-33.33	0.0442
		Aggravated Assault	47	35	42	48	14.29	37.14	2.13	0.3534
		Robbery	6	10	2	2	0.00	-80.00	-66.67	0.0147
		Total Violent Crime	65	52	55	58	5.45	11.54	-10.77	0.4270
Newport News City	183,056	All Offense Types	12,406	14,029	15,853	15,044	-5.10	7.24	21.26	8.2183
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	30	31	49	22	-55.10	-29.03	-26.67	0.0120
		All Rape	71	62	73	54	-26.03	-12.90	-23.94	0.0295
		Aggravated Assault	970	877	1,303	1,136	-12.82	29.53	17.11	0.6206
		Robbery	132	187	214	156	-27.10	-16.58	18.18	0.0852
		Total Violent Crime	1,203	1,157	1,639	1,368	-16.53	18.24	13.72	0.7473
Norfolk City	231,105	All Offense Types	18,623	21,660	18,927	18,808	-0.63	-13.17	0.99	8.1383
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	64	64	43	37	-13.95	-42.19	-42.19	0.0160
		All Rape	128	115	113	99	-12.39	-13.91	-22.66	0.0428
		Aggravated Assault	1,377	1,216	903	802	-11.18	-34.05	-41.76	0.3470
		Robbery	282	304	207	179	-13.53	-41.12	-36.52	0.0775
		Total Violent Crime	1,851	1,699	1,266	1,117	-11.77	-34.26	-39.65	0.4833

Ceasefire Locality	2024 Population	Offense Type	2021	2022	2023	2024	23-24 Growth %	22 - 24 Growth %	21 -24 Growth %	2024 Crime Rate (per 100K)
Petersburg City	33,365	All Offense Types	1,962	2,374	2,644	2,841	7.45	19.67	44.80	8.5149
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	19	23	25	15	-40.00	-34.78	-21.05	0.0450
		All Rape	11	18	10	22	120.00	22.22	100.00	0.0659
		Aggravated Assault	199	201	178	291	63.48	44.78	46.23	0.8722
		Robbery	21	45	28	33	17.86	-26.67	57.14	0.0989
		Total Violent Crime	250	287	241	361	49.79	25.78	44.40	1.0820
Portsmouth City	96,482	All Offense Types	9,057	10,320	9,891	8,765	-11.38	-15.07	-3.22	9.0846
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	36	47	38	36	-5.26	-23.40	0.00	0.0373
		All Rape	30	48	37	35	-5.41	-27.08	16.67	0.0363
		Aggravated Assault	535	577	554	515	-7.04	-10.75	-3.74	0.5338
		Robbery	141	210	189	165	-12.70	-21.43	17.02	0.1710
		Total Violent Crime	742	882	818	751	-8.19	-14.85	1.21	0.7784
Richmond City	233,655	All Offense Types	15,224	16,886	18,842	16,118	-14.46	-4.55	5.87	6.8982
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	90	59	64	57	-10.94	-3.39	-36.67	0.0244
		All Rape	21	12	89	44	-50.56	266.67	109.52	0.0188
		Aggravated Assault	535	563	537	505	-5.96	-10.30	-5.61	0.2161
		Robbery	263	223	254	224	-11.81	0.45	-14.83	0.0959
		Total Violent Crime	909	857	944	830	-12.08	-3.15	-8.69	0.3552




Ceasefire Locality	2024 Population	Offense Type	2021	2022	2023	2024	23-24 Growth %	22 - 24 Growth %	21 -24 Growth %	2024 Crime Rate (per 100K)
Roanoke City	97,912	All Offense Types	11,012	11,902	11,326	11,477	1.33	-3.57	4.22	11.7218
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	17	19	29	11	-62.07	-42.11	-35.29	0.0112
		All Rape	93	117	74	85	14.86	-27.35	-8.60	0.0868
		Aggravated Assault	308	371	397	427	7.56	15.09	38.64	0.4361
		Robbery	72	98	79	91	15.19	-7.14	26.39	0.0929
		Total Violent Crime	490	605	579	614	6.04	1.49	25.31	0.6271
All Ceasefire Cities	1,432,869	All Offense Types	106,811	117,448	117,202	110,341	-6.22	-6.05	3.30	7.7007
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	337	317	306	232	-31.90	-26.81	-31.16	0.0162
		All Rape	593	563	608	517	-17.60	-8.17	-12.82	0.0361
		Aggravated Assault	5,594	5,334	5,423	5,086	-6.63	-4.65	-9.08	0.3550
		Robbery	1,192	1,388	1,276	1,111	-14.85	-19.96	-6.80	0.0775
		Total Violent Crime	7,716	7,602	7,613	6,946	-9.60	-8.63	-9.98	0.4848
Virginia	8,811,195	All Offense Types	385,293	421,698	430,985	404,450	-6.16	-4.09	4.97	4.5902
		Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter	582	642	542	427	-21.22	-33.49	-26.63	0.0048
		All Rape	2,933	2,858	2,787	2,544	-8.72	-10.99	-13.26	0.0289
		Aggravated Assault	13,351	14,079	14,601	13,705	-6.14	-2.66	2.65	0.1555
		Robbery	2,951	3,384	3,354	2,953	-11.96	-12.74	0.07	0.0335
		Total Violent Crime	19,817	20,963	21,284	19,629	-7.78	-6.36	-0.95	0.2228




Violent Crime Trends Statewide

A time series analysis was conducted on violent crime data for 2020 to 2024 in all thirteen Ceasefire localities and Virginia as a whole with a focus on 2023 to 2024. This analysis was conducted using crime data provided by the Virginia State Police updated as of September 15, 2025. Overall in Virginia, total violent crime decreased 7.5% between 2023 and 2024. Violent crime reduction for all Ceasefire cities accounts for 40.7% of the total reduction in violent crime in Virginia. For all Ceasefire cities, total violent crime decreased 8.5% between 2023 and 2024.

Ceasefire Cities vs. Virginia

For all Ceasefire cities, total violent crime decreased from 2023 to 2024 by 8.5%, dropping from 7,683 to 7,027 total violent crimes. For Virginia as a whole, total violent crime dropped from 21,588 to 19,977 with a 7.5% decrease overall. In total, Ceasefire cities were responsible for 40.7% of the violent crime reduction in Virginia.





Violent Crime with Firearms



Looking at firearms specifically, Ceasefire cities had a 10.0% reduction in firearm-involved violent crimes from 2023 to 2024, going from 3,655 to 3,288. Similarly, Virginia as a whole had an 11.9% decrease of the same time span, dropping from 7,829 to 6,894. In total, Ceasefire cities accounted for 39.3% of the reduction in firearm-involved violent crimes in Virginia.

Violent Crime Trends by Locality

In addition to overall violent crime trends in Virginia, analysts from the CPP also mapped violent crime trends in each Ceasefire locality. Data used in this analysis was provided by the Virginia State Police updated as of September 15, 2025. Data was vetted and categorized by violent crime type, with a notation of whether a firearm was used in the commission of the violent crime. Violent crime trends are presented for each Ceasefire locality. A more detailed analysis of violent crime trends by locality will be presented in the final report.



Chesapeake

For **Chesapeake city**, total violent crime decreased by 18.7% from 2023 to 2024. For 2023 to 2024 in Chesapeake, aggravated assault and rape both decreased by 19.9% and 33.0%, respectively, while murder and non-negligent manslaughter increased by 20.0%. Robbery remained static with 0.0% change from 2023 to 2024.





Danville

For **Danville city**, total violent crime decreased slightly by 0.6% from 2023 to 2024. For individual offense types, aggravated assault (-2.6%) and rape (-21.1%) both decreased while murder and non-negligent manslaughter (50.0%) and robbery (15.8%) increased.





Emporia

For **Emporia city**, total violent crime has been increasing with a 51.3% increase from 2023 to 2024. Aggravated assault and robbery both increased by 81.5% and 60.0%, respectively. Conversely, both rape (-80.0%) and murder and non-negligent manslaughter (-50.0%) decreased.





Hampton

For Hampton city, total violent crime decreased by 14.9% from 2023 to 2024. There was a reduction in 2024 for all offense types—aggravated assault by 4.3%, rape by 14.6%, murder and non-negligent manslaughter by 44.4%, and robbery by 29.3%.





Hopewell

For Hopewell from 2023 to 2024, total violent crime slightly increased by 5.7%. Violent crimes have remained fairly steady from 2020 to 2024, with a sizeable increase in 2022, dropping back down in 2023. While aggravated assault increased in the city for 2024 (19.0%), rape and robbery both decreased by 14.3% and 54.5%, respectively. Murder and non-negligent manslaughter remained steady with 0.0% change from 2023 to 2024.





Lynchburg

For Lynchburg city, total violent crime increased by 6.1% from 2023 to 2024. Looking at individual offense types in Lynchburg, murder and non-negligent manslaughter increased 125.0% going from 4 to 9, while aggravated assault and rape increased by 4.5% and 31.4%, respectively. Robbery decreased from 2023 to 2024 in Lynchburg by 20.5%.





Martinsville

For Martinsville city, total violent crime increased by 7.3% from 2023 to 2024. For 2023 to 2024 in Martinsville, aggravated assaults increased by 16.7% while rape and murder and non-negligent manslaughter both decreased by 25.0% and 33.3%, respectively. Robbery remained flat at 0.0% change.





Newport News

For Newport News city, total violent crime decreased by 16.3% from 2023 to 2024. From 2023 to 2024 in Newport News, all violent offense types decreased—aggravated assault by 12.5%, rape by 25.3%, murder and non-negligent manslaughter by 55.1%, and robbery by 27.1%.





Norfolk

In Norfolk city, total violent crime decreased by 11.3% from 2023 to 2024. For 2023 to 2024 in Norfolk, all violent offense types decreased—aggravated assault by 10.7%, rape by 10.4%, murder and non-negligent manslaughter by 14.0%, and robbery by 13.9%.





Petersburg

For Petersburg city, total violent crime increased by 51.5% from 2023 to 2024. For 2023 to 2024 in Petersburg, aggravated assault (64.6%), rape (130.0%), and robbery (21.4%) increased while murder and non-negligent manslaughter decreased (40.0%).





Portsmouth

For Portsmouth city, total violent crime decreased by 8.6% from 2023 to 2024. For 2023 to 2024 in Portsmouth, all violent offense types decreased—aggravated assault by 7.7%, rape by 2.5%, murder and non-negligent manslaughter by 2.6%, and robbery by 13.5%.





Richmond

For Richmond city, total violent crime decreased by 11.7% from 2023 to 2024. For 2023 to 2024 in Richmond, all violent offense types decreased—aggravated assaults by 6.4%, rape by 47.3%, and both murder and non-negligent manslaughter and robbery by 10.9%.



Roanoke

For **Roanoke city**, total violent crime increased by 7.0% from 2023 to 2024. For 2023 to 2024 in Roanoke, aggravated assaults (8.2%), rape (17.3%), and robbery (16.5%) all increase, while murder and non-negligent manslaughter decreased by 62.1%.



Violent Crime Hotspots


In addition to crime trends, CPP analysts also utilized hotspot mapping to highlight any changes in concentrations of violent crime in each Ceasefire Locality. Violent crime hotspots are micro-geographic areas—often individual street segments or intersections—where rates of serious offenses such as homicide, aggravated assault, and robbery exceed the jurisdictional baseline by wide margins.²⁰ Like with violent offenders, where a small percentage of the population are responsible for the overwhelming majority of violent crime, a small fraction of places account for a disproportionately large share of violent crime. For example, Weisburd and colleagues find that 4–5% of micro-places generate about 50% of crimes in a city context.²¹ Identifying these hotspots is critical for effective public safety planning, as it allows agencies to allocate law enforcement, prevention programs, and community services more strategically.

For this analysis, incident level data was sent to the CPP quarterly by each Ceasefire Locality. Data was then geocoded for analysis. Utilizing the geocoded crime data from the Ceasefire localities, multiple hot spot maps were generated using the Getis-Ord Gi* algorithm in the ArcGIS Pro software package. In order to examine hot spot trends over the study period of 2023-2024, CPP researchers created space-time cubes using temporal data and generated multiple emerging hot spot maps. Different hot spot sizes were used depending on the map extent—for city-wide maps, hot spots were 1/4 mile in size. Some violent crime incidents may be omitted due to lack of an address or an address that was unable to be geocoded. A more detailed hotspot analysis will be included in the final report.


²⁰ Braga, A. A., Papachristos, A. V., Hureau, D. M., & others. (2019). *Hot spots policing of small geographic areas effects on crime*. *Journal name, volume(issue)*, pages. <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8356500/>

²¹ Weisburd, D., Groff, E. R., Jones, G., Cave, B., Amendola, K. L., Yang, S. M., & Emison, R. F. (2015). The Dallas patrol management experiment: can AVL technologies be used to harness unallocated patrol time for crime prevention?. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 11(3), 367-391.

Chesapeake Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023

Chesapeake Violent Crime Hot Spots

2024

Chesapeake


In Chesapeake in 2023, violent crime hot spots are primarily concentrated in the northeast around Plymouth Park, Quincy, Norfolk Highlands, and southward in lower density into the Fernwood Farms and Wilson Heights regions. Additional hot spots are located between Camelot and Broadmoor, around Ahoy Acres, West Chadswyk, and near Dunedin. Violent crime hot spots are largely consistent between 2023 and 2024 although the hot spots located south of North Highlands have reduced in concentration.

Danville

In Danville, violent crime hot spots in 2023 are largely concentrated between Tanglewydle and Dundee, and northeast of Druid Hills. There is an additional hot spot in the northernmost region of Danville. For 2024, several additional hot spots have condensed around the Dundee area as well as north of Almagro.


Danville Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023




Danville Violent Crime Hot Spots

2024




Emporia Violent Crime Hot Spots

Jan-Sep 2023



Emporia Violent Crime Hot Spots

Jan-Sep 2024


Emporia

Due to data delivery issues, violent crime data for Emporia was only available through September for 2024 at the time of analysis. As a result, analysis was only conducted comparing January to September of 2023 and 2024. In Emporia, violent crime hot spots in 2023 are very centralized around White City and North Emporia. For 2024, hot spots stayed around the same density but shift westward.


Hampton

In Hampton, VA, for 2023, violent crime hot spots are spread across the city, primarily in the southern half. Major violent crime hot spot areas in 2023 include the Pleasant Manor area and to the north, crossing over East Mercury Blvd., and around the Fordham area. For 2024, hot spots around the city largely reduced in size, especially around Fordham and Pleasant Manor. Violent crime hot spots around Tide Mill Farms and Michaels Woods either reduced or dissipated completely in 2024.


Hampton Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023


Hampton Violent Crime Hot Spots

2024

Hopewell Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023

Hopewell Violent Crime Hot Spots

2024

Hopewell


For Hopewell in 2023, violent crime hot spots are located primarily to the north of Highland Park area around East Randolph Rd. as well as along Winston Churchill Dr. to the east of the Kenwood area. In 2024, the northernmost hot spots have shifted to the east and the southern hot spots have condensed and spread further north and south of Winston Churchill Dr.

Lynchburg

For Lynchburg, VA, in 2023, violent crime hot spots are largely around the Midtown area around the intersection of the Lynchburg Expressway and Kemper St. with an additional hot spot around Forest Brook Hills. In 2024, the Midtown hot spots have remained similar in size but have shifted towards the area between the Lynchburg Expressway and Richmond Hwy. Hot spots between Midtown and Forest Brook Hills reduced though additional violent crime hot spots in 2024 have developed around Chestnut Hills and Jackson Heights.


Lynchburg Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023




Lynchburg Violent Crime Hot Spots


2024



Martinsville Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023

Martinsville Violent Crime Hot Spots

2024

Martinsville


For Martinsville, VA, violent crime hot spots are primarily around Fayette St. in 2023, close to W. Church St. and W. Commonwealth Blvd. In 2024, the primary hot spot from 2023 has largely dissipated and an additional hot spot has developed south of J. Frank Wilson Memorial Park.

Newport News

For Newport News, VA, in 2023, violent crime hot spots are spread all along Warwick Blvd. and Jefferson Ave. with the highest concentration around Lower Downtown and Stuart Gardens. For 2024, violent crime hot spots have not changed significantly though some of the hotspots between Sedgely-Morrison and Briarfield have dissipated.


Newport News Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023




Newport News Violent Crime Hot Spots


2024



Norfolk Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023

Norfolk Violent Crime Hot Spots

2024

Norfolk


In 2023, violent crime hot spots in Norfolk, VA, violent crime hot spots are heavily concentrated between Downtown, Park, and Lindenwood, with additional hot spots around Denby Park, northeast of Norview, the intersection of Virginia Beach Blvd. and Military Hwy., and to the south near Campostella. In 2024, hot spots remain fairly consistent with an additional hot spot developing around the intersection of Granby St. and Admiral Taussig Blvd.

Petersburg

In Petersburg, VA, for 2023, violent crime hot spots are mostly centralized along East Washington St. and S. Crater Rd. around Blandford, Petersburg National Battlefield Park, Pembroke, Heights, and between Blandford and Woodmere. For 2024, some of the central Petersburg hot spots have dissipated with additional hot spots developing west of Pembroke, and south of the intersection of I-295 and County Dr. The hot spots north of Woodmere have dissipated.


Petersburg Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023




Petersburg Violent Crime Hot Spots


2024



Portsmouth Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023

Portsmouth Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023

Portsmouth


Violent crime hot spots in Portsmouth, VA, in 2023 are heavily concentrated around I-264, stretching between Douglas Park, Swimming Point, Skyler Cove, and Stanley Court. An additional hot spot area is to the west near Collinswood. For 2024, while hot spots have stayed largely in the same regions, there is some dissipation in the density, particularly in the southwest. An additional hot spot has developed near Ebony Heights.

Richmond

In 2023 for Richmond, VA, violent crime hot spots are primarily centralized in downtown Richmond around Gilpin, Whitcomb, Mosby, Fairmount, and Creighton, with additional hot spots around McGuire, Midlothian, north of Bellemeade, and south of Windsor. In 2024, hot spots in both downtown Richmond and the McGuire area have reduced and the hot spots around Bellemeade and Windsor have almost completely dissipated.


Richmond Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023




Richmond Violent Crime Hot Spots


2024



Roanoke Violent Crime Hot Spots

2023

Roanoke Violent Crime Hot Spots

2024Roanoke

In Roanoke in 2023, violent crime hot spots are spread centrally along Orange Ave. with some spread up Williamson Rd. up to Preston Park. In 2024, there has not been much shifting positionally, but there has been some dissipation just west of Lincoln Terrace and around Preston Park.

Perceptions of Crime, Safety, and Law Enforcement

The overall goal of Ceasefire Virginia is to reduce violent crime throughout the Commonwealth. Analyzing crime trends is only one way to gauge the impact of Ceasefire Virginia. The Community Safety Survey serves as the primary benchmarking tool for the program, highlighting perceptions of crime, safety, and law enforcement in Ceasefire localities. The survey is scheduled to be readministered in 2026 to note changes in perceptions over the course of Ceasefire Virginia.

Survey Methodology

The Community Safety Survey was informed by prior community safety and perceptions of law enforcement survey research. Staff from the CPP drafted the survey, adapting prior validated survey questions.²² The survey was then vetted by OAG staff. To implement the survey, the CPP contracted with Responsive Management—a Virginia-based survey research firm. The survey was distributed via telephone interviews with a representative sample of adults, ages 18 or older, living in Ceasefire Virginia localities. Telephone interviews were conducted by landline and cell phone, an approximately $\frac{2}{3}$ split. Phone interviews were conducted in English over a two-week period. Statistical results were weighted to reflect known demographic proportions in the Commonwealth. The margin of sampling error for the complete set of weighted data is ± 3.096 .

Both cellular and landline samples were provided in their proper proportions, based on Ceasefire Virginia locality population according to state telephone type usage by Marketing Systems Group, a firm that specializes in providing research-based statistical samples. The cellular sample was prescreened for disconnected numbers. The listed landline database was built directly from public and proprietary sources obtained by Marketing Systems Group. The cellular sample consisted of randomly generated U.S. cellular telephone numbers within all thousand-series blocks (the first seven digits of a telephone number) dedicated to cellular service. Non-productive numbers were identified via CELL-WINS, a non-intrusive real-time screening process that identifies active and inactive numbers and were removed from the potential sample.

²² Geron, M., Factor, R., Cowell, W., Lane, K., Kloog, I., Wright, R. O., & Wright, R. J. (2023). Validation of a neighborhood sentiment and safety index derived from existing data repositories. *Journal of Exposure Science & Environmental Epidemiology*, 33(2), 207-217.

As many as seven attempts were made to contact every landline telephone number, and as many as five attempts were made to contact each cell phone number. Calls were made at different times of day and different days of the week to maximize the chance of contacting potential respondents. Each telephone number received at least one daytime call when necessary. In addition to the five attempted phone calls for each cell number, cell numbers that were not reachable in five attempts were sent a message via Short Message Service (SMS) with a request to participate in the study. The SMS message contained a link that would lead the respondent to the survey.

Participants were informed:

“In this survey, you will be asked questions about your perceptions of safety and recent crime prevention efforts in your community. The survey should take approximately five to ten minutes to complete, participation is voluntary, and responses will remain completely anonymous. No names will be recorded, and none of your answers can be traced back to you.”

Survey Demographics

The figure below illustrates the geographical distribution of the 1,932 survey respondents.

DISTRIBUTION OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS




Table 1 and Table 2 provide detailed characteristics of respondents and households, respectively. About half of the respondents are female (51%), white (51%), and married or partnered (56%). Black or African American respondents represent 31% of the sample, followed by Latinos with 7%. The age distribution ranges from 18 years old up to older than 80 and, while roughly 70% fall within 18-35 and 36-59 age ranges, the survey over-represents the elderly. The survey captures diverse political views, with democrats representing 32% of respondents, independents 34%, and republicans 16%. Respondents are distributed across urban (40%), suburban (50%), and rural areas (6%). A significant proportion of them live alone (19%) or with one additional person (33%), with larger families comprising the remaining 48% of the sample.

Table 2: Respondent's Household Characteristics

	Frequency	Percent
<i>Area</i>		
Suburban	918	50%
Urban	732	40%
Rural	115	6%
Other	64	4%
<i>Household size</i>		
1 person	349	19%
2 people	612	33%
3 to 4	634	34%
5 and over	270	14%


Table 1: Respondent's Demographic Characteristics

	Frequency	Percent
<i>Gender</i>		
Male	903	47%
Female	983	51%
Nonbinary / other	11	1%
Refused	35	2%
<i>Race</i>		
White	978	51%
Black or African-American	590	31%
Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish Origin	128	7%
Asian	25	1%
American Indian or Alaskan Native	19	1%
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	4	0%
Other	97	5%
Prefer not to say	92	5%
<i>Age</i>		
18 to 35	659	34%
36 to 59	652	34%
60 to 79	437	23%
80 and over	185	10%
<i>Relationship status</i>		
Married / partnered	1031	56%
Not married / partnered	816	44%
<i>Party</i>		
Democrat	626	32%
Republican	302	16%
Independent	663	34%
Something else	79	4%
Refused	153	8%
Don't know	108	6%


Perceptions of Crime

After qualifying questions, participants were asked to describe the crime problem in their area on a scale of “An extremely serious problem” to “Not a problem at all.” The survey results show that, while most respondents perceive crime as a concern, they differ on how serious they consider the issue. About 60% describe crime as at least a moderate problem, with 31% seeing it as moderate, 20% very serious, and 6.5% extremely serious. Meanwhile, 27% view crime as only a minor problem, and 14% as not a problem at all. However, when asked a subsequent question, “How has crime in your area changed compared to one year ago?”, a majority felt that crime has increased, particularly crime in general (60%) and violent crime (55%). Far fewer respondents thought crime had decreased, and a notable share, especially regarding property crime (29%), said they did not know. Taken together, these findings reveal a strong sense of rising crime in the communities.


HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE CRIME IN YOUR AREA? (N=1932)




HOW HAS CRIME IN YOUR AREA CHANGED COMPARED TO ONE YEAR AGO? (N=1932)



PERCEPTIONS OF THE AMOUNT OF GUNS IN THE COMMUNITY RELATIVE TO ONE YEAR AGO (N=1932)



HOW OFTEN DO YOU HEAR GUNSHOTS IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD? (N=1,833)




A central goal of Ceasefire Virginia is the reduction of gun violence. To this end, participants were asked “Compared to one year ago, have you noticed or do you feel like there are more guns or fewer guns in your community, or has the amount of guns in the community stayed about the same?” Responses reveal mixed perceptions of the prevalence of guns in local communities. When asked about changes in the amount of guns compared to a year ago, 46% of respondents believe the number has stayed the same, while 33% perceive no more guns, and 16% are uncertain. As such, the overall perception ranges from stability to a growing concern. When asked about changes in the amount of guns compared to a year ago, 46% of respondents believe the number has stayed the same, while 33% perceive no more guns, and 16% are uncertain. As such, the overall perception ranges from stability to a growing concern.

Participants were also asked to report how often they hear gunshots in their respective neighborhoods. While more than half of respondents (53%) say they never hear gunfire during the day, and 38% report the same at night, a substantial fraction does. About 30% hear gunshots less often than weekly during the day and 38% at night, while 11% (daytime) and 17% (nighttime) report hearing them weekly. Smaller but notable shares (2-3%) say they hear gunfire daily or nightly, and 1-3% report multiple times per day or night. Therefore, although many residents are not directly exposed to gunfire, regular or frequent exposure is a lived reality for a significant segment of the community, particularly at night.


Feelings of Safety

Next, participants were asked how safe they feel in their respective communities –during daytime and nighttime hours. Most residents reported always feeling safe (36%) or usually feeling safe (48%) in their communities in general, perceptions vary by time of the day. During nights, 18% of the respondents said they never or rarely feel safe, in contrast with 5% during the day. While fear of crime may impact behavior in theory, the majority of respondents say that it never (42%) or rarely (38%) prevents them from doing things they would like to do. Similarly, when they leave their homes, they never (35%) or rarely (42%) worry about it being vandalized.

HOW SAFE DO YOU FEEL IN YOUR COMMUNITY—DURING DAYTIME AND NIGHTTIME HOURS? (N=1,833)



HOW OFTEN DOES FEAR OF CRIME PREVENT YOU FROM DOING THINGS YOU WOULD LIKE TO DO? (N=1932)




Perceptions of Law Enforcement

In addition to perceptions of crime and safety, the Community Safety Survey also asked participants to share their perceptions of their local law enforcement agency. The survey shows generally favorable levels of trust and approval relative to the local police department. The strongest agreement appears around safety, with 76% agreeing that officers make their community safer. Similarly, 71% agree to some extent that officers treat people in the community fairly and with respect (65%) and are responsive to community concerns (68%). About 70% trust their local police department, 16% do not, and 10% have neutral feelings. The majority of respondents (72%) believe the local police department does a good job, and a much smaller proportion (11%) expressing disapproval.


Respondents' perceptions are more mixed regarding quickness of response and fairness of arrests. Fewer than two-thirds (60%) agree that officers respond quickly, with higher levels of neutrality (12%) and disagreement (17%) than on other items. Regarding arrests, confidence is split: only 37% agree that most arrested individuals are guilty, while 23% disagree, 22% are neutral, and a notable 19% report "don't know," suggesting uncertainty about the integrity of arrests.

HOW MUCH DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? (N=1932)



When asked about whether the city and the community support the local police department, responses reveal two highlights. First, about 70% agreed to a certain extent. Second, there does not seem to be a significant difference between perceptions across city or community lines. Overall, the findings point to strong and widespread support for local law enforcement.

MY CITY/COMMUNITY SUPPORTS THE LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENT? (N=1,932)



Explaining Perceptions of Crime

To further example perceptions of crime, staff from the CPP examined factors that may explain perceptions of crime in more detail. Table 3 details the factors that may help explain how participants report feelings about crime and safety, using regression analysis. In column 1, the outcome of interest is a five-point scale of how serious participants think crime is in their community, ranging from “not a problem at all” to “an extremely serious problem.” Columns 2 through 4 examine related questions about how often participants feel safe: in general, during the day, and at night. Each of these outcomes is measured on a scale from “never safe” to “always safe.” Lastly, columns 5 through 7 focus on whether respondents believe crime has increased in the past year. Here, the outcomes are yes/no measures, capturing whether people think overall crime, violent crime, or property crime has gone up compared to the past year.

Key explanatory factors include satisfaction with the local police department (ranging from very dissatisfied to very satisfied), perceptions of whether the number of guns in the community has increased or decreased (relative to stayed the same), and how often people hear gunshots in their neighborhood during the day or night (from never to multiple times per day or night). The models also account for demographic characteristics such as gender, race, age, political party, and type of residence (rural, suburban, or urban).

The numbers in columns 1 to 4 indicate how much perceptions of crime or safety change when these factors increase by one unit, or relative to a reference group. These estimates come from ordinary least squares regression. In columns 5 to 7, the numbers instead show changes in the probability that respondents think crime has increased over the past year in percentage points. These are reported as marginal effects from logistic regressions.

Variables	(1) Perceptions of Crime as a Serious Problem	(2) Feelings of Safety In General	(3) Feelings of Safety During Day Time	(4) Feelings of Safety During Night Time	(5) Crime in General Has Increased	(6) Violent Crime Has Increased	(7) Property Crime Has Increased
Key Explanatory Variables							
Satisfaction with the Local Police Department	-0.27***	0.17***	0.20***	0.26***	0.01	-0.04***	-0.05***
<i>Perceptions of the numbers of guns</i>							
Decreased (Ref = stayed the same)	0.37**	-0.20	-0.33**	-0.11	-0.03	-0.01	-0.09
Increased (Ref = stayed the same)	0.26***	-0.07	-0.13*	-0.17	0.02	0.14***	0.08
<i>Frequency hearing shots in the neighborhood</i>							
Shots during the night	0.26***	-0.23***	-0.18***	-0.35***	0.03	0.06***	0.03
Shots during the day	0.08**	-0.04	-0.03	-0.08	0.00	0.00	0.01
Demographics							
Female (ref=Male)	0.01	-0.15**	-0.27***	-0.54***	0.07***	0.01	-0.02
Black or African-American (ref=White)	0.09	-0.12	0.01	0.11	0.10***	0.05	-0.03
Other Race/Ethnicity (Ref=White)	-0.26**	0.04	0.04	-0.13	-0.06***	-0.02	0.06
Age	0.01***	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00***	-0.00
Democrat (Ref=Republican)	0.07	-0.06	-0.11	0.03	0.11***	0.22***	0.13**
Independent or Other Party (Ref=Republican)	0.17*	-0.11	-0.21***	-0.14	0.04	0.07**	0.05
Residence (ref= urban)							
Rural	-0.08	-0.06	-0.01	0.30*	-0.01	0.06	-0.05
Suburban	-0.10	-0.06	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.05*	-0.04
Observations	1,255	1,207	1,207	1,147	1,220	1,161	1,184
R-squared / Pseudo R-Squared	0.28	0.23	0.25	0.33	0.09	0.18	0.05

Table 3: Explaining Perceptions of Crime

The findings highlight important factors shaping how participants perceive crime and safety in Virginia:

- Individuals who are more satisfied with their local police department consistently report feeling safer – in general, during the day, or night – and are less likely to view crime as a serious problem.
- Higher satisfaction with their local police department is also associated with lower probability of perceiving violent and property crime as increasing.
- Perceptions of the amount of guns in the community also matter: those who believe that guns have increased are also more inclined to perceive crime as a more serious problem and to perceive violent crime as having increased.
- Additionally, hearing gunshots, particularly at night, translates into lower feelings of safety and a greater concern about crime.

The results also reveal demographic nuances:

- Women report feeling significantly less safe than men, particularly at night.
- Black respondents are more likely than White respondents to say violent crime has increased, while those identifying as another race/ethnicity are less likely to see rising crime overall.
- Democrats and Independents are more likely than Republicans to say crime has increased.
- Finally, place of residence matters somewhat – suburban residents are less likely than urban residents to perceive rising property crime, and rural residents tend to report feeling safer at night.

Law Enforcement Focus Groups

In addition to violent crime trend analysis and the community perceptions survey, the mixed methods evaluation also considers the opinions of law enforcement officers in Ceasefire localities. Being first responders and active investigators of violent crime, the informed perceptions of law enforcement officers offer valuable insights into the causes and solutions to violent crime, as well as the programmatic effectiveness of various aspects of Ceasefire Virginia.

Methods

Staff from the CPP developed a focus group guide (see Appendix B) for law enforcement officers, which was vetted by OAG staff. The guide asked law enforcement to share their opinions about violent crime in their locality, how crime has changed over the years, issues with enforcing laws within their locality, and what they believe to be effective, and ineffective, strategies to prevent and suppress violent crime. The guide also asked law enforcement to reflect on various aspects of Ceasefire Virginia. Staff from the CPP reached out to law enforcement representatives in each of the Ceasefire localities to schedule focus groups. CPP staff traveled to each Ceasefire locality and conducted focus groups with law enforcement of various ranks. The only selection criteria were that officers should “work in a position where they directly interact with violent crime.” Contacts within each police department selected the officers for participation in the focus group.

Focus group size varied by locality, from 3 to 18 officers. Focus groups with a larger number of participants were divided into multiple sessions. For example, three focus groups sessions were conducted in Newport News, Richmond, and Roanoke, respectively.²³ Focus groups lasted in duration from 45 minutes to 2 ½ hours. CPP staff took contemporaneous notes during the focus groups and recorded each session.

Locality	Focus Groups
Chesapeake	5 officers
Danville	6 officers
Emporia	3 officers
Hampton	5 officers
Hopewell	5 officers
Lynchburg	9 officers
Martinsville	Pending
Newport News	13 officers
Norfolk	9 officers
Portsmouth	Pending
Petersburg	8 officers
Richmond	18 officers
Roanoke	16 officers

²³ It should be noted, due to scheduling issues within the Ceasefire locality, two focus groups are currently pending and a full analysis will be included in the final report

Each session was listened back to during writeup and compared to notes for analysis. Several thematic elements emerged from the focus groups, which are detailed below. Similar to the Community Safety Survey, focus groups will be repeated in 2026 to note changes in opinions or perceptions across the Ceasefire timeline.

Focus group sessions began with introductions and an explanation of the process and purpose of the focus groups. CPP staff explained how data would be collected, compared, and analyzed. Additionally, CPP staff explained how the data would be compiled for presentation to the OAG and that the recordings would only be used for writeup purposes. The participants were offered the opportunity to ask questions or share concerns. Hearing none, the focus groups commenced.

The focus groups began by asking participants to detail their current rank, years of experience, and any special assignments, units, or task forces in which they served. CPP staff then began to probe the groups about their experiences and perceptions of violent crime, their departments, the community, what they feel is working to combat violent crime, and areas for improvement within their departments. What follows are major trends that emerged across all focus groups.

Violent Crime

After introductions and a review of their positions and current assignments, CPP staff asked participants to share their experiences with violent crime in their locality. Across all localities, participants shared that it feels as if violent crime was increasing in recent years. Officers reported seeing more guns, more shootings, and more drugs. However, law enforcement participants highlighted that it is mostly a small number of people in their localities were responsible for the most violence.

“It’s the same people over and over again, a game of who is beefing with who. We see the same people, we know their names, the community knows their names.”

Gun-related crime, particularly shootings, was identified as the most pressing concern. Officers described the prevalence of stolen firearms, including weapons modified with “switches,” and observed that guns are easier to access than ever before.

“The switches are scary, the spray they carry is dangerous. Before, if someone can’t aim, it was just a gun shot, now they have a better chance of hitting people.”

Interestingly, in several localities, officers mentioned there were two types of violent crime: domestic and gang/group related that affected how officers respond and how proactive they could be in their jurisdictions.

“Domestic violent crime, like families beefing, that is consistent – its always there. Gang stuff [violent crime] comes in waves and is a lot of retaliation. Sometimes we can intervene in that.”

“We’ve had more domestic crimes recently, not so much gang activity.”

Social media was seen as both a catalyst and amplifier, with online disputes escalating into real-world violence. Officers across all localities noted how social media was glorifying violence and encouraging young people to promote their crimes. Officers noted that people in their jurisdiction were stealing cars to commit other crimes but still posting it on social media. Additionally, officers in a few localities reported social media was being used to promote music videos that were actually gang or group-affiliated made to dis rival groups. According to participants, this online culture has normalized violence, portraying it as acceptable or even aspirational for young people.

“With social media it is easier to get exposed to violence earlier... it makes it seem cool and fun – they don’t see the actual consequences.”

“Social media has been glorifying criminal behavior, there has been a cultural shift to promoting a criminal lifestyle.”

“Social media is changing kids mentality – they just want to shoot someone, because they see it all the time.”

In addition to guns and social media, law enforcement officers also extensively discussed how much of their violent crime is being driven by juveniles, especially among juveniles whose parents also commit crimes, something known as generational crime.

“Seems like shooters are getting younger and younger. Most of our violence is from kids who want to make a name for themselves.”

“We’ve got 12 and 13 year olds posting guns, there parents either don’t know or don’t care.”

“Kids are bragging about shootings, they just seem different nowadays, but its generational – their parents are encouraging their behavior – they tell them to go and sell drugs.”

“Parents want us to parent their child – they leave them unattended and let them do whatever they want.”

Accountability

As officers discussed their encounters with juveniles and violent crime, a key theme emerged – the lack of accountability within their localities, particularly for juveniles.

“They get no accountability – no consequences – at all. No accountability from their parents, from school, even from the courts, it’s a joke. Then people wonder why they act that way, why not? There’s no punishments.”

Officers described a system where neither schools nor the courts impose meaningful consequences, allowing negative behaviors to escalate unchecked. Others echoed this sentiment, emphasizing that this absence of consequences fosters further disrespect and defiance.

“No accountability in schools and it just continues on the street.”

Participants were especially critical of juvenile intake processes, which they felt consistently fail to impose sanctions. “Juvenile intake sucks,” one officer stated plainly. Another explained, *“We arrest adults and most of the time, it sticks, but juvenile intake decides and are not giving them any accountability.”* Officers described scenarios where young people *“never go to class and never face consequences”* and concluded that the system *“needs to stop cutting people breaks.”* Many felt that this permissiveness has encouraged juveniles to reoffend, *“People don’t want to accept responsibility for their actions.”*

Participants also raised concerns about how offenders are increasingly being portrayed as victims, which they felt overlooks the harm caused to actual victims of crime. *“Viewing offenders as victims and ignoring victims”* was a recurring frustration. While some acknowledged that certain individuals are indeed *“victims of circumstance,”* officers stressed that *“that doesn’t mean they should not have consequences for their actions.”*

The sentiment of a lack of accountability was not only found for juveniles, but many officers felt the same for adults. The discussion reflected a belief that the justice system too often fails to hold offenders accountable. Officers suggested that a small percentage of repeat offenders are responsible for much of the crime—*“1% = career criminals”*—yet juvenile and adult courts alike are failing to

impose consequences that might deter future behavior. This perception reinforced a broader frustration that, without accountability, both juveniles and adults are emboldened to continue offending, contributing to cycles of violence and disorder.

Courts

When asked to think about reasons for the lack of accountability, many officers suggested their local courts and court actors were responsible. Many officers voiced significant frustration with prosecution practices and the court system, describing them as central to a “revolving door” of offenders cycling in and out of custody without meaningful consequences. Much of the discussion focused on the role of the Commonwealth’s Attorney (CA), with officers expressing dissatisfaction about overreliance on plea deals, lack of communication, and insufficient case preparation.

“The new CA is learning, but not great. They plea everything and don’t communicate well. We see people back on the street without notice.”

“The CA wants to plea, but some cases need to go to trial – we’re like, how is that guy out again?”

“Feels like they are afraid to fight ... not getting charges, or pleading everything. So not a lot of time and back on the street – revolving door.”

“It’s a bit demoralizing to do all this investigative work, just for it to be pled down.”

The perception that prosecutors are avoiding trials was repeated throughout each focus group. Officers felt that plea bargaining has become the default approach, leading to leniency and undermining deterrence. Concerns extended beyond the local CA’s office to relationships with federal prosecutors. While federal charges were seen as carrying more weight, officers described difficulty in getting federal partners to take cases. *“Not a great relationship with feds, they take way too long,”* one said. *“Seems like they don’t want to take a case if there is no headline. Need to rebuild this relationship.”* Another added, *“Only luck with feds, but the process is slow, won’t take cases unless it’s 100% winnable.”* As a result, participants felt that state charges often *“hit harder now”* than federal ones.

Judges, juries, and magistrates were also identified as barriers to effective accountability. Officers described a “jaded jury pool” and judges who, in their view, tolerate sloppy preparation by prosecutors. *“Court sucks – too many plea deals, no consequences,”* one officer remarked. Another noted, *“They fumble a lot of cases because they are overworked, which leads to a lack of prep.”*

Despite these frustrations, some participants pointed to positive developments in collaboration. One locality, which had a dedicated Ceasefire Prosecutor was highlighted as opportunities for coordination across law enforcement and prosecution.

“Biggest help has been special Ceasefire prosecutor - working with pd on a 1on1 level - never had that before. Working with detectives, officers, taking cases and winning them. Helps to send a message that no one is getting off easy anymore.”

“There’s an open dialogue – daily convos with CAs and brass. No longer us vs. them. Goal is conviction. Building strong and thorough cases.”

Overall, participants portrayed prosecution and court processes as overburdened, risk-averse, and overly reliant on plea deals. While some collaboration has improved, officers remained deeply concerned that prosecutorial and judicial practices are weakening accountability, creating a cycle where offenders quickly return to the community, undermining both public safety and officer morale.

Internal Dynamics

Focus group participants were also asked about conditions within their own departments. Officers described internal department challenges as a persistent barrier to effective policing, with staffing shortages and retention difficulties hindering their work. Officers repeatedly emphasized that the agency is understaffed.

“Staffing has been hard. Two to three short, but only 27 full staff. Tried hiring surges, but no luck. Retention is tough. Officers get poached a lot. Never ending cycle of turnover.”

“The city has increased in size, but the police force has not. We have less than half of neighboring cities. Mandatory overtime hammers morale. Just running call to call, can’t be proactive. It’s draining.”

The consequences of short staffing were described as wide-reaching, affecting both operations and morale. Officers highlighted the inability to run proactive units, conduct interdictions, or build community relationships. Many agreed that community policing goals were unattainable without adequate manpower.

“We’re short-staffed, it affects everything. No proactive units, no street crime units, no surveillance, short investigators.”

“It’s honestly dangerous, someone is going to get hurt out there. We’re tired, we have no downtime, just running from call to call. It sucks.”

“Feels like responding like a fire department. Used to have community presence, but now no time.”

“Some units taken away, knowledge is retiring and just a lack of manpower. You can’t be proactive in the environment”

Recruitment and retention challenges were compounded by compensation, benefits, and equipment. Officers noted that other agencies offered stronger incentives, and those agencies often poached their officers.

“The County has better benefits, take-home cars. We should be premier – it is much more dangerous here, but we get paid less, with worse equipment.”

“We need more pay, better uniforms, take-home cars. The forced OT is hard.”

Generational differences and training gaps also surfaced as key concerns. Several officers suggested that COVID policing had eroded basic communication skills and highlighted how COVID policing policies hurt their relationship with the community.

“Post COVID, officers seem not to know how to talk to people. Don’t have skills to interact with the community. Only way they interact is with escalation.”

“COVID made our street presence disappear.”

Officers also described morale as mixed, shaped by both internal dynamics and leadership. Some expressed pride in their work but frustration with management. Others stressed that while burnout was real, positives remained: *“Need to be more focused on retention. But there is good morale overall here. Positives outweigh the negatives.”*

Finally, officers noted that high call volumes and policy constraints contributed to the department’s reactive posture. Many felt they were pulled into matters better handled by other institutions, such as civil or family disputes, explaining, *“We over-respond to matters that don’t involve police. Civil matters. Getting more domestic calls and very minute issues. But we have to respond.”* This constant reactive cycle, combined with staffing shortfalls, left little capacity for proactive policing or specialized units.

Overall, the discussion revealed that departments are struggling to balance community safety with internal challenges of staffing, retention, generational change, and morale. Officers consistently linked these internal dynamics to their external effectiveness, warning that without improvements in pay, equipment, and training, the agency would continue to lose personnel and remain trapped in reactive policing rather than proactive crime prevention.

Community Dynamics

Despite struggles with staffing and court partnerships, when asked about community dynamics, officers in Ceasefire localities reflected positively on their relationships with the community. Officers described community support as generally strong, though uneven across neighborhoods. In some areas, residents are receptive and appreciative, while in others, people remain reluctant to engage.

“Community support depends on the area. But overall lucky – we have good times, but silent majority don’t speak up in support.”

“I get more thank you’s than F yours.”

“Some areas, no one wants to talk to us, but overall the community is much more receptive and seems to appreciate us.”

Participants emphasized that rising crime has actually strengthened community partnerships. Families of victims have become more outspoken, and the department has worked to build bridges through initiatives such as the citizens academy. Officers described a shift in the way the community views their work. Residents, they noted, are aware of who the repeat offenders are and value policing efforts that target troublemakers without heavy-handed enforcement.

“Community feels it and appreciates it – they know who the troublemakers are and like that we aren’t over policing their area. They see the retaliation on social media and they are willing to help us.”

Being visible, approachable, and proactive was described as key: *“Be present. Marked, in uniform, showing up. Stopping people, introducing ourselves, and telling them WHY we are here. Better messaging – saving people vs. locking people up.”*

Several officers noted that being able to be proactive has changed the community’s willingness to cooperate. *“Overall community support – they know us, so they are willing to help, which is a change,”* one officer said. *“The community feels we are getting results so they want to be proactive.”* Officers stressed that the chief’s emphasis on community-oriented policing has played a major role in building trust.

“Our new Chief is community oriented – lots of community engagement. Now we actually have a community policing model, and trying to actually earn trust... and its going a lot better than expected – a lot of trust in our community. We do a lot of work in neighborhoods, and because of that, the community is willing to do the work too.”

Despite these positive developments, officers highlighted gaps in community resources, especially for young people. *“Nothing for juveniles to do here,”* one said bluntly, while another added, *“we need more community supports and activities – no real kid-oriented programming.”* Officers recognized that long-term community safety depends not only on law enforcement presence but also on building constructive outlets for youth.

Overall, participants portrayed community engagement as a relative strength. While challenges remain, they stressed that local residents generally support the police, value their efforts to target offenders, and respond positively to transparent, proactive engagement. As one officer summarized, *“Community engagement is going well – don’t have the overall cop hate. We have trust. No major assholes giving us a bad name. We just need to help people learn how to communicate.”*

Technology

Following the discussions surrounding issues within their Departments and communities in relation to violent crime, staff from the CPP asked law enforcement participants about what was working well in their localities. The overwhelming response to this question, from all Ceasefire localities, was the tremendous impact of the implementation of technology, in particular the use of automatic license plate readers, or FLOCK.

“FLOCK and other tech has been a game changer. We are fortunate in our department to be well equipped.”

“Leaning into technology has helped the Department, FLOCK is ‘gangbusters’ - it is huge for stolen vehicles, wanted people, missing people. It cuts our investigative time.”

Law Enforcement Needs

To conclude each focus group, CPP staff prompted law enforcement participants to share their most pressing needs within the Department, concerning violent crime or in general. Law enforcement from all Ceasefire Virginia localities reported the need for more **funding for technology** (FLOCK, cameras, mobile device forensic tools), as they considered the technology to have the greatest benefits to their departments.

“We need more FLOCK - it aids in fast tracking our investigations.”

“Technology helps a lot, more would help.”

The next most common need was more **funding for equipment**, to include vests, fleet (vehicles), weapons, and tactical gear. Several law enforcement officers pointed out that while Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) grants for law enforcement agencies are beneficial, they often restrict funding for equipment, such as fleet. Another commonly raised need was for a **statewide pursuit policy**. Several officers lamented their own department's policy restricting pursuits and shared frustrations with the inconsistencies with neighboring jurisdictions and Virginia State Police.

Cost of Crime Calculator

In addition to violent crime trends and hot spot analysis, the Community Safety Survey, and law enforcement focus groups, the CPP was also asked to examine the return on investment (ROI) of two crime reduction investments made as part of the Ceasefire initiative. The first was a media campaign designed to reduce anti-retaliatory gun violence in Ceasefire cities. The second was an investment in automatic license plate reader (ALPR) technology. This section of the report examines the ROI for these initiatives. To begin the ROI analysis, staff from the CPP first developed a Cost of Crime Calculator, modeled on the framework established by Miller and colleagues in 2021.

The Miller Framework

Miller and his colleagues have spent years developing solutions to the difficult to measure aspects of the cost of crime in the U.S. In 2021, Miller and colleagues published the article “Incidence and Costs of Personal and Property Crimes in the USA, 2017” in the *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis*.²⁴ This paper built on years of experience in cost of crime estimation research and relied on decades of data to achieve its goal of estimate the cost of crime in the U.S. by incident type. Specifically, Miller and colleagues found that crime cost the U.S. \$2.6 trillion in 2017 with violent crimes accounting for 85% of these costs. The Miller framework has been modified and used in various analyses, to include the Commonsense Institute—a non-partisan non-profit organization which has conducted cost of crime analyses for several states building off the framework established by Miller and colleagues.²⁵ In each analysis, adjustments to the Miller framework were made to accommodate the nuanced differences of the state being analyzed, including how crime data are collected and mapped onto the Miller framework crime categories for which costs are available. These reports adjusted the Miller framework costs for inflation. Similarly, all findings presented by the CPP reflect 2025 dollars, adjusted for inflation.

The Miller framework attempts to capture all associated costs of crime into one model. As detailed in a 2017 report,²⁶ the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) outlined the challenges involved in determining the financial costs of crime, including

²⁴ Miller, T. R., Cohen, M. A., Swedler, D. I., Ali, B., & Hendrie, D. V. (2021). Incidence and Costs of Personal and Property Crimes in the USA, 2017. *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis*, 12(1), 24–54. doi:10.1017/bca.2020.36.

²⁵ https://www.commonseminstituteus.org/colorado/research/crime-and-public-safety/the-cost-of-crime-and-its-economic-impact-on-colorado-crimes-impact-on-the-economy-and-residents#_Toc139982627

²⁶ <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-732.pdf>

difficulties measuring avoidance behavior (and its market effects), pain and suffering due to victimization, and fear of crime. Additionally, this paper mentions more complex intangible costs such as psychological effects on the family and communities of offenders, second generation costs (like the increased likelihood of victims becoming offenders), and “overdeterrence” (like restricting legal behavior in reaction to criminal conduct). In an attempt to capture the multi-dimensional nature of the cost of crime, the Miller framework reflects numerous cost measures to present a holistic cost of crime. All costs detailed in the Miller framework are considered tangible costs with the exception of Quality of Life. The cost include:

- Medical
- Mental Health
- Productivity
- Property Loss
- Public Services
- Adjudication & Sanctioning
- Perpetrator Work Loss
- Quality of Life

Medical

Medical costs include emergency transport, hospital services, prescriptions, rehabilitation, home health care, medical equipment, and professional services. Based on Miller 2017, an established US injury cost model to compute the lifetime medical loss per victim was applied to the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Program national discharge samples dataset to estimate the cost of injuries in 2014 U.S. dollars then converted through inflation in 2025 U.S. dollars.²⁷

Mental Health

Mental health costs were derived from a survey of mental health providers administered in 1993. The Miller framework considers that crime related mental health costs may be higher than estimated in their framework due to the increase in mental health care that has taken place since 1993. However, the authors also acknowledge that mental health costs may also have come down in meaningful ways due to prison diversion efforts and lower average time served since 1993.

²⁷ Corso, P. S., Mercy, J. A., Simon, T. R., Finkelstein, E. A., & Miller, T. R. (2007). Medical costs and productivity losses due to interpersonal and self-directed violence in the United States. *American Journal of Preventive Medicine*, 32(6), 474–482. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2007.02.010> ; Zonfrillo, M. R., Spicer, R. S., Lawrence, B. A., & Miller, T. R. (2018). Incidence and costs of injuries to children and adults in the United States. *Injury epidemiology*, 5(1), 37. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40621-018-0167-6>

Productivity

Productivity costs include wages, fringe benefits, housework, and school days lost by victims and their families. Productivity lost by co-workers and supervisors recruiting and training replacements for disabled workers, worrying about an injured co-worker, etc., and by people stuck in traffic jams caused by drunk driving crashes is also included in this category. Lastly, it includes insurance claims processing costs and legal expenses incurred in recovering productivity losses from drunk drivers and their insurers.²⁸ These costs were then estimated by applying methodology in Zonfrillo et al. (2018) and Miller et al. (1996) to HCUP data.

Property Loss

The cost of property damage is defined as the value of property damaged and of property taken and not recovered, plus insurance claims administration costs that arise in compensating victims' property losses.²⁹ The majority of this data is from the *National Crime Victimization Survey*³⁰ and includes costs for identity theft and vandalism, fraud data from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) survey *Victimization of Persons by Fraud*.³¹

Cost of Public Service

Public service costs are an estimate of police costs per police-reported crime taken from Hunt and colleagues (2019)³² and additional costs. This category also includes additional costs for emergency transport services for victims of rape, robbery, assault, arson, and murder as well as victim assistance program costs including the activities of Victim Services Agencies and Child Protective Services agencies such as foster care for maltreated children removed from their homes, special education for maltreated children, and services aimed at reintegrating families with maltreatment problems.

²⁸ Miller, T. R., Cohen, M., & Wiersema, B. (1996). *Victim costs and consequences: A new look* (NIJ Research Report, NCJ 155282). U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/victim-costs-and-consequences-new-look>

²⁹ AA

³⁰ <https://bjs.ojp.gov/data-collection/ncvs>

³¹ <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/153727NCJRS.pdf>

³² Hunt, P. E., Saunders, J., & Kilmer, B. (2019). Estimates of Law Enforcement Costs by Crime Type for Benefit-Cost Analyses. *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis*, 10(1), 95–123. doi:10.1017/bca.2018.19

Adjudication and Sanctioning Costs

Adjudication and sanctioning costs include the estimated cost of courts (including public defenders, prosecutors, judges, and juries) per reported crime, jail and prison, probation and parole officers, and diversion programs.³³

Perpetrator Work Loss

The cost of perpetrator work loss per offense includes lost wages of the offender and their family as well as lost tax revenue and productivity based on methodology from Miller and colleagues (1996) and McCollister and colleagues (2010).³⁴

Quality of Life

Quality of life represents the monetary value of pain, suffering, and overall lost quality of life defined by cost based on the “willingness-to-award” methodology in conjunction with unintentional injury costs to prevent double counted costs (Zaloshnja et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2017; Zonfrillo et al., 2018). The “willingness-to-award” methodology subtracts the medical and wage losses from punitive damages to estimate non-economic loss by injury type through a regression equation where the sum of past and future monetary loss was the dependent variable, and the independent variables were primarily the types of injuries (Miller et al., 2017).

Table 4 shows the average cost of various crimes, by cost category, in 2017. These estimates include crimes that were and were not reported to police. Due to costs associated with reporting crimes to the police – investigations, adjudications and sanctioning – the costs between reported and unreported crimes can differ.

³³ <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/victim-costs-and-consequences-new-look>

³⁴ McCollister KE, French MT, Fang H. The cost of crime to society: new crime-specific estimates for policy and program evaluation. Drug Alcohol Depend. 2010 Apr 1;108(1-2):98-109.

Table 4: Cost of Crime by Category

	Medical	Mental Health	Productivity	Property Loss	Public Services ^a	Adjudication & Sanctioning	Perpetrator Work Loss	Subtotal: Tangible Costs	Quality of Life	Total
Murder	\$12,735	\$11,976	\$1,828,638	\$197	\$148,832	\$478,072	\$177,869	\$2,658,319	\$5,150,836	\$7,809,155
Rape	\$1,835	\$4,108	\$4,575	\$176	\$25	\$852	\$351	\$11,923	\$214,518	\$226,441
Police-Reported	\$3,333	\$6,504	\$7,178	\$176	\$901	\$44,660	\$18,409	\$81,161	\$319,632	\$400,793
Other Sexual Assault	\$706	\$1,580	\$1,760	\$68	\$51	\$328	\$135	\$4,627	\$82,507	\$87,134
Robbery	\$1,436	\$156	\$3,401	\$1,279	\$647	\$6,754	\$2,905	\$16,578	\$11,145	\$27,723
Police-Reported	\$1,959	\$196	\$4,639	\$1,285	\$1,321	\$13,784	\$5,928	\$29,112	\$14,656	\$43,768
Assault	\$1,734	\$177	\$1,192	\$44	\$1,891	\$2,705	\$1,002	\$8,745	\$20,581	\$29,326
Police-Reported	\$2,090	\$403	\$2,292	\$79	\$4,315	\$6,172	\$2,286	\$17,635	\$21,149	\$38,784
Intimate Partner Violence ^a	\$727	\$193	\$1,336	\$65	\$13	\$269	\$207	\$2,810	\$25,440	\$28,251
Child Maltreatment ^{b,c}	\$9,708	\$3,891	\$1,443	\$7	\$12,180	\$11,358	\$0	\$38,586	\$40,734	\$79,320
Arson	\$2,647	\$45	\$3,389	\$19,519	\$4,002	\$2,596	\$505	\$33,008	\$6,430	\$39,438
Impaired Driving Crash	\$3,719	\$432	\$17,022	\$7,848	\$78	\$1,088	\$107	\$30,294	\$53,449	\$83,743
Other Impaired Driving	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$9	\$1,088	\$107	\$1,204	\$0	\$1,204
Burglary	\$0	\$0	\$23	\$1,641	\$240	\$386	\$384	\$2,675	\$0	\$2,675
Police-Reported	\$0	\$0	\$39	\$2,882	\$582	\$935	\$931	\$5,369	\$0	\$5,369
Larceny/Theft	\$0	\$0	\$15	\$465	\$678	\$1,935	\$170	\$3,263	\$0	\$3,263
Police-Reported	\$0	\$0	\$31	\$1,052	\$901	\$2,570	\$226	\$4,780	\$0	\$4,780
Motor Vehicle Theft	\$0	\$0	\$102	\$6,214	\$565	\$1,552	\$606	\$9,039	\$0	\$9,039
Police-Reported	\$0	\$0	\$118	\$7,219	\$715	\$1,964	\$767	\$10,783	\$0	\$10,783
Fraud	\$0	\$0	\$57	\$1,854	\$73	\$52	\$16	\$2,053	\$0	\$2,053
- Fraud (FTC)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$2,736	\$22	\$15	\$5	\$2,778	\$0	\$2,778
- Fraud (identity theft)	\$0	\$0	\$141	\$573	\$148	\$105	\$32	\$999	\$0	\$999
Buying Stolen Property ^d	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1,321	\$5,385	\$1,570	\$9,422	\$0	\$9,422
Vandalism	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$390	\$23	\$688	\$248	\$1,349	\$0	\$1,349
Weapons Carrying ^d	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$79	\$2,573	\$1,073	\$3,725	\$0	\$3,725
Prostitution/Pandering ^d	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$79	\$257	\$108	\$444	\$0	\$444
Drug Possession/Sales ^d	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$5,046	\$3,599	\$1,502	\$10,147	\$0	\$10,147
Gambling ^d	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$79	\$257	\$108	\$444	\$0	\$444
Liquor Laws ^d	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$79	\$1,228	\$512	\$1,819	\$0	\$1,819
Drunkenness ^d	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$79	\$1,228	\$512	\$1,819	\$0	\$1,819
Disorderly Conduct ^d	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$79	\$1,228	\$512	\$1,819	\$0	\$1,819
Vagrancy ^d	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$79	\$1,228	\$512	\$1,819	\$0	\$1,819
Curfew/Loitering Violations ^d	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$79	\$1,228	\$512	\$1,819	\$0	\$1,819
All Other Non-traffic Offenses ^d	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$79	\$257	\$165	\$501	\$0	\$501
All Violent Crime	\$2,438	\$1,665	\$3,565	\$149	\$2,328	\$3,201	\$757	\$14,055	\$77,055	\$91,110
Impaired Driving	\$1,208	\$140	\$5,527	\$2,548	\$31	\$1,088	\$107	\$10,649	\$17,355	\$28,004
All Non-Violent Crime	\$0	\$0	\$44	\$1,499	\$274	\$433	\$89	\$2,349	\$0	\$2,349
All Personal Crime	\$544	\$339	\$1,009	\$1,280	\$672	\$1,016	\$245	\$5,103	\$16,191	\$21,294

^a Public services include police, fire, EMS, victim services. Violent crimes are rape, other sexual assault, robbery, assault, intimate partner violence, child maltreatment, and arson.

^b Excludes cases police reported as assaults.

^c Annual costs per child maltreated.

^d No national incidence estimates available; based on number and costs per offense of incidents reported to police.

Limitations of the Miller Framework

Miller and colleagues emphasized the known limitations of their methodology. Specified limitations include:

- Omission of the cost of preventing and avoiding crime (e.g., enhanced lighting, burglar alarms).
- Omission of the cost of crime-related fear to communities.
- Excluded sexual contact between prison and jail inmates and facility staff.
- Outdated cost data updated through the rise of inflation.
- Cost estimates are based on a national average and are not available at the state or local level.

CPP highlights the following additional limitations of this analysis:

- Relies solely on police reported data (where the Miller framework includes estimates of crimes not reported to police).
- Omits crimes reported to police for which the Miller framework provides no costs (e.g., animal cruelty).

Cost of Crime in Virginia

The numbers below are based on Virginia’s 2024 incidence of crime data provided by Virginia State Police and the CPP’s modified Miller framework. Table 5 details the overall cost of police-reported crimes in Virginia. It shows that \$8.9 billion dollars were spent or lost as a result of police-reported crimes that took place in 2024. Approximately 69% of these costs are attributable to violent crime. That table also shows that police-reported crimes in 2024 cost each household in Virginia \$2,626 with violent crime accounting for \$1,800 of that cost. Lastly, the table shows that a 1% reduction in crime (across all measured crime types) would save the Commonwealth \$89.3 million.

Table 5: Cost of Crime in Virginia

Cost of Crime in Virginia, 2024	
All Police Reported Crimes Cost	\$8.9 Billion
Police Reported Violent Crimes Cost	\$6.1 Billion
Cost per Virginia Household (All)	\$2,626
Cost per Virginia Household (Violent)	\$1,800
A 1% Reduction in All Police Reported Crime would save	\$89.3 Million

The cost of crime calculator developed for this project allows CPP to examine violent crime costs by Ceasefire locality (Figure 4). Richmond (\$643.6 million) and Norfolk (\$464 million) experienced the highest costs of violent crime in 2024.




Figure 4: Cost of Violent Crime per Locality

Petersburg (\$11,926) and Portsmouth (\$10,518) experienced the highest costs of violent crime per household in 2024 (Figure XX).




Figure 5: Cost of Violent Crime, per Household, per Locality

Table 6 details the costs of violent crime by type. Costs are based on 2024 violent crime data provided by Virginia State Police. All amounts are reflected in 2025 dollars. The highest costs in each category are bolded. Richmond had the highest costs of murders and robberies, Norfolk had the highest cost of rapes, and Newport news had the highest costs of assaults.

Table 6: Cost of Violent Crime, by Type, by Locality

Ceasefire City	Total Costs, Police-Reported Violent Crimes	Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter Costs	Police-Reported Rape, No Child Sex Abuse Costs	Assault Costs	Police-Reported Robbery Costs	Violent Crimes, Cost Per Household
Hopewell	\$67.8 Million	\$62.6 Million	\$2.4 Million	\$2.4 Million	\$316,417	\$7,200
Petersburg	\$177.1 Million	\$156.6 Million	\$8.9 Million	\$9.6 Million	\$2.1 Million	\$11,926
Richmond	\$643.6 Million	\$595 Million	\$17.8 Million	\$16.7 Million	\$14.2 Million	\$6,301
Lynchburg	\$121.3 Million	\$93.9 Million	\$18.6 Million	\$6.8 Million	\$1.9 Million	\$4,227
Chesapeake	\$181.2 Million	\$125.3 Million	\$25.4 Million	\$23.1 Million	\$7.3 Million	\$1,962
Emporia	\$13 Million	\$10.4 Million	\$403,948	\$1.6 Million	\$506,268	\$5,843
Hampton	\$185.4 Million	\$156.6 Million	\$16.6 Million	\$7.2 Million	\$5.1 Million	\$3,211
Newport News	\$299 Million	\$230 Million	\$21.8 Million	\$37.5 Million	\$9.9 Million	\$3,942
Norfolk	\$464 Million	\$386.2 Million	\$40 Million	\$26.4 Million	\$11.3 Million	\$4,912
Portsmouth	\$417.4 Million	\$375.8 Million	\$14.1 Million	\$17 Million	\$10.4 Million	\$10,518
Danville	\$105.1 Million	\$94 Million	\$6.1 Million	\$3.7 Million	\$1.4 Million	\$5,640
Martinsville	\$25 Million	\$21 Million	\$2.4 Million	\$1.6 Million	\$126,567	\$4,451
Roanoke	\$169 Million	\$114.8 Million	\$34.3 Million	\$14.1 Million	\$5.8 Million	\$3,891

Return on Investment (ROI): Ceasefire Media Campaign

The OAG invested \$2,898,834 on a digital and out of home advertising (OOH) campaign designed to prevent gun violence in Ceasefire Virginia localities. Prevention investments like these have some evidence of success in academic literature, but there is also evidence of limited effectiveness.

- **Cost-Effectiveness of Prevention vs. Punishment:** Prevention strategies consistently deliver higher returns on investment than traditional punishment approaches. Developmental programs like Perry Preschool and Nurse-Family Partnership yield returns up to \$12.90 per dollar spent.³⁵ California's SACPA program demonstrated savings of approximately \$926 million between 2001-2006 by diverting non-violent drug offenders to treatment rather than incarceration.³⁶
- **Media Campaign Effectiveness Varies by Context and Design:** Community mobilization strategies showed benefit-cost ratios of \$8.22 per dollar invested.³⁷ Targeted poster campaigns in Bogotá resulted in a 24% reduction in premeditated crimes with 93% recall rates. Forensic property marking campaigns with prominent signage reduced domestic burglaries by 10-50% in treated areas.³⁸
- **Limited Effectiveness:** Mass media campaigns for alcohol-impaired driving showed only a 2% mean decrease in self-reported incidents.³⁹ European Crime Prevention Network campaigns had neutral evaluation outcomes despite 56.5% participation rates.⁴⁰

³⁵ Welsh, B. C., & Farrington, D. P. (2015). Monetary value of early developmental crime prevention and its policy significance. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 14(4), 673-680.

³⁶ Bartos, B. J. (2016). *The diminishing returns of incarceration: Evidence from California's Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act (SACPA)* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California). eScholarship. <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3p9844v2>

³⁷ Nussio, E., & Norza Céspedes, E. (2018). Deterring delinquents with information: Evidence from a randomized poster campaign in Bogotá. *PLOS ONE*, 13(7), e0200593.

³⁸ <https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/117625/1/WRAP-public-confidence-reduction-impact-forensic-property-marking-Hodgson-2018.pdf>

³⁹ Zatoński, M., & Herbeć, A. (2016). Are mass media campaigns effective in reducing drinking and driving? Systematic review – an update. *Journal of Health Inequalities*, 2(1), 52–60

⁴⁰ Vermeulen, G., Hardyns, W., Pauwels, L., & Dieussaert, J. (2020). *Strategic market position of the European Crime Prevention Network* (Report). European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN).

Madison + Main Campaign

To implement the Ceasefire Virginia media campaign, the OAG contracted with Madison + Main (M+M), a marketing agency in Richmond, Virginia that is highly experienced with designing and implementing similar campaigns for state government agencies, including campaigns aimed at reducing opioid addiction and preventing drunk driving.

With stakeholder input, M+M designed a campaign with the following key attributes:

- Out of Home Advertisements
 - Billboards
 - Lawn Signs
 - Bus Wraps
- Digital Advertisements
 - YouTube Ads
 - Spotify Ads
 - Facebook Ads

Targeted digital advertisements, or anti-retaliatory ads, were deployed following shooting events to reach individuals at risk of retaliatory violence. Certain digital advertisements were released after shooting events to reach potential retaliatory shooters.

Campaign Results⁴¹

Media campaign success in prevention campaigns are typically measured by the number of impressions. Media impressions are defined as the number of times a digital ad is displayed on a screen or played via audio, which is reported as the Designated Market Area (DMA) level. Due to the unique aspects of retaliatory gun violence, prevention campaigns cannot be easily compared to campaigns designed to prevent other negative social behaviors such as drunk driving or opioid addiction. Therefore, CPP cannot

⁴¹ Note: Due to delay in data delivery, a full analysis of the media campaign will be completed for the final report.

determine if the number of impressions generated by this campaign is considered “strong” or “poor”. Table 7 details the total number of impressions for the Ceasefire Virginia media campaign.

Table 7: Ceasefire Virginia Media Impressions, by Type

Ceasefire Virginia Media Impressions	
Website Visits	134,000
Youtube Videos Views	956,000
Digital Ad Impressions	56,800,000
Digital Ad Clicks	113,000
Paid Video Views	7,000,000
Spotify Ad Streaming Reach	55,542
Facebook Page Impressions	139,000
Anti-Retaliatory Zip Codes Targeted	399
Radio Sports Run	4,563
TV/Cable Ads Run	1,890
Billboard Impressions	3,718,208

Cost per Impression: Comparisons

To situate and contextualize the media campaign, staff from the CPP conducted an extensive literature search for similar public awareness campaigns, and their associated costs and measures of success, launched recently across the United States. Table 8 details similar campaigns with similar budgets that can be compared to the Ceasefire Virginia media campaign, to highlight the effectiveness. All campaigns selected have similar digital and out of home advertising strategies conducted by government entities in North Carolina, South Dakota, and Kentucky. Campaigns have been orchestrated within the last 5 years with budgets ranging from \$1.4 million - \$3.6 million. Information availability on specific source impressions varies, but the total number for each campaign has been verified. Some campaigns with similar structures have been excused from this comparison given the lack of published impression data. The Ceasefire Virginia media campaign is comparable to cost and impressions to similar statewide awareness campaigns.

Table 8: Media Campaign Impressions

Name of Campaign	Cost	Timeline	Total # of Impressions*	Cost per Impression
NC S.A.F.E (NC) ⁴²	\$2,261,442	May 2023 - January 2024	82.56 million	\$0.027
"Meth. We're On It." (SD) ⁴³	\$1,400,000	November 2019 - May 2020	14 million	\$0.10
"Better Without It" (KY) ⁴⁴	\$3,600,000	October 2024 - June 2025	20 million	\$0.18
Ceasefire Virginia	\$2,898,834	January 2024 - December 2024	56.8 million**	\$0.051

*Data sourced from the Madison and Main Ceasefire Virginia Data Dashboard.

⁴² <https://www.ncsafe.org/>

⁴³ <https://shortyawards.com/5th-socialgood/meth-were-on-it-the-anti-drug-campaign-that-worked>

⁴⁴ <https://www.betterwithout.it/kentucky/>

Scenario Based Return on Investment

Prevention efforts are notoriously hard to measure. This is due to the simple fact that researchers and evaluators are unable to count how often a negative behavior *does not* occur. Interventions aimed at preventing negative behaviors such as drunk driving, substance misuse, or retaliatory shootings fall into this category. However, valuable attempts can be made to estimate the effectiveness of prevention interventions based on reasonable, data-based assumptions. Such efforts allow analysts to support decision makers as they seek to allocate resources appropriately to prevention activities.

For this Return on Investment (ROI) analysis, staff from the CPP developed several scenarios to conceptualize the impact of the media campaign as it relates to the overall investment by the OAG. The three scenarios offered below highlight the overall goals of Ceasefire Virginia - reducing violent crime and gun violence. The ROI is informed by the Virginia Cost of Crime Calculator, a modified version of the Miller framework. All amounts are reflected in 2025 dollars.

- **ROI if 1 Murder Prevented:** If the Ceasefire media campaign prevented one retaliatory shooting resulting in a death across the state, the return on investment would be 260%. This number is derived from comparing the cost of the media campaign (\$2,898,834) to the savings from avoiding 1 murder (\$10,438,538), a profit of \$7,539,694.
- **ROI if 10 Shootings Prevented:** If the Ceasefire media campaign prevented 10 shootings, none of which resulted in a death, the return on investment would be -89%. This number is derived from comparing the cost of the media campaign (\$2,898,834) to the savings from avoiding 10 assaults (\$329,779), a loss of \$-2,569,055.
- **ROI if 100 Shootings Prevented:** If the Ceasefire media campaign prevented 100 shootings, none of which resulted in a death, the return on investment would be 13.8%. This number is derived from comparing the cost of the media campaign (\$2,898,834) to the savings from avoiding 100 assaults (\$3,297,794), a profit of \$398,96.

Media Campaign ROI	
If 1 Murder Prevented...	
• Media Campaign ROI	260%
• For every media \$1 spent	\$3.60 saved
If 100 Shootings Prevented....	
• Media Campaign ROI	13.8%
• For every media \$1 spent	\$1.14 saved

Return on Investment (ROI): Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR)

Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs) have been in use by law enforcement for over 20 years: “By 2016, 68% of municipal law enforcement agencies with over 100 sworn officers had acquired ALPRs.”⁴⁵ A 2024 report by the Virginia State Crime Commission revealed that 82% of large law enforcement agencies (that responded to a DCJS survey) and 74% of medium law enforcement agencies had procured ALPRs.⁴⁶ ALPRs are used by most law enforcement agencies, local governments, and private businesses in order to scan license plates and check them against vehicle records. ALPRs can be placed either at a fixed location or be mobile. When a vehicle passes an ALPR, the camera takes a photo of the vehicle and license plate, records the date, time, and location, and then stores this information in a computer system. Law enforcement may use this information to support investigations, such as identifying stolen vehicles, locating cars connected to criminal activity, or finding missing persons.

ALPR Evaluative Approaches

To determine appropriate measures for inclusion in the ALPR ROI analysis, CPP staff conducted an extensive literature review of recent ALPR assessments in the United States.

- **Follow-Up Arrests:** In 2016, an evaluation of ALPRs was conducted in Cincinnati that compared follow-up arrests between officers using ALPRs and those relying on traditional policing methods. The analysis found that “...officers using ALPR technology produce the same outcomes (in terms of follow-up arrests) for \$ 825,216 less in a given month, compared with traditional policing.” These savings were then compared to the cost paid for ALPRs leading the authors to conclude that the investment pays for itself within one month (Ozer, 2016).
- **Case Clearances:** In 2024, an ALPR company, Flock Safety, evaluated the effectiveness of its own cameras and software in the hands of law enforcement officers to determine effectiveness of their products. This evaluation focused on clearance rates, distinguishing ALPR-assisted clearances from clearances that did not involve ALPRs. This analysis found that “...a typical

⁴⁵ Ozer, M. (2016). Automatic licence plate reader (ALPR) technology: Is ALPR a smart choice in policing? *The Police Journal*, 89(2), 117-132. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032258X16641334> (Original work published 2016)

⁴⁶ <https://vscc.virginia.gov/2024/Dec16Mtg/DCJS%20-%20Findings%20from%202024%20Surveillance%20Technology%20Equipment%20Reporting.pdf>

agency that acquires an additional owned Flock Device per Sworn Officer may expect a 9.1% increase in ALPR-assisted clearance rate.”

Ceasefire Virginia ALPR ROI Analysis

To facilitate the ALPR ROI analysis, CPP staff used an hourly savings approach to gauge the impact of the ALPR investment. The CPP analysis estimates the hourly savings associated with vehicle location using ALPRs as compared to traditional policing methods. Specifically, this analysis relies on the hours required to locate stolen vehicles with and without ALPR technology. Though ALPRs can be used to track and locate vehicles involved in any crime, vehicle theft cases are plentiful in all localities, well documented, and nearly always involve license plates for ALPRs to act on.

It should be noted that limitations to the Hours Saved approach exist. Limitations include:

- **Unclear baseline** - It is very hard to estimate the average amount of time it takes to locate a vehicle using traditional policing methods. Estimates vary widely between a couple hours to a few days, to vehicles never being found.
- **Unclear time savings** - An estimate of hours saved from using ALPR technology does not appear to exist. The CPP team did not conduct any primary data collection to determine the estimated hours saved by using ALPR technology for this project. The CPP did ask all Ceasefire Virginia localities if they track the use of ALPR technology. While many did, there was no measure of time savings associated with this training.
- **Deterrence** - A primary benefit of surveillance technology in crime prevention is crime deterrence. This analysis does not examine the savings from crimes prevented by the presence of ALPR technology.
- **High Quality Evidence** - Another benefit of ALPR technology is its ability to provide high quality evidence in the judicial process. This analysis does not examine the savings to the judicial process as a result of ALPR evidence.

Vehicle Theft Data

The National Insurance Crime Bureau states “34% of recovered stolen vehicles are recovered on the same day as the theft and 45% are recovered within two days.”⁴⁷ FBI data from 2004 (below), before the wide adoption of ALPRs, shows a stolen vehicle recovery rate of 63%. In 2023, after the wide adoption of ALPRs, NICB reported a recovery rate of 85% for stolen passenger vehicles.”

FBI Vehicle Theft Statistics 2004-2018											
Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Crime Clock*	25.5	25.5	26.4	28.8	33.0	39.7	42.8	44.1	43.7	45.1	45.7
Average value	\$6108	\$6173	\$6649	\$6755	\$6751	\$6505	\$6152	\$6089	\$6019	\$5972	\$6537
Dollar loss (in billions)	\$7.5	\$7.6	\$7.9	\$7.4	\$6.4	\$5.2	\$4.5	\$4.3	\$4.3	\$4.1	\$4.5
Total thefts	1,237,851	1,235,859	1,192,809	1,095,769	958,629	795,652	737,142	715,373	721,053	699,594	689,527
Recovery rate %	63.0	62.1	59.0	57.9	57.2	56.8	56.1	52.3	53.9	54.8	55.2
Unrecovered**	458,005	468,391	489,052	461,319	410,294	343,722	323,606	341,233	332,406	316,217	308,909

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	
Crime Clock*	44.5	41.1	40.9	42.2	
Average value	\$7001	\$7680	\$7,708	\$8,407	
Dollar loss (in billions)	\$4.9	\$5.9	\$5.9	\$6.3	
Total thefts	707,758	765,484	773,139	748,841	
Recovery rate %	58.2	58.4	59.1	59.3	
Unrecovered**	295,909	318,442	316,213	304,778	

* Seconds between thefts

**These figures are dynamic and change almost daily as vehicles are recovered nationwide with regularity

Source: Compiled by the National Insurance Crime Bureau from data supplied by the FBI, Crime in the United States, Uniform Crime Reports

Though data in the table above ends at 2018, NICB reports that “vehicle theft rates have risen steadily since 2019” and documents 1,020,729 vehicle thefts in 2023.

ALPR Usage and Adoption

Currently, all Ceasefire Virginia localities utilize ALPR technology within their jurisdiction. The CPP obtained ALPR data from FLOCK Safety on ALPR usage in select Ceasefire Virginia localities, with permission from Ceasefire law enforcement agencies. Table 9 details ALPR usage in select Ceasefire Virginia localities.

⁴⁷ <https://www.nicb.org/news/news-releases/vehicle-thefts-united-states-fell-17-2024>

Table 9: FLOCK usage in select localities

Ceasefire City	Sworn Officers with ALPR Access	ALPR Adoption per Sworn Officer	Number of Searches
Martinsville	41	90.2%	31,284
Roanoke	201	40.3%	13,571
Danville	113	59.3%	887
Lynchburg	140	61.4%	14,503

ALPRs have a return on investment of 127.6%. Table 10 details the findings from the ALPR ROI. This estimate assumes that \$1.3 million was spent on the ALPR technology and it was used to reduce the search time for 15,439 motor vehicle thefts in Virginia by 4 hours. This is the number of motor vehicle thefts that occurred in 2023. Importantly, ALPR technology can be used to accelerate vehicle location in regards to many crimes, not just motor vehicle thefts. As a result, this ROI estimate is likely conservative. The ROI is informed by the Virginia Cost of Crime Calculator, a modified version of the Miller framework. All amounts are reflected in 2025 dollars.

Scenario Based ROI

Estimating hours saved by ALPR technology is difficult. As this analysis was not a traditional Return on Investment (ROI) analysis, staff from the CPP developed several scenarios to conceptualize the impact of the use of ALPR as a time saving measure as it relates to the overall investment by the OAG. The ROI is informed by the Virginia Cost of Crime Calculator, a modified version of the Miller framework. All amounts are reflected in 2025 dollars.

- **ROI if 1 Hour Saved:** If the ALPR investment saved 1 hour of a police officer's time on a case it would be a savings of \$47.90. Assuming a price of \$1,300,000 for the ALPR investment, and 15,439 motor vehicle theft cases (the number of incidences from 2023), the ROI of this investment would be -43.1%. This number is derived from comparing the cost of the ALPR investment (\$1,300,000) to the savings from reducing 1 hour per case (\$739,528), a loss of \$-560,472.
- **ROI if 4 Hours Saved:** If the ALPR investment saved 4 hours of a police officer's time on a case it would be a savings of \$191.60. Assuming \$1,300,000 for ALPRs and 15,439 motor vehicle theft cases, the ROI of this investment would be 127.6%. This number is derived from comparing the cost of the ALPR investment (\$1,300,000) to the savings from reducing 1 day per case (\$2,958,112), a profit of \$1,658,112.
- **ROI if 8 Hours (1 Day) Saved:** If the ALPR investment saved 8 hours (1 work day) of a police officer's time on a case it would be a savings of \$383.20. Assuming \$1,300,000 for ALPRs and 15,439 motor vehicle theft cases, the ROI of this investment would be 355%. This number is derived from comparing the cost of the ALPR investment (\$1,300,000) to the savings from reducing 1 day per case (\$5,916,255) a profit of \$4,616,225.

Conclusion

Return on investment analyses for behavior prevention media campaigns and ALPR investments can be tricky when there is limited data. This analysis takes a scenario-based approach to both efforts and uses reasonable assumptions where necessary to supplement unknown or unknowable data points. We hope this analysis serves decision makers well in their efforts to thoughtfully allocate resources.

Table 10: Ceasefire ALPR ROI

ALPR ROI	
Total Cost to Employer, per officer avg.	\$99,636
Average Police Officer Salary in Virginia	\$61,276
Benefits (38.5% of total compensation)	\$38,360
Average Police Officer Cost per Hour	\$47.90
ROI - Assuming 4 hours saved on 15,439 motor vehicle theft cases and a cost of \$1.3 million on ALPR technology	127.6%
For every ALPR \$1 spent	\$2.28 saved

Next Steps

As mentioned throughout the report, this is a preliminary report evaluating the implementation of Ceasefire Virginia by the Office of the Attorney General. Issues with data availability have delayed the evaluation, and subsequent report, considerably. Most data sources have confirmed to be delivered by the end of September 2025. Staff from the CPP will then complete remaining analysis and submit a final report before the end of 2025. The final report will include the following analyses that are absent from this report:

- A full evaluation of the Ceasefire Virginia Media Campaign.
- A full evaluation of the use of FLOCK ALPRs in select Ceasefire localities.
- An expanded violent crime trend analysis.
- A full law enforcement focus group analysis.