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8	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA	
9	FOR THE COUNTY OF VENTURA	
10	FOR THE COUNTY OF VENTORA	
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12	LESLIE RULE,	Case No.:
13	Dlaintiff	COMPLAINTEOD
14	Plaintiff, v.	COMPLAINT FOR:
15	CITY OF OJAI,	1) INDEMNIFICATION
16	Defendant.	2) DECLARATORY RELIEF
17	Delendant.	
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23	PLAINTIFF LESLIE RULE ("PLAINTIFF" or "RULE") hereby alleges:	
24	1. This complaint seeks to compel the Defendant City of Ojai to defend and	
25	indemnify Rule against all claims brought against her in <i>Byrne et. al. v. Rule et al.</i>	
26	Super Ct. No.2023CUMC008352, Court of Appeal No. B332962 (consolidated with	
27	Ct. of Appeal No. 335099) and to reimburse her for all cost and fees incurred in	
28	said actions to date.	
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COMPLAINT FOR:1) INDEMNIFICATION2) DECLARATORY RELIEF - 1

#### **PARTIES**

- 1. Plaintiff Leslie Rule is a duly elected member of the Ojai City Council ("the Council"), having been employed in that capacity since December 13, 2022.
- 2. Defendant City of Ojai ("the City") is an incorporated city in the County of Ventura, in the State of California.

#### JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this controversy as a court of general jurisdiction within the County of Ventura. This Court has jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief under to Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") §§ 525 and 526, and jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief under CCP § 1060.
- 4. Venue is proper under CCP § 395.5, as Defendant City of Ojai is located in the County of Ventura, both parties are residents of and do business in Ventura County, and all conduct giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in this County.

### STATEMENT OF FACTS

- 5. In the Fall of 2022, the Ojai City Council enacted an ordinance ("the Ordinance") approving a real estate Development Agreement with a local developer by a vote of 4-1, with only the Mayor, Betsy Stix, voting NO.
- 6. In early December 2022, Sabrina Venskus, a local Ojai attorney, led a successful effort to gather signatures to place a ballot initiative (the "Initiative") on the City's election calendar. The express purpose of the Initiative was to overturn the City's Ordinance adopting the Development Agreement.
- 7. Days later, Sabrina Venskus also filed a lawsuit on behalf of a local nonprofit called "Simply Ojai" against the City. The lawsuit also sought to invalidate the Ordinance and Development Agreement on the alleged basis that the Ordinance and Development Agreement violated CEQA (the Cal. Environmental Quality Act) ("the CEQA Litigation").

- 8. The week of December 5, 2022, Mayor Stix, exercising her unilateral prerogative to add items to the City Council's agenda, added a closed session item to discuss the now already-pending CEQA Litigation. She set the first closed session for December 13, 2023, the first day of the newly elected Council.
- 9. Thus, the first of three closed sessions convened were set to convene on the very first day Rule and two other new Councilmembers took office without Rule's knowledge or participation.
- 10. The Council's Closed Session Agenda Statement, drafted by City Attorney Matthew Summers, cited the CEQA Litigation and Government Code § 54956.9(2) ("already-filed" litigation) as its only legal authority and they repeated this formulation for the two succeeding closed sessions.
- always *precedes* a closed session, a member of the community suggested that Mayor Betsy Stix *recuse* herself from all City matters concerning the CEQA Litigation and plaintiff Simply Ojai. He pointed out that the Mayor's election campaign *manager* was also the manager and sole employee of Simply Ojai; her assistant election campaign *treasurer* was Simply Ojai's treasurer; the Simply Ojai treasurer had contributed money to the Mayor's re-election campaign; and that Mayor Stix's position on the Development Agreement matched with the position of Simply Ojai the plaintiff in the CEQA Litigation—which was *adverse* to the City's now-established law, *i.e.*, the Ordinance.
  - 12. Mayor Stix ignored the suggestion to recuse herself.
- 13. The Council then went into closed session. Immediately, Mayor Stix recommended that the City hire a new law firm she had lined-up to "look at the Development Agreement with a new set of eyes" not to defend or advise the City on the CEQA litigation. Hiring new counsel to "look at the Development Agreement" was not covered by the closed session Statement.

- 14. When Councilwoman Suza Francina asked the Mayor to respond to the conflicts of interest raised in the open session (also not covered by the closed session Statement), Councilman Andrews Whitman ("Whitman"), yelled at her, "Suza, you're talking out of your ass!" Councilwoman Leslie Rule came to her defense, saying the conflicts were a real issue and merited a response. Whitman barked at Rule, "You're talking horseshit."
  - 15. Whitman's profanity-laced outbursts silenced the two councilwomen.
- 16. The Council then (tacitly) agreed to accept Mayor Stix's suggestion to hire her recommended new law firm.
- 17. It is unknown who assigned what to the new law firm, but rather than addressing the CEQA Litigation, the new firm's work and the Council's ensuing discussions conducted in closed session focused on thwarting the developer and blocking the Development Agreement. These issues included but were not limited to rezoning the relevant real estate, exercising eminent domain over it, applying historical status to it, purchasing it, rescinding the Ordinance and Development Agreement, and the merits of proceeding with the Initiative.
- 18. Over the course of these three closed sessions, it became apparent to Plaintiff Rule that something was horribly amiss. One key moment came when she posed a question to the new outside lawyer to the effect of: "What is your take on the CEQA allegations of the complaint?" The new lawyer admitted she had not been engaged to review or research the CEQA issue. This was thus not an attorney-client communication relating to the CEQA Litigation; it was an admission that none of the statements made in the closed session were attorney-communications relating to the City's defense of the CEQA Litigation at all.
- 19. Consequently, at the end of the third closed session on January 10, 2023, Plaintiff Rule pointedly asked Mayor Stix, "Where did you get the recommendation for this law firm?" After a long awkward pause, Mayor Stix

responded, "Sabrina." That is, Sabrina Venskus – the lawyer for the *plaintiff*, *Simply Ojai*, in the CEQA Litigation – *against* the *defendant City*.

- 20. Plaintiff Rule was outraged; it was like the proverbial farmer hiring the fox to watch the hen house. She asked Stix, "You didn't think that the fact that the recommendation for a lawyer to represent the City [the *defendant*] came from the *plaintiff's* lawyer was a fact worth mentioning to us beforehand?"
  - 21. Mayor Stix then sheepishly responded, "Sabrina is my friend."
- 22. In the week after that closed session, Rule sought the advice of the City Attorney, telling him she felt that these improprieties *had* to be made public, that the people of Ojai needed to know about these things. Summers told Rule she could not disclose ANYTHING from the closed sessions.
- 23. Summers' advice to keep silent did not sit well with Rule, who then consulted three other lawyers, all of whom said she was on solid legal ground in disclosing these improprieties.
- 24. Accordingly, on January 24, 2023, in *open session* of the Council, Plaintiff Rule made a public statement reporting non-confidential information about the closed sessions. Rule then handed out a written statement that included Councilman Whitman's profanity-laced outbursts at Rule and another councilwoman, along with Mayor Stix's admission that she had secretly colluded with Venskus, lawyer to the plaintiff, to hire a law firm to give advice to the defendant City. Rule, through her lawyer, also submitted one letter to the City Attorney at the beginning of that Council meeting and one follow-up letter about the meeting a few days later.
- 25. In response to her disclosures in the open session, the City Attorney Matthew Summers, Andrew Whitman, and Mayor Stix shouted Rule down, accusing her of willfully violating the Brown Act and her duty of confidentiality.
- 26. On numerous occasions thereafter, over many months, these three repeated the erroneous assertion that Rule had willfully violated the Brown Act.

27. The City Attorney's false accusations fueled and gave legal cover to Mayor Stix and Councilman Whitman to relentlessly attack and level spurious accusations against Rule. Rather than acknowledge and apologize for his improprieties, Whitman publicly insinuated that Rule was corrupt, trying to curry favor with the real estate developer. Mayor Stix echoed those sentiments.

## THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY CITES THE CITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE BROWN ACT IN ALL THREE CLOSED SESSIONS

- 28. Due to public outcry over the improprieties of their Council, the District Attorney for Ventura County became involved in the controversy. After interviewing City witnesses and reviewing the documentary evidence, the District Attorney cited the City for violations of the Brown Act in all three closed sessions.
- 29. The Council was thus compelled to enact a resolution stating that it would commit itself to not continue violating the Brown Act.

### THE MAYOR'S FRIEND FILES A LAWSUIT AGAINST RULE

30. On April 28, 2023, seven residents of the Ojai Valley – led by attorney Sabrina Venskus (Mayor Stix's "friend") – filed a lawsuit ("the Lawsuit") against Rule (and her attorney Jon Drucker, who had served her *pro bono* from January through April) for Declaratory Relief, alleging that Rule had violated the Brown Act when she disclosed – in a public Council Meeting and letters relating thereto – information from the three closed sessions of December 2022 and January 2023.

### RULE REQUESTS THE CITY DEFEND HER IN THE LAWSUIT

- 31. In May 2024, Plaintiff Rule filed a written request and motion (the "Motion") for the City to provide her with a defense to the Lawsuit.
- 32. In mid-June, the City Council considered Rule's Motion and denied it. Rule recused herself while Stix and Whitman the people whose improprieties were exposed by Rule voted NO. With only four City council members voting, Rule's Motion could not receive a majority of votes. It was defeated.

- 33. Mayor Stix admitted voting not to provide Rule with the defense to which she was statutorily entitled because she considered Rule a political enemy, stating that Rule had "violated the law" and citing support of her followers, saying, "I don't feel comfortable using taxpayer money to pay her [Rule's] legal fees."
- 34. Councilman Whitman justified his vote by falsely claiming Rule's statements about the illegal meetings were made "maliciously."
- 35. City Attorney Summers neglected to advise Stix and Whitman that their feelings of hurt were irrelevant to the legal issue at hand. Neither did he inform Whitman that "actual malice" has a specific legal definition hinging on the "knowing falsity" of facts in the relevant statements. And no one has ever argued that Rule's statements were *false* (only that she should not have made them).

### RULE INCURS ATTORNEY FEES IN THE LAWSUIT

- 36. Rule was thus forced to proceed with her own defense of the Lawsuit brought by Sabrina Venskus and her seven plaintiffs. Rule retained the Law Office of Drucker and the Law Office of Stephen Johnson, to defend her.
- 37. The Lawsuit was entitled *David Byrne*, et. al v. Leslie Rule, et. al., Ventura Superior Court Case No. 2023CUMC008352.
- 38. Councilman Whitman joined in the Lawsuit, filing a declaration *in* support of the plaintiffs against Rule. In his declaration, he insinuated Rule made her disclosures to curry favor with the developer and damaged the ability of the Council to effectively operate in closed session. And he misstated (under oath) the nature of the District Attorney's actions, for which the Court reprimanded him. Additionally, Whitman's declaration was so outlandish that, of its **22** paragraphs, the Court struck **21** of them.
- 39. Rule successfully brought an anti-SLAPP motion and prevailed at the trial-court level. SLAPP is an acronym used to describe "Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation." Thus, the Hon. Ben Coats found Rule was sued solely to interfere with Rule's right and duty of public participation.

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- 40. Judge Coats awarded fees and costs to Rule but the award was calculated to cover only those fees specifically related to the anti-SLAPP motion and not Rule's entire defense.
- 41. The plaintiffs then appealed from both anti-SLAPP ruling and the fee award. The City has not paid Rule for any of the expenses she has incurred for actions she took solely in her official capacity to decry illegal closed sessions, which both the Ventura County District Attorney and Ventura Superior Court Judge Coats *confirmed* to be illegal *and the City has been forced to renounce*.

### RULE INCURS ATTORNEY FEES IN THE APPEAL

- 42. Rule continues to incur attorney fees on appeal. The City has persisted in refusing to indemnify her. The City has also refused to defend the Court conclusion that Rule acted in full compliance with her rights and duties.
  - 43. The Lawsuit and the Appeal are referred to here as "the Litigation."
- 44. In the course of the Litigation, Rule has incurred attorney fees in the sum of \$352,042.85 to date, with fees continuing to accrue as the Appeal continues.

# THE COUNCIL MAKES FINDINGS ON RULE'S REQUEST FOR INDEMNIFICATION

- 45. In the Fall of 2024, after having incurred hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt to her attorneys, Rule moved in the Council for *indemnification*.
- 46. At the City Manager's urging, the Council retained an outside law firm to advise it on the issue of indemnifying Rule.
- 47. On December 1, 2024, the Council met in closed session and made three findings: 1) Rule had acted within the scope of her authority, 2) Rule did not commit fraud, corruption or act with actual malice; but 3) Rule was "adverse" to the City and thus concluded that it was *optional* for the City to indemnify her.
- 48. Shocked by the Council's bad faith finding of adverse interest, Rule withdrew her Motion and the Council did not vote on the request itself.

### RULE APPLIES TO THE NEW COUNCIL FOR INDEMNIFICATION AND IS AGAIN REFUSED

- 49. With a new mayor having been elected in November 2024, Rule applied again to the Council for indemnification. The matter came on for hearing in closed session on February 4, 2025.
- 50. The new Council proceeded on the *prior* Council's *finding* that Rule was "adverse" to the City, and did not agree to indemnify Rule.

### THE CITY ASSERTS A LEGAL POSITION DEVOID OF MERIT

- 51. The City's legal position is devoid of legal merit. In citing an alleged "adverse interest," it appears to base its position on Government Code § 995(a)(3), which is the only place the word "adverse" is even mentioned in any of the statutes dealing with defense or indemnification. Government Code § 995.2(a)(3) provides in relevant part:
  - (a) A public entity **may** refuse to provide for the **defense** of a civil action ... brought against an employee ... if the public entity determines any of the following:

\* \* \*

(3) The defense of the action ... by the public entity would create a specific conflict of interest between the public entity and the employee.... For the purposes of this section, "specific conflict of interest" means a conflict of interest or an adverse ... interest, as specified by statute or by a rule or regulation of the public entity.

### (Emphasis added)

- 52. First, this statute (and its mention of "adverse interest") is irrelevant: This statute relates to decisions to *defend* an employee not to *indemnify* one. The City had already refused Rule's *defense* in June 2023.
  - 53. At no time has the Council identified any "specific conflict of interest."

- 54. The Ventura Superior Court has held that Rule did NOT violate the Brown Act; it is thus indisputable that Rule's actions never conflicted with the interests of the City of Ojai.
- 55. Finally, there is NO "statute, rule or regulation of the public entity" **specifying** any conflict of interest (or adverse interest) that conceivably exists.
- 56. For any and all of these four reasons, the City's refusal to fully indemnify Rule is without merit and made in bad faith.
- 57. Meanwhile, Plaintiff Rule's legal expenses continue to accrue in the Litigation -- and in her dealings with the City.

### FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

### for Indemnification Against Defendant City of Ojai Under Government Code § 852.2

- 58. Plaintiff hereby realleges all the paragraphs above by this reference.
- 59. Defendant City is obligated to fully indemnify Plaintiff Rule against any and all liability for legal expenses and costs that she may incur in the Litigation, as well as in this action to secure her right to indemnification.
  - 60. Government Code §§ 825.2 provides in relevant part:
  - (a) Subject to subdivision (b), if an employee...of a public entity pays<sup>1</sup> any claim...against him [or her], or any portion thereof, that the public entity is required to pay under Section 825, he [or she] is entitled to recover the amount of such payment from the public entity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The law holds that the employee need not actually "pay" to be entitled to indemnification. Being liable for payment suffices. "A literal interpretation of section 852.2, subdivision (a) would also lead to great injustice for potentially innocent employees, denied a defense by their public entity employer, who nonetheless become liable for a judgment arising out of the course and scope of their employment with the public entity. Such employees would be required to pay the judgment, in many cases bankrupting themselves, before triggering any duty on the part of the public entity employer to reimburse them for their losses." *Rivas v. City of Kerman* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1120-21.

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- (b) If the public entity did not conduct his defense against the action..., an employee ... of a public entity may recover from the public entity under subdivision (a) only if he establishes that the act...upon which the claim...is based occurred within the scope of his employment as an employee of the public entity and the public entity fails to establish that he for she acted or failed to act because of actual fraud, corruption or actual malice....
- 61. The act on which Rule's claim is based occurred within the scope of her employment by the City – in and related to a public session of the Council.
- 62. Defendant City has already found that Plaintiff Rule's actions were not attributable to fraud, corruption or actual malice. Defendant City is thus estopped from asserting otherwise now.
- 63. Plaintiff Rule has been damaged and continues to be damaged by Defendant City's refusal to indemnify her for her legal expenses, which are subject to proof but are at \$352,042.85 to date.
- 64. Plaintiff Rule has also suffered irreparable damages stemming from her inability to pay her bills, as well as the physical, mental, and emotional injuries, pain, distress, suffering, anxiety, worry, shame, humiliation and indignity, as well as damages to reputation, and other non-economic damages that Defendant City has inflicted on her, in a sum to be ascertained according to proof.

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### SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

### **Declaratory Relief**

### Against Defendant City of Ojai

- 65. Plaintiff hereby realleges all the paragraphs above by this reference.
- 66. Plaintiff Rule contends that Defendant City has violated state law by denying her legal right to indemnification of her legal expenses in the Litigation.

- 67. Defendant City contends indemnifying Rule is optional and refuses to indemnify her.
- 68. A judicial declaration is thus necessary and appropriate at this time under the circumstances in order that Rule and the City may ascertain their rights and duties concerning indemnification.
- 69. Additionally, Plaintiff Rule is entitled to a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring Defendant City to comply with her reasonable and timely requests for indemnification.
- 70. Plaintiff Rule does not have an adequate remedy at law, as her claim for indemnification requires immediate remedial action to prevent further irreparable damages stemming from her inability to pay her bills, as well as the physical, mental, and emotional injuries, pain, distress, suffering, anxiety, worry, shame, humiliation and indignity, as well as damages to reputation, and other non-economic damages that Defendant City has inflicted on her, in a sum to be ascertained according to proof.

### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Leslie Rule seeks judgment against Defendants and each of them, on all causes of Action for:

- 1. An order declaring (a) that the Defendant City comply with Plaintiff's reasonable requests for indemnification of her legal expenses as they come due, and (b) that Defendant City be prevented from depriving Plaintiff Rule of her right to indemnification from the City.
- 2. An order pursuant to Plaintiff Leslie Rule's standing as a City Council member and employee, ordering:
  - A. Defendant City of Ojai to comply with the orders of this Court to indemnify Plaintiff in accordance with Government Code § 825.2.

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