



MEDIA RELEASE

The MDA's proposed system for Guam will not bring security but will have a significant impact on our lives

Hagåtña, GU. July 28, 2025 – The U.S. Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (EIAMDS) in Guam overstates the effectiveness of the technology and brushes aside the significant impact it will have on the people of Guam. This proposal would introduce a new level of weaponization to our community, while offering minimal benefits in terms of increased security. It is also clear that the proposed EIAMDS would increase the ongoing displacement of the people of Guam from available housing while continuing the degradation of native habitat.

The EIS is best characterized as promoting an uncertain, if not false, sense of security. At the same time, it ignores the lives of the people the military says they are protecting. The overarching nature of these DOD plans is revealed by what they offer specifically and what is left unsaid. It offers a militarized technological solution to complex strategic, diplomatic, and economic challenges, while the people of Guam are offered a frontline seat to conflict with no regard for their concerns over housing, environmental degradation, or personal safety.

PCIS Chair, Robert Underwood

Following are high-level notes on the MDA's EIS.

1. **EIAMDS is not a shield.** The EIAMDS has been noted by DoD to [“deter adversaries from attacking the island”](#) and [“complicate adversary plans”](#) but at the end of the day it is only designed to manage [“small-scale, coercive attacks.”](#) This EIAMDS capability [falls short of addressing a complex saturation attack](#) from a peer adversary. The U.S. military's expectations about Guam not being available in conflict (evidenced by the development of divert airfields and upgraded post access from the [CNMI](#) to [Yap and Palau](#) and the [US Air Force's ACE doctrine](#)) underscore the known limits of the EIAMDS in Guam.
2. **EIAMDS is not security.** The MDA's claim that the EIAMDS is to “defend the people, infrastructure, and territory of Guam” is not credible. In addition to the recognized limits of the proposed system, even casual observers of recent and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine understand that shelters for the population are an essential element of population security. The U.S. government has not offered any program or even a study to shelter the people of the territory of Guam. While billions of dollars are proposed for military research development and operations, \$NONE have been suggested for population shelters and related resiliency infrastructure.
3. **The EIS does not evaluate the impact of conditions under which the EIAMDS would be used.** The EIS “only analyzes peacetime operations; operations related to launch situations

were not addressed because these activities are considered to be an act of war, and outside normal operations.” By not addressing the purpose for which the EIAMDS is intended, the EIS overlooks issues that increase insecurity in populated areas adjacent to the 16 proposed sites around Guam. This approach also allows the MDA to avoid discussion of the movement of missile launchers and reloading operations that are certain to expose the civilian population to additional insecurity in the event of conflict.

4. **The peacetime impacts on Guam are significant, but the EIS either punts or bulldozes through.** Socioeconomic impacts (housing, medical services), biological resources (native forests and species) will experience impacts that the EIS distorts. In the case of housing and medical services, the EIS passes the buck. Although the impacts are identified as significant, no budgeted solutions are proposed. Given the now decade-long military acknowledgement that its dependency on Guam to house its personnel has created housing insecurity, the EIS rings hollow in its claim that “DoD is addressing military need for housing on Guam in a holistic approach.” On biological resources, the EIS makes pretensions about “mitigation” when ongoing mitigation practices for native flora are proving to be ineffective. Significant impacts of the “peacetime” EIAMDS on the people of Guam are effectively brushed aside.
5. **Significant questions remain about “transparency.”** The [MDA](#) and [other DoD officials](#) have promoted the idea that the EIAMDS EIS is about “transparency.” The EIS, however, does not address any of the critical questions about the EIAMDS’ architecture or its impact on Guam’s housing situation, which were prepared by Lincoln Labs in a Congressionally mandated review. The EIS’ failure to include the Lincoln Labs report—which was focused on the technical aspects and socioeconomic impacts of the EIAMDS—is a noted failure in transparency. Claims of “transparency” are cheapened when purpose-driven analysis is shielded from public view.
6. **EIAMDS components and architecture remain in question.** The plan to build out the EIAMDS over ten (10) years raises questions about technology depreciation and system effectiveness when complete. However, key components of the proposed system are not yet ready for prime time. Development and production of the [AN/TPY-6 radar \(brought to Guam for the staged Guam Flight\) has been cancelled](#). The Sentinel A4, [initially projected to be delivered in late 2022](#), has recently had [full rate production delayed until mid-2026](#). The effectiveness and delivery of new components complicate what is already seen as a complex technological challenge. Independent assessors have consistently found that MDA’s testing approach to the EIAMDS has not been “[operationally realistic](#).” The U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee recently noted that it was “[troubled by the apparent lack of progress by DOD to effectively integrate the various lines of effort that are expected to comprise IAMD OG architecture](#).”

For further information, commentary or requests for interviews, contact Leland Bettis (lelandbettis@pcisguam.com).